Short answers questions

Short Answer Questions How does the Role of Narrative Identity Play in Ethics? Charles Taylor (25-52) suggests that narratives are linked to the idea that humans evaluate themselves to make sense of their environments. The evaluations are limited to the constraints of human biographies. Taylor points that’s narrative identity is the result of strong evaluation and narrativity encompasses self-interpretation. This is to say that Taylor advocates the role of narrative identity with the personal interpretations of how valuable a reader considers his/her ethical standards. In order to sustain one’s identity, narrative and ethical perspectives are crucial. This is also interpreted to mean that narrative identity is subject to personal interpretation of ethical identity and can be largely considered to be an illusionary identity of the reader.
Is Abortion Morally Permissible?
According to Thompson (65), the degree at which abortion can be considered morally permissible is constrained by factors that make it morally impermissible. Thompson (65) argues that abortion is morally permissible in circumstances such as when the necessary precautions to avoid pregnancy are taken but eventually conception occurs either way. In this case, the parents of the fetus can consider abortion as refusal to take responsibility for an outcome they are not ready to take responsibility of. On the other hand, Thompson (66) argues that since it is problematic to point at what point a fetus is considered to have a moral identity, it is rational to assume that fetuses are humans from the time of conception, thus, they have moral identities which make abortion the killing of a human. Thus, regarding the two counterarguments, abortion is both morally permissible and impermissible. By applying the Personal Identity Theory of Reductionism, which considers the psychological continuity affecting identity judgments.
Works Cited
Thompson J. J. “ A Defense of Abortion.” Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 1, No. 1: pp. 65-66
Taylor, Charles. Sources of Self. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989: pp. 25-52