The federalist number ten

The Federalist Number Ten The Federalist Number Ten In his 1787 publication, Federalist Number Ten, James Madison argues that the chief vice of popular government is its susceptibility to problems instigated by factions that are special interest groups (Madison, 1787). Majority factions, in supporting their interests, sometimes undermine the rights of fellow citizens-minority factions. Madison (1787) is justified to argue that majority factions may oppress the minority for self-gain, prompting the necessity for a government to ensure fairness in a democratic society.
Madison argues that two strategies are feasible to eradicate the effects of faction, in a democratic society (Madison, 1787). First strategy proposed by Madison is eliminating the causes of factions. Second, Madison provides a proposal involving controlling the effects of factions in a democratic society. Eliminating the formation of factions in the society may be in two ways. The first viable option is eliminating liberty that permits factions to form or developing similar interest. The second option is to discourage the passions and opinions in people to control the effects of factions (Hamilton, 2006). According to Madison, the causes to factions are impracticable to eliminate. Therefore, the most-feasible strategy is controlling the effects of factions in a democratic society.
A minority faction in a pure democracy poses insignificant threat since it is easy to outvote and suppress it. On the contrary, the majority faction has power to control the government completely. Therefore, modification is necessary to any democracy to protect the minority from oppression by minority. According to Madison, allowing citizens to make their laws promotes the risk of promoting self-interest at the expense of public interests. In such situations, majority society members oppress the minority to their advantage (Hamilton, 2006).
James Madison asserts that citizens have different self-interests, and every society forms factions that sometimes harm fellow citizens. The Articles of Confederation never controlled the adverse effects of factions on the nations effectively prompting the necessity for a new government. Madison concludes that a diverse nation ruled by the majority can thrive if it factors a fair consideration for all.

References
Hamilton, A. (2006). The Federalist. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Books.
Madison, J. (November 23, 1787). The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. The Federalist Papers No. 10. Retrieved from http://thomas. loc. gov/home/histdox/fed_10. html