Iran is developing a nuclear weapons program

Task Iran is developing a nuclear weapons program Introduction The world has been plunged into chaos with various nations battling to regain superiority in the world’s list of superpower nations. The accumulation of dangerous weapons had first appeared among the soviet nations during the cold war era when Russia had been suspected of producing nuclear weapons. These are the world’s most deadly arsenal, and its effects have led to strict laws being passed to limit its spread. Iran has witnessed participation in these conventions to promote global peace through signing treaties that limit its activities in the creation of dangerous weapons. If these agreements are not reached at, there is probable threat of a universal instability that may lead to an outbreak of a major war. The strength of the nations is measured by their ability to create super weapons that are superior within the ranks of other nations. This paper argues out the credibility of the nuclear production in Iraq and articulates the measures that may be implemented to sustain the existing global peace. In the 1980s, a serious war broke out between Iran and their neighbors Iraq. There was a high casualty number with the victims having to face the implication of nuclear weapons. The year 2007 assessment by the US intelligence revealed that the Iranian country had been working on a nuclear weapon, and its design had been ended in 2003. The intention for the creation of the weapon was not clear, but it indicated that its completion was still not close. The nation’s capability to generate a complete threatening nuclear program was suggested to be minimal, but recent developments have articulated the production of the weapons as a threat. President Obama confirmed the production of weapons by Iraq when questioned about the possibility of an airstrike by Israel and suggested that the country should stop its nuclear production (Joscelyn). The countries are adamant on the need to reduce nuclear production threat, and the US has supported legislations that limit the nuclear threat on the global level through international forums (Halevy). Though no concrete evidence presented itself, the will of the president to act candidly and express the desire to create a lasting solution to the problem. Iran, however, were not willing to admit their threat to the world and have not corporate to reduce the threat that their actions have presented. The mystery presented around the nuclear production by Iran has had limited evidence to point out these fete to the society. The fact that the US president could address the public on the issue meant that there could be a possibility of ongoing production. The normal world super powers have presented similar approach to protect their civilians from intelligent information, to reduce the insecurity threats that may be the result of the measures. The measure by Iraq to deny any involvement in the nuclear production, and yet it is proved that they have developed an interest in its development has developed suspicion among nations. Majority may argue on the theory that they have all the materials that are necessary for the production of a nuclear weapon and are most likely in production (Oppel Jr.). Iran has argued against enriching its uranium deposit level for the production of nuclear weapons. No nation could collect uranium in the level that Iran possesses for commercial use for its citizens. It can create nuclear weapons but articulates the development for peaceful purposes refraining from the conflict that the weapons may generate. Iran has belonged to the NPT since 1970 and has supported a no tolerance level to the nuclear weapons development. Iran has since developed nuclear infrastructure that involves the mining of uranium, its conversion and enrichment. The UN has since passed regulations that limit Iran from pursuing its uranium enrichment programs. However, the tension was rejuvenating when Iran revealed the development of another enhancement facility next to its city of Qom in 2009. Tehran had failed to reduce its threat to construct a nuclear plant, and this has prompted the development of tension within the other nation members of NDT. It has denied interest in the production of nuclear weapons articulating that, as an NPT member, it has zero tolerance on the production of the dangerous weaponry. The Iranian president had confirmed the connection when he had announced that his country had been loading nuclear rods into one of the factories at Tehran. The threat for Iran to produce the destructive weapons is immense. It is a question of the right time that enough evidence could be drawn to link the country with a nuclear weapon creation. This threat has led to the reaction of the international countries and organization to call off the production of the nuclear production by Iran to sustain peaceful relations. Currently, Iran explains that they are enriching the uranium level for fuel production, but it is evident that the similar step can be articulated to weapon production. Conclusion It is evident that where all facts concur to point towards the nuclear production by Iran, it would ultimately support my topic of the evident production. Iran’s claim of not being interested in weapon production is negated by its ability to possess the weapon production equipments (Santis 1). President Obama’s concern of Iran’s nuclear production program is evidence that there has been intelligence involved confirming the threat. Moreover, the enrichment of uranium level in Tehran has confirmed all suspicions of Iran’s ability to create nuclear weapons. Works Cited Halevy, Efraim. Iran’s Achilles’ Heel. The New York Times. 2012. Web. 16 February 2012. Available at: Joscelyn, Thomas. Obfuscating Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program. The weekly standard. 2012. Web. 16 February 2012. Available at: Oppel Jr., Richard. THE CAUCUS; Gingrich Says Iran Poses Dire Danger. The New York Times. 2012. Web. 16 February 2012. Available at: Santis, Yitzhak. Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program: What can be done about it. Jewish community Relations Council. Vol. (3): pp. 1-4. 2008.