Gender and the law in the workplace

Smith’s fellow employees affirmed their perception of the increased manifestation of his feminity characteristics.
Smith’s employer resorted to a scheme that would propel him to resign, but instead after they suspended him on ‘ professional grounds, he sued.
The Holding
Smith’s first case was dismissed as a feeble attempt to use stereotyping and sex discrimination as a conduit around his claim, which the statute did not proscribe (378 F 3d 566, 486). The second appeal granted support, holding that Smith had an actionable say for gender stereotyping based on his masculinity non-conforming demeanor and his transsexualism.
Conclusion
Gender prejudice based on sex is equated with insupportable discrimination on the bias of sex stereotypes, which requires one to display prominent femininity or masculinity qualities. The court ruling concluded that Smith’s inadequacy to match typical male characteristics was the main intent behind his discrimination (378 F 3d 566, 487).
The Reasoning
The ruling exemplified that employers rights should not be hinged on their sex-specific dressing. It also includes appearance codes, and excuse sex-specific appointments in categories that prove necessary to hire only one sex (378 F 3d 566, 489). Se stereotyping according to gender is an unacceptable bias that should not subject a transgender victim to professional discrimination.
Verdict
The second ruling was fair and just because a transgender victim should not be discriminated due to gender conformity stereotypes. Their decision to cross over to their proffered sex based on medical prescriptions should be respected as part of their universal rights. The employers should not create a gender-conforming dress code that defines positions in its functional structure.
SCHROER V. BILLINGTON
The Issue
Diane Schroer was born male. During the interview, Schroer was dressed in traditional male attire and was hired. Before beginning duty, Schroer informed Preece that she was under medical care for gender dysphoria that would transform her into a full woman. After ‘ serious considerations’, Preece informed her of his resolution that was for the sake of the service; she was not ‘ fit’ for the position based on her new gender transformation, hence her position was filled (577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 633). The employer felt sufficiently convinced that despite Schroer’s twenty-five years of military service, her transformation would jeopardize her competence in her new roles.
Facts
Diane Schroer was a male-to-female transsexual. Although born male, Schroer had an internal psychological sense as a female. Schroer was sufficiently qualified for the position. Schroer did not use her new name in the application because at that time, and she was still using her legal male name (577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 635).
Holding / Conclusion
The modified objection alleged that Schroer’s non-selection resulted from Preece’s response on seeing photographs of Schroer in women’s attire expressly, that Preece held that Schroer looked like a man in women’s clothing relatively to what he supposed a woman should look like (577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 637).
Schroer’s victory was tethered on the fact that transformation would not violate the ‘ fitness clause in the statutes because, by proof of experience, she had already served the military for twenty-five years. Her transformation was duly informed by a professional prescription and was not part of the evaluation in the hiring process.
Reasoning
It is unlawful in the part of an employer dismissing an individual or rather discriminate against any person regarding reimbursement. The law also inculcates conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, religious conviction, sex, or nationality (577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 638). Gender discrimination was clearly pointed by The Library. Who argued that some of their nondiscriminatory concerns were about her capacity to maintain or timely receive security consent, her fidelity, and the perspective that her changeover would divert her from her core duties.
Verdict
Title VII was used by The Library as a scapegoat to their discriminatory conviction on Schroer’s case: They argued that a hiring decision based on transsexuality was not unlawful discrimination under the legislation.
KIRKLAND ANALYSIS
Smith’s case was leveraged on the employer’s use of discriminatory schemes to disqualify Smith as a Lieutenant in the Fire Department (Anna, 87). Title VII was the vantage point, merely because it did not regard transgender discrimination in the clause.
Kirkland further argues that, after Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against women; for instance, because they do not wear makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex (Anna, 94). The author further reiterates that an employer who discriminates against men simply because they do not wear makeup is also engaging in sex discrimination because it wouldn’t occur but for the victim’s sex.
Discrimination against the plaintiff is prejudice to their decision to identify with their choice of sex. The law should not legalize the plaintiff’s discrimination on the bias of non-conformity to sexual characteristics of male or female gender (Anna, 102). The defendants termed ‘ sex stereotyping’ as a Price Waterhouse loophole. However, the Supreme Court gave a phenomenal opinion when it characterized the term as discriminative and hence helped reinstate the plaintiff’s position.