Military readiness in wars: actions in mogadishu research paper example

– Factors affecting the military’s readiness to handle hostilities in the case of Actions in Mogadishu
– Tradition on humanitarian relief
– Inadequate understanding of the social-cultural context of the war context
– Lack of an adequate reason for involvement
– Role of the NCO in preparing soldiers for combat operations
– Conclusion
– References

Introduction and thesis

For a long time now, the readiness of our disciplined forces to tackle emerging hostilities remains a puzzle to many. This can be attributed to the fact that many at times, our defense forces have been caught off guard, particularly during spontaneous outbreak of hostilities vented against them by the enemy’s forces. While it is true that our armies training are intense and merged with different intelligence related strategies, our battlegrounds remain futile with attacks that could have been easily detected and resolved promptly by our forces. In the year 19982, on the month of August amidst a looming humanitarian crisis in Somalia, our military sought to offer adequate interventions, which is often referred to “ Actions in Mogadishu.” Precisely, the U. S instigated the Operation Provide Relief, but this did not offer adequate solutions as armed groups restructured their operations and began stealing the relief supplies put on offer for the affected populations (Chapman, 1996). Overall, actions in Mogadishu as one of the operations launched by the U. S military identifies a number of factors that affect U. S military’s readiness to execute its functions, particularly at the initial stages of conflicts.

Discussion:

Factors affecting our military’s readiness to handle hostilities in the case of Actions in Mogadishu
Tradition on humanitarian relief
More importantly, the U. S military has and continues to have a tradition on humanitarian relief. Precisely, Americans are often considered compassionate persons; hence, they always do what is within their confines to offer humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations. Adoption of this tradition has and continues to jeopardize our soldier’s readiness to handle hostilities (Potgieter & Liebenberg, 2012). This is because as the soldiers focus more on offering humanitarian assistance to the victim of war and other conflicts, the enemies get an ample time to wage attacks on them. Evidently, this was the case during the Actions in Mogadishu, whereby a significant focus on humanitarian relief by the U. S forces culminated in the untimely death of close to thirty soldiers, eight Air Force recruits, and four marines. Indeed, the army had managed to save many populations from the jaws of hunger and starvation, but this humanitarian quest pushed the soldiers to be involved in civil strife in Somalia, which cost the lives of the above mentioned soldiers.

Inadequate understanding of the social-cultural context of war

Another notable factor during Actions of Mogadishu that depicts our military’s unpreparedness to handle emerging hostilities is their inadequate understanding of cultural issues that are relevant to the populations involved in conflicts. The attack on the safe house by the American soldiers during the Actions of Mogadishu occurs as one of the factors that indicate the military’s inadequate understanding of the various social-cultural issues that are highly regarded by the populations involved in war. Notably, attack on the safe house by the United States Forces has been hypothesized as one of the primary factors that fueled war in Somalia. By the close of the year 1992, the U. S army attacked a safe house, where elders allied to the Aideed’s Habar Gidir clan were holding a meeting. This meeting was official as it had even been announced in various media platforms, and it was aimed at identifying ways of ending the looming crisis in Somalia. Despite this, the U. S military launched an attack, resulting in the death of close to 73 of the elders attending the meeting (Potgieter & Liebenberg, 2012).
As a result, the Somali people were angered, and they became unified against the U. S military. Certainly, the mistaken attacks on the safe house depict discrepancies in our intelligence. In fact, it shows our military’s unpreparedness to handle different issues that culminate during the onset of conflicts. Arguably, this episode became the turning point in the Actions in Mogadishu as things became worse than it was. Angers amongst the Somalis was even vented on foreign journalist; whereby four were killed as they tried to cover the safe house attacks by the U. S military (Kelly, 1996). If the U. S military team were competent, they would have noted that the meeting was supplementing the U. S military efforts to bring lasting peace in Somalia. Precisely, the elders meeting in the safe house were on the side of the U. S military; hence, played a comprehensive role in curbing hostilities waged against the U. S soldiers. Certainly, this shows that lack of an understanding of social cultural issues such as the essence of elders by the U. S military is one of the factors that depict our unpreparedness to handle hostilities at war times.

Lack of adequate reason for involvement

For a long time now, questions have merged as to whether it is always necessary for the U. S military to get involved in various wars and conflicts. This was also the case during the Actions in Somalia, whereby the reason for the U. S military being their still beckons for answers. Indeed, the main cause of U. S military presence in Somalia was to offer aid to close to 1. 5 million refugees and prevent no more deaths and starvation as the death tolls resulting from the same had stretched to half a million people. For this purpose, the U. S military was going to Somalia, not for a combat mission, but to offer relief to vulnerable populations. However, things turned out for the worse as efforts to channel relief to the most vulnerable populations were made futile by the inter-clan warfare (Potgieter & Liebenberg, 2012). With regards to this, the U. S military was not ready to hand hostilities from the warring clans. This factor shows that the U. S military’s primary cause of being involved in conflicts and war contributes to its unpreparedness to handle emerging hostilities.
In contrast, it is important to note that the U. S military involvement during Actions in Somalia was aligned with other intentions not limited to humanitarian aid. Arguably, the U. S military had some cold war interest of Somalia and its neighboring country; Ethiopia due to the strategic location of these two countries at the horn of Africa (Chapman, 1996). With time, this became evident, and the created more resistance from Somali’s and Ethiopians. The implications of this cause of involvement were evident when troops allied to the UN forces were ambushed. This became another turning point during the Actions in Mogadishu as the mission diverged from humanitarian effort to combat mission aimed at hunting those liable for the ambush. This case shows that lack of an adequate and well explained cause of being involved in a war culminates in different tragedies the military are not prepared to handle.

Role of NCO in preparing soldiers to conduct combat operations

The role of NCO in preparing soldiers for a combat mission remains crucial as it was during the Actions in Mogadishu. Precisely, the NCO trains a significant force often connoted as the Ranger force; hence, making them ready to handle combat operation of any kind. With regards to the unpreparedness of our soldiers to handle emerging hostilities in the wake of war, the NCO remains to be blamed for failure to conduct proper coordination, which could have prevented the occurrence of calamities resulting in death of the Military soldiers and other personnel’s involved during the war. A reflection on the Action in Mogadishu shows that there is a need for more efforts by the NCO aimed at assuring success of the military in any emerging conflicts. Such successes will not come in isolation, but call for concerted efforts that would prepare the soldier for war; both at the initial stages and thereafter (Kelly, 1996).
Conclusion

References

Chapman, B. (1996). Post-cold war national security policy: A survey of the U. S. Government print and internet literature. References Services Review, 24 (3), 37-60.
Kelly, C. (1996). Limitations to the use of military resources for foreign disaster assistance. Disaster Prevention and Management, 5 (1), 22-29.
Potgieter, T., & Liebenberg, I. (2012). Reflections on war: Preparedness and consequences. Stellenbosch: Sun Media.