” Anyone who can solve the problems of water will be worthy of two Nobel prizes – one for peace & one for science.”
– John F. Kennedy
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. The fact that water is the basis of all life on the planet is well established from pre-historic times & is borne out by the various civilisations that flourished along river systems. However, due to increasing population, dwindling water resources, & demand for water from all sectors of the economy, there is scarcity & competition for water even in regions where water appears to be in abundance. Given the depleting water sources, the issue of water security & its impact on human security have assumed astronomical proportions. While the demand for fresh water is increasing day by day everywhere in the world, its supply is decreasing. So, the gap between demand for fresh water & its supply has been ever increasing globally. In this regard, a major report recently issued by the 2030 Water Resources Group including the World Bank estimated that, the gap between global water demand & reliable supply could reach 40% over the next 20 years and particularly in developing regions the water deficit could rise to 50%. Therefore, fresh water shortages are becoming a major cause of conflict both domestically as well as regionally between the states. 2. Consequent to the demise of the bipolar world in the last decade of the twentieth century & India’s economic liberalisation programme, it has steadily gained a position of importance at the world stage & in particular in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). As India looks to take its rightful place in the comity of nations, it requires to support growth & stability in its neighbourhood so as to counter the internal & external security, economic & political challenges that have emerged over the past decade due to external influences in the region. A stable & friendly South Asia is a sine qua non for India’s growth as a global power in the emerging multi polar world order. One of the most threatening issue that mars bilateral relations in South Asian region is water. The issues of cross border water distribution & mega- irrigation /hydroelectric projects affecting the lower riparian states have taken centre stage in defining the inter-state relations in light of increasing water stress & its impact on human development. 3. India as both upper & lower riparian state has come into conflict with most of its neighbours on the issue of cross- border river sharing. Even though UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1997 attempts to resolve such issues amongst riparian states, as India & Bangladesh are non signatories to this convention, the issue of distribution of water & its management is straining Indo-Bangladesh relations despite Indian attempts at reviving the relationship with Bangladesh to a new level of trust & cooperation. 4. In spite of sharing 54 rivers, India & Bangladesh have an agreement in place only for sharing of one river, the Ganges signed in 1996 (The extracts of the treaty are attached at Appendix A). This treaty rather than diffusing the water conflict has only heightened the perceived neglect of Bangladesh as a lower riparian state due to large scale desertification of areas of north west Bangladesh due to reduced discharge available at Farraka Barrage. This is due to over drawl by the states of Uttar Pradesh & Bihar as these upper riparian states were not included as part of the treaty. Thus, lack of internal water sharing agreement for Ganges River has resulted not only in threatening the survival of the Kolkata port, it has also caused straining of relations between India & Bangladesh. 5. The Teesta River which originates from Sikkim, flows through West Bengal & North West Bangladesh is increasingly becoming the focus of emotive debates on the issue of equitable water sharing between the two countries. In spite of an understanding on the sharing of the river, the dry season availability of Teesta River waters is a cause of concern for Bangladesh. The issue grabbed the lime light when the West Bengal Chief Minister refused to accompany the Indian Prime Ministers delegation to Bangladesh in September 2011 for signing of the Teesta River Water Sharing Treaty, thereby leading to a political deadlock on the issue. 6. A pro India Government in Bangladesh is essential for India to check cross border migration, tackling insurgent bases / safe havens, curbing funding support for radical Islamic groups in India & denying strategic space to other nations in the region. The issue of Teesta River water sharing though not a vital issue of conflict is now being exploited by opposition parties & anti India forces in swaying public opinion in Bangladesh. This trend if unchecked could pose a serious challenge to the improving internal security in the North Eastern states of India by bringing about an anti India regime to power in Bangladesh. With the growing cooperation between China & Bangladesh in the fields of commerce & defence, it is imperative for India to arrive at an early resolution to the Teesta conflict, so as to secure India’s national security objectives in the region.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Statement of the Problem
7. The issue of Teesta River water sharing though not a vital issue of conflict is now being exploited by opposition parties & anti India forces in swaying public opinion in Bangladesh. This trend if unchecked could bring about an anti India regime to power in Bangladesh. This in turn will cause an increase in the influence of anti India forces in Bangladesh & provide strategic space to Pakistan sponsored groups to impinge on India’s national security. It will also lead to increased environmental migration from Bangladesh further effecting demography of North Eastern states of India & thus, pose a serious challenge to the improving internal security in the North Eastern states of India.
Hypothesis
8. An early & equitable resolution for sharing of Teesta River waters will contribute to the improvement of the internal security situation in the North Eastern states of India.
Justification of Study
9. Teesta is one of the 54 rivers shared by India & Bangladesh depicted at Figure 1 at Appendix B. It originates from Sikkim, flows through West Bengal & North West Bangladesh before joining the Brahmaputra River at Fulchori. India & Bangladesh however, have an agreement in place only for sharing of one river, the Ganges. In spite of an understanding on the sharing of the Teesta River, the dry season availability of Teesta River waters remains a cause of concern for Bangladesh. The issue grabbed the lime light during the visit of Indian Prime Ministers to Bangladesh in September 2011 due to the refusal of the West Bengal Chief Minister to accompany the delegation. The issue of Teesta River water sharing though not a vital issue of conflict is now being exploited by opposition parties & anti India forces in swaying public opinion in Bangladesh. This trend if unchecked could pose a serious challenge to the improving internal security in the North Eastern states of India by bringing about an anti India regime to power in Bangladesh. 10. A pro India Government in Bangladesh is essential for India to check cross border migration, tackling insurgent bases / safe havens, curbing funding support for radical Islamic groups in India & denying strategic space to other nations in the region. With the growing cooperation between China & Bangladesh in the fields of commerce & defence, it is imperative for India to arrive at an early resolution to the Teesta conflict, so as to secure India’s national security objectives in the region. There is hence, a need for India to engage Bangladesh on the issue of Teesta water sharing on an equal footing so as to meet their legitimate aspirations, in order to secure India’s national security objectives against the backdrop of rapidly evolving multi polar world.
Scope
11. The research is limited to the study of the current sharing mechanism for Teesta River between India & Bangladesh, & its impact on the security of North Eastern states of India. For ease of assimilation, the study is organised as under:-(a)Hydrology of Teesta River Basin. The focus will be on the origins of Teesta River, its flow data & the barrages & hydro electric projects on the river.(b)Importance of Teesta River & Existing Mechanisms for Sharing Teesta Waters. The attempt will be to analyse the importance of Teesta River to the states of Sikkim & West Bengal & also its importance for India & Bangladesh. Also the current river sharing mechanism between the countries & problems in calculating net discharge of the river will be examined.(c)Current Water Sharing Laws. The UN convention on sharing of Trans Boundary Rivers & its provisions for water sharing between countries will be examined. Also, a model for water sharing will be assessed with examples of other trans boundary rivers.(d)Impact of Teesta River Sharing on Security of India. The impact of Teesta River sharing on Political stability in India & Bangladesh, the issue of migration & its effect on changing demography in North Eastern states of India, the terrorist groups operating in Bangladesh, & rising influence of China in Bangladesh will be examined.(e)Recommendations. The chapter will suggest a water sharing model & steps required for changing perceptions in both countries so as to deconflict the issue of water sharing.
Research Methodology
12. The research has been carried out by analyzing the Indian as well as Bangladeshi perspective on the contentious issues in the light of the plans of both the upper riparian & lower riparian stake holders of Teesta River. The research analyses the provisions for sharing of the Teesta River, its impact on the stake holders & the reasons for conflict. It further draws linkages between Teesta River sharing & the security of North Eastern states of India. The research on the hydrology of Teesta River, the various stake holders & water sharing laws / case studies is based on primary & secondary data collected from research papers / publications & books. The reasons for conflict & the impact on security of North Eastern states of India are derived from analytical analysis of primary data collected through questionnaires from a wide section of officers & supplemented by data drawn from other primary / secondary sources.
Methods of Data Collection
13. For carrying out the research, review of literature of a wide variety of sources was carried out & resources as mentioned below have been utilised for data collection:-(a)Research papers / journals.(b)Books on the subject by leading authors.(c)Questionnaires circulated to colleagues, Indian Defence Attaché in Bangladesh, Indian officers that have attended courses in Bangladesh & Bangladesh officers on course in India.(d)Internet sites.
CHAPTER III
HYDROLOGY OF TEESTA RIVER BASIN
14. Teesta River originates as Chhombo Chhu from a glacial lake Khangchung Chho at an elevation of 5, 280 m in the north eastern corner of the state of Sikkim in India. The glacial lake lies at the snout of the Teesta Khangse glacier descending from Pauhunri peak (7, 056 m) in north western direction. It is a perennial river, and flows through the territories of Sikkim, West Bengal in India and Bangladesh. The flow is turbulent, characterised by high velocities. Throughout its course in Sikkim, the Teesta and its tributaries flow in very narrow and deep valleys having precipitous hill slopes, except where the tributaries join the main stream. 15. The concentration of flow in the river is large and velocity of flow is high due to gorge constriction. The silt and timber charge carried due to hillside denudation is also high when the river having a width less than 200 m at Sevoke Road Bridge meets the plains of Jalpaiguri south of the railway bridge; it spills along a width of 4 to 6 km braiding itself into four well-defined streams separated by large silt fans. The river traverses the length of Sikkim before flowing into Jalpaiguri & then to Rangpur district of Bangladesh, before merging with the Brahmaputra at Fulchori. 16. The total length of the river is 414 km & it drains an area of 12, 159 sq km. Out of the total length of 414 Km, about 293 Km of the river lies in India & the remaining 121 Km in Bangladesh. Of the total drainage area of Teesta River, approximately 87% of the area lies in India & the balance 13% in Bangladesh. The river is fed by snow melt & rain water with 75% of the total rainfall that feeds the river occurring between June & September. 17. The Teesta basin includes surface bodies like rivers or lakes & underground drainage of various types. Hence, three types of surface drainage have been distinguished in the basin area as under:-(a)Precipitation of moisture or rainfall and flowing in accordance with the varied topography.(b)Drainage conspicuously confined along these streams especially during dry or non-dry periods.(c)The static water bodies being typified by seasonal flow only during floods or extreme meteorological events which are common in the Teesta drainage area.
Projects on Teesta River in India
18. Sikkim. The annual runoff of the river in Sikkim is a Table 1. However, the peak discharge has come down from 5000 m3/sec in 1972 to approximately 2200 m3/sec in 1998 showing a downward trend as shown at Figure 1 attached at Appendix B. The National Hydro Power Corporation (NHPC) of India has started planning construction of series of dams in the State of Sikkim to generate 5, 000 MW of hydropower with an investment of $ 31 billion US dollars[1]. The hydro electric power projects on Teesta River under construction / operation & the proposed projects are at Figure 2 attached at Appendix C.
Table 1: Teesta River Annual Average Runoff in Sikkim
Site
Period of Data Availability
Discharge (Million Cubic Metres)
Chungthang1976 �” 954332Sanklang1989 �” 957860Dik Chuu1984 �” 939580Khanitar1980 �” 941156919. West Bengal. Water for irrigation was first planned in the State of West Bengal in 1976 by constructing a barrage across Teesta & Gajoldoba in Jalpaiguri district (India’s TBP) for irrigating 9, 22, 000 hectares in six districts of Northern West Bengal, though the project remains incomplete. In addition, the project also aimed at generating 67. 5 MW of hydro electric power. By March 2011, most of the construction was completed & the project was able to irrigate 66, 000 hectares of land & provide 20 MW of power. As part of the project, barrages & canals were constructed as under:-(a)Barrages were constructed on Teesta River at Gajoldoba in Jalpaiguri district, on Mahananda River at Phansidewa in Darjeeling district & on Dauk River in North Dinajpur district.(b)Canals constructed were the Teesta Mahananda Link Canal (27. 5 km), Mahananda Main Canal (32. 33 km), Dauk Nagar Main Canal (23 km of the 80 km) & Teesta Jaldhaka Main Canal (24 Km of 30. 31 km). In addition, Nagar Tangan Main Canal (42. 2 km) is yet to be constructed. The schematic layout of the project & the areas proposed to be irrigated by it are at Figure 3 attached at Appendix D.(c)The peak discharge at Coronation bridge has come down from 5200 m3/sec in 1972 to approximately 3500 m3/sec in 1998 showing a downward trend as shown at Figure 4 attached at Appendix E. This discharge declines to a minimum of 140 m3/sec in the lean months.
Teesta Barrage Project in Bangladesh
20. According to the feasibility study in 1959, the barrage on the Teesta River was proposed to supply 255 cubic metres / sec of water to irrigate 7, 50, 000 hectares (Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) report 1990). The TBP envisaged construction of the Barrage at Dalia in Lalmornihat for a discharge capacity of 12, 755 cubic metres / sec to provide water in three crop seasons. The first phase was completed in 1998 & has a command area of 1, 54, 250 hectares with a net irrigable area of 1, 11, 406 hectares. It is spread over 12 twelve Upaziilas of Nilphamari, Dimla, Jaldhaka, Kishoreganj, Saidpur, Rangpur, Taraganj, Badarganj, Gangachara, Parbatipur, Chirir-bandar & Khanshama. It comprises construction of a Barrage, Flood Embankment, Flood by Pass, Silt Trap, Main Canal and part of canal system with improvement of existing drainage canal. The second phase is under construction. Irrigation started from January 1993 in the upper reach where canals were ready with cross drainage structures in place and on an average 6, 500 hectares were irrigated in first and second Kharif season in 1993. The layout of the project is at Figure 5 attached at Appendix F. Table 2 shows the Teesta River flow in the dry season since completion of the TBP phase 1. The highest average flow in the dry season recorded in 2000, accounts for 80 percent of the proposed irrigation requirement and 1. 6 percent of the barrage discharge capacity. Flow is the lowest in February and seldom exceeds 160 cubic metres / sec.
Table 2: Teesta River Flow in Dry Season in Bangladesh
Year
River Flow (m3/sec)
Percentage of Irrigation requirement
Maximum
Minimum
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Average
19982039014779. 635. 357. 6199981627131. 824. 327. 8200024416320495. 763. 980. 020021536611060. 025. 943. 1
Summary
21. The Teesta River is a glacier fed river experiences a dry season between November & April. The state of Sikkim in India is the upper riparian with the state of West Bengal as the middle riparian & Bangladesh as the lower riparian of Teesta River. India & Bangladesh have both constructed projects on the Teesta River without following a consultative mechanism for these. The discharge in Teesta River has shown a downward trend & has reduced to 3500 m3/sec in peak season at Coronation Bridge and it further reduces to 140 cubic metres / sec in the lean months.
CHAPTER IV
THE STAKE HOLDERS
India
22. India’s Union Ministry of Water Resources estimates the countries water requirements to be around 1093 BCM for the year 2025 and 1447 BCM for the year 2050 due to the projected population growth of 1. 4 billion by 2050. In 1951, the annual per capita availability of water was 5177 m, which reduced to 1342 m by 2000. The facts indicate that India is expected to become ‘water stressed’ by 2025 and ‘water scarce’ by 2050. The National Commission for Integrated water Resource Development (NCIWRD) has estimated that against a total annual availability of 1953 BCM (inclusive of 432 BCM of ground water and 1521 BCM of surface water) only 1123 BCM (433 BCM ground water and 690 BCM surface water) can be put to use, i. e., only 55. 6 percent. The high-level of pollution further restricts the utilisable water thus posing a serious threat to its availability and use[2]. 23. Hydro Electric Projects. India has the world’s fifth-largest electricity generation capacity with a total installed capacity 2, 09, 276 MW in 2012 out of which hydro electric power accounts for 39, 291 MW which is 18. 77 percent of total capacity as depicted at Figure7 attached as Appendix G. Due to the fast-paced growth of the economy, the country’s energy demand has grown at an average of 3. 6 percent per annum over the past three decades leading to peak demand shortage of percent. This shortage is likely to increase over the next two plan periods as depicted at Table 3 below. To make up for the anticipated shortfall India requires to tap its hydro power generation potential worth 1, 50, 000 MW, of which only 25 percent has been harnessed till date. Teesta being a perennial river with substantial flows even in lean season with an enormous fall of the order of 3, 300 m over a river stretch of 175 km is an ideal and reliable source of hydro electric power.
Table 3: Anticipated Increase in Energy Requirement & Planned Capacity Expansion
Year
Energy Reqmt (Billion KWH)
Installed Capacity Required (GW)
Planned Capacity Expansion (MW)
Power Capacity Shortfall (MW)
2016-171, 52430675, 78521, 0002021-222, 11842593, 40046, 60024. Area under Cultivation. The northern districts of West Bengal comprising of Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling, North & South Dinajpur, & Malda have large amount of cultivable land, but due to restricted irrigation only a portion of this area is utilised for agriculture as depicted below at Table 4. To fully utilise the potential of these districts, the Teesta Barrage Project at Gajoldoba envisages irrigating additional 9, 22, 000 hectares of land with break down as given at Table 5.
Table 4: Cultivable Area & Irrigation Potential in Northern West Bengal
District
Area
(Sq Km)
Net Cultivated Area (Hectares)
Net Irrigated Area (Hectares)
Area Irrigated (%)
Cooch Behar33872, 30, 39139, 50817. 14Jalpaiguri62272, 25, 67635, 44115. 70Darjeeling314766, 87120, 08630. 38Dinajpur53583, 93, 98481, 63720. 62Malda37732, 80, 85069, 00024. 56
Table 5: Increase in Irrigated Areas by TBP in Northern West Bengal
District
Stage I
Stage II
Stage III
Total
Sub Stage I
Sub Stage II
Cooch Behar20, 00061, 0001, 42, 000
–
2, 23, 000Jalpaiguri62, 000
–
81, 000
–
1, 43, 000Darjeeling17, 000
–
–
–
17, 000Dinajpur2, 04, 0001, 21, 000
–
65, 0003, 90, 000Malda39, 00022, 000
–
88, 0001, 49, 000
Total
3, 42, 000
2, 04, 000
2, 23, 000
1, 53, 000
9, 22, 000
25. Productivity. The northern districts of West Bengal rely largely on agriculture for employment as a primary source of income. Agriculture employs nearly 70% of the rural work force in the area. In fact the contribution of agriculture to the Gross Domestic Product in respect of these districts is much higher as compared to the state average, indicating the primacy of agriculture & hence importance of irrigation to these districts. This is depicted at Table 6 below.
Table 6: Share of Agriculture in Gross Domestic Product in Northern West Bengal
District
1996-97
1998-99
2000-01
2002-03
2004-05
Rank in State in 2004-05
Cooch Behar49. 9949. 3844. 2643. 0245. 92
1
Jalpaiguri38. 1137. 8933. 4138. 8236. 37
6
Darjeeling24. 5433. 5223. 7030. 2328. 98
12
Dinajpur44. 7844. 6441. 5445. 1541. 42
3
Malda45. 8744. 5741. 5334. 6835. 04
10
West Bengal
28. 88
27. 75
22. 87
25. 21
22. 08
–
Bangladesh
26. In Bangladesh, presently, about 162. 2 million people live on 56, 977 sq. miles (1, 47, 570 sq km) of land which makes Bangladesh the most densely populated larger country in the world & the population is set to increase to 200 million by 2020. Therefore, fresh water supply will be a crucial issue for this country as its population is on the increase & this can lead to intense unrest & social instability. As per Dr. MA Quassem, Chairman of National Disaster Management Advisory Council of Bangladesh, “ Water availability in Bangladesh is around 90 billion cubic metres (BCM) during the dry season against the demand of about 147 BCM, a shortage of nearly 40 percent, resulting in drought- like situation in large parts of the country”[3]. 27. Area under Cultivation. The Teesta River enters Bangladesh near Nilphamari district and courses 121 kilometres through the rice predominant districts of Rangpur, Lalmonirhat and Gaibandha before meeting the Brahmaputra River at Fulchori. The details of area under agriculture & pattern of cropping is as under:-(a)The Teesta River Floodplain (TRF), which includes the extreme northwest region of the country, accounted for 14 percent of the total cropped area in 2001 & supported around 8. 5 percent of the total population in the country. Around 63 percent of the total cropped area in the region is irrigated as compared to the national average of 42 percent irrigated cropped lands. On average, each unit of this irrigated cropped land supports 1. 82 crops per year as compared with national average of 1. 75 crops per year, indicating a direct association between irrigation water availability and agricultural land use. The map of drought prone areas of Bangladesh is at Figure 6 attached as Appendix G & shows that the north western area of Bangladesh is water stressed zone / dry zone.(b)The TRF is largely dependent on trans boundary river inflow for the supply and management of its water resources and agricultural production. The Teesta River barrage at Gajoldoba in India controls the amount of water flow downstream to Bangladesh. In order to increase the irrigation potential of the northwest region, Bangladesh constructed the Dalia barrage on the Teesta River in Lalmonirhat district to provide irrigation water from the river through a canal network. In the dry season, the exclusive control of the river water at Gajoldoba renders the Dalia Barrage almost useless for diversion of water due to low flows.(c)The total land (target area) under the Dalia barrage is 7, 50, 000 hectares and requires at least 40 percent of the total water flow in the dry season to remain active.(d)The greater availability of water post the construction of the Dalia Barrage led to increase in the area under cultivation as shown at Table 7.
Table 7: Correlation Between Water Availability & Area Under Cultivation
Year
Water Availability (m3/sec)
Additional Cultivation (Hectares)
Crop Produced (Tonnes)
199459492, 0006, 50019956231, 12, 00048, 00019965941, 32, 00056, 000199719845, 00032, 00019988532, 00021, 00019992427, 00011, 000(e)The increase in area under cultivation led to increased productivity benefits given at Table 8 for a two year period. The maximum amount of land (30 percent of the total target area) was cultivated in the year 1996 which produced crops worth US $ 48. 86 million.
Table 8: Increase in Productivity Due to Teesta Barrage at Dalia
Crop
Additional Land Under Cultivation (Hectares)
Monetary Benefit (US $)
1994
1995
HYV Paddy92, 0001, 12, 0008 MillionTobacco50, 00072, 00012 MillionWheat20, 00052, 0005 Million28. Increase in Rural Employment. In Bangladesh, per hectare average labour requirement to produce High Yield Variety (HYV) rice is 161 person-days, of which 48 percent is hired (Asian Development Bank report 1997). Irrigation water availability from Teesta River up to 1998 (pre the Gojaldoba Barrage project of India) increased farm labour use in two crop seasons downstream of the Teesta barrage. Expansion of cropped area and use of HYVs of rice contributed to increased labour demand. Downstream of the barrage the irrigation costs were reduced by one-fifth. Increase in rice yield level together with the decrease in irrigation cost, doubled the farm incomes leading to increased wage rate by 24. 5 percent. The rural employment pattern showed an increase in employment for the period 1991 – 1996 reflecting the success of the Project at Dalia prior to operations of the Gajoldoba Barrage as depicted at Figure 7 below.
Figure 6: Employment Pattern in Bangladesh
29. Environmental Migration. Essam El-Hinnawi, in his UNEP Report of 1985, defines such refugees as “ those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardised their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life”[4]. While economic migrants are the voluntary migrants, the environmental migrants belong to the forced migration category[5]. This problem of trans boundary environmental migration exists between Bangladesh & India as under:-(a)The construction of the Farraka Barrage & the conclusion of the agreement on sharing of Ganges water at Farraka[1]resulted in large scale desertification of division of Khulna, thus forcing environmental migration of Bangladeshis to states of West Bengal & Assam in India as depicted by the reducing population growth rate of this division at Table 9.
Table 5: Population Growth Rates in Bangladesh (Pre 1993)
Division
1961 �” 74
1974 �” 81
1981 �” 91
Chittagong2. 87%2. 48%2. 22%Dhaka3. 11%2. 75%2. 22%
Khulna
3. 31%
2. 41%
1. 62%
Rajshahi3. 56%2. 64%2. 09%
National Average
3. 21%
2. 57%
2. 03%
(b)Another example is the migration of Chakma tribals from the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh to India, being displaced by the Kaptai Dam project[6]. 30. Political Dimensions. The Sheikh Hasina government came to power in Bangladesh after a massive victory in December 2008 elections. This election virtually decimated the Khaleda Zia led Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and brought Awami League’s grand alliance of 14 parties to power. The Awami League presently controls 229 of the 300 parliamentary seats. It commands a more than two-thirds majority on its own which is sufficient to bring about any constitutional amendment. In the last two years, the Bangladeshi courts have declared a number of constitutional amendments invalid. The first to be invalidated was the Fifth Amendment, which was signed into law in 1979 and revoked the ban on religion-based parties. The court in its judgment said all the changes in government from August 15, 1975 right up to the national elections of 1991 were unconstitutional[7]. This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh on February 2, 2010[8]. These rulings have severely degraded the capability of religious organisations to affect the political process & strengthened the hand of Awami Leauge to arrive at a consensus with India. However, the political challenges to Mrs Sheikh Hasina individually and to her Awami League led government from a coalition of political and fundamentalist elements led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) of Begum Khalida Zia and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) show no sign of withering away. Their anti-Indian and pro-Pakistan constituency remains intact, but they are not yet in a position to pose a serious street challenge to her. At this juncture it is imperative for the Awami League to depict gains in negotiations with India on the water sharing issue so as to further strengthen its position prior to the 2013 elections.
Reasons for Conflict
31. After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, talks on the Teesta water sharing continued in the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission. The talks continued without any result until 1983, when the two parties reached an adhoc allocation agreement, according to which India was to get 39 percent, Bangladesh 36 percent and the remaining 25 percent was to be reserved for reallocation later, after further study. 32. Prior to the construction of the two barrages on Teesta River, the lowest discharge of Teesta in Bangladesh was above 160 cubic metres / sec. Considering the sharing percentages this would entail Bangladesh getting 60 cubic metre/sec (insufficient to cater for the 255 cubic metres / sec requirement for irrigation by the TBP at Dalia). However, after construction of two barrages the lowest discharge has further reduced to 152 cubic metres / sec in 2000 and 80 cubic metres / sec in 2005 as depicted below at Table 10. This meant that Bangladesh only got 28 metres / sec of discharge, thus being able to only irrigate only 31, 000 hectares of land in the Rangpur Division. This has increased the water stress considerably & if unchecked, it could lead to partial desertification of some areas.
Table 10: Long Term Flow Characteristics of Teesta River at Kauni (in m3/sec)
Period
High Season Flow
Low Season Flow
Annual Average Flow
MaximumMinimumAverageMaximumMinimumAverage1967-893674197010312281691398861990-993647214012712261521109312000-0522591548966114805067933. Quantum of Dry Season Discharge. Both India & Bangladesh differ on the quantum of discharge of the Teesta River during lean season. The root cause of this is that India calculates the discharge based on outflow from the Teesta Barrage at Gajoldoba, whereas Bangladesh insists that it must be based on the discharge data measured at the Sevoke (Coronation) bridge upstream of the barrage. Due to this, India estimates minimum discharge at 5000 cusecs (140 cubic metres / sec) while Bangladesh insists that it is 35, 000 cusecs (990 cubic metres / sec).(a)Based on the Indian discharge figures, Bangladesh is assured of a minimum of 1800 cusecs (50 cubic metres / sec). Bangladesh on its part insists that this figure should be 12, 600 cusecs (355 cubic metres / sec).(b)Bangladesh hence feels that owing to the unilateral withdrawal of water by India, Bangladesh is getting only 8 �” 10 percent of the lean period flow against the minimum requirement of 8, 000 cusecs (225 cubic metres / sec). This impression is further strengthened due to reducing flows in Teesta River post the commencement of operations of the Gajoldoba Barrage as depicted at Table 11 below.
Table 11: Post Gajoldoba Period Water Discharge (m3 / sec)
Year
Maximum
Minimum
Average
1993-944531382961994-956331904121995-96459442521996-97478392591997-98672343531998-993643620034. Losses due to Internal Problems. After the commencement of operations of the Dalia Barrage Project, internal problems related to the water supply, distribution and use have reduced the availability of water. The internal problems affecting the Dalia project are as under:-(a)The outlet canals are low causing water spillages.(b)Most canals are not concrete structures and get damaged leading to leakages.(c)Negligence of the water distribution management committee leads to water not being supplied when needed. 35. A major constraint in evolving a uniform water management policy is that water is a state subject, included in Entry 17 of the List II in the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. Though Entry 56 in the List I empowers the Centre to legislate on inter-state rivers, political calculations tend to influence and distort policies and decisions[9]. This is further complicated due to the coalition politics prevalent in the country today.
Summary
36. India’s energy demand has grown at an average of 3. 6 percent per annum over the past three decades leading to peak demand shortage of 12 percent. To overcome this shortfall India requires to tap its hydro power generation potential of 1, 50, 000 MW. Teesta being a perennial river with substantial flows even in lean season with an enormous fall of the order of 3, 300 m over a river stretch of 175 km is an ideal and reliable source of hydro electric power[10]. 37. The northern districts of West Bengal have large amount of cultivable land, but due to restricted irrigation only a portion of this area is utilised for agriculture. To fully utilise the potential of these districts, India has initiated the Teesta Barrage Project at Gajoldoba to irrigate additional 9, 22, 000 hectares of land. Agriculture employs nearly 70 percent of the rural work force in the area & agriculture significantly contributes to the Gross Domestic Product. Thus, an increase in area under irrigation would lead to increased rural employment & incomes in the area[11]. 38. The Teesta River Floodplain (TRF) in Bangladesh, which includes the extreme northwest region of the country, accounts for 14 percent of the total cropped area & on average, each unit of this irrigated cropped land supports 1. 82 crops per year as compared with national average of 1. 75 crops per year, indicating a direct association between irrigation water availability and agricultural land use. The greater availability of water post the construction of the Dalia Barrage has increased the area under cultivation & productivity. It has also generated greater rural labour employment. Bangladesh requires 255 cubic metres / sec of water for irrigating 7, 50, 000 hectares of land. However, due to inadequate dry season flows the north western area of Bangladesh is water stressed zone / dry zone. This trend is likely to result in environmental migration from the region[12]. 39. The Awami League presently controls 229 of the 300 parliamentary seats. Also, recent rulings by the Supreme Court have severely degraded the capability of religious organisations to affect the political process. However, the political challenges to Awami League led government from a coalition of political and fundamentalist elements led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) show no sign of withering away. At this juncture it is imperative for the Awami League to depict gains in negotiations with India on the water sharing issue so as to further strengthen its position prior to the 2013 elections[13]. 40. Reasons for Conflict. The conflict over Teesta River water sharing is due to the under mentioned reasons:-.(a)Prior to the construction of the two barrages on Teesta River, the average lowest discharge of Teesta was above 160 cubic metres / sec. However, after construction of two barrages the lowest discharge has drastically reduced to 80 cubic metres / sec in 2005[14].(b)Both India & Bangladesh differ on the quantum of discharge of the Teesta River during lean season since India calculates the discharge based on outflow from the Teesta Barrage at Gajoldoba as 5000 cusecs (140 cubic metres / sec), whereas Bangladesh insists that it must be based on the discharge data measured at the Sevoke (Coronation) bridge upstream of the barrage as 35, 000 cusecs (990 cubic metres / sec)[15].(c)After the commencement of operations of the Dalia Barrage Project, internal problems related to the water supply, distribution and use have reduced the availability of water[16].(d)In India, water is a state subject, thus limiting the powers of the central Government in reaching an agreement on water sharing.
CHAPTER V
SHARING OF TRANS BOUNDARY RIVERS
“ What lies at the heart of water conflict is greed…. Agreements, accords and treaties may temporarily bring peace, but conflict will erupt unless we learn to redefine ‘development’.”
Ramaswamy Iyer[17]
Laws on Trans Boundary River Sharing
41. The laws / conventions / regulations governing the use, sharing and management of international water resources include laws and conventions governing the navigational use of international water courses and those governing the riparian waters. The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997 was adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution 51/229 of 21 May 1997. It includes both the right to utilize the water course and the duty to cooperate in its protection and development. The resolution was based on four doctrines as under follows[18]:-(a)The Harmone Doctrine. It implies that the country was free to use water from any system that flows through its territory, in a way that best suited it. The doctrine negated any responsibility or obligation of a country to lower riparian countries in terms of quantity or quality of water that flows into those countries. However, this principle of total territorial sovereignty was rejected by the International Court of Justice in 1949.(b)Doctrine of Absolute Territorial Integrity. This doctrine stipulates that the upper riparian states must ensure that the rights of lower riparian states are preserved by allowing continuation of natural flow of water.(c)Doctrine of Limited Territorial Sovereignty & Integrity. This doctrine entitles every riparian state to make natural use of a stream that flows through or originates within its territory without affecting the use of the water course by other countries.(d)Doctrine of One Riparian Community. This doctrine stipulates that the water of an entire river system should be managed by one economic unit. 42. Successes in Water Sharing of Trans Boundary Rivers. In spite of the above laws, there are two historic examples of international treaties that have withstood hostilities / conflict between belligerents stand out as under:-(a)The Unified Plan for Jordan River Valley which was signed between the parties in 1955 to share the waters of the Jordan River. The Jordan River basin, some 18, 300 square kilometres in area, straddles the territories of Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank (represented by the Palestinian Authority) and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Arab side, and Israel. In spite of Arab refusal to accept the state of Israel & frequent armed clashes / wars between the two sides, the treaty served as a reasonably successful tool for water sharing initially. However, the subsequent unilateral developments by Israel precipitated a series of clashes ultimately leading to the Arab �” Israeli war in 1967. However apart from this setback, the treaty has formed the basis a stable sharing mechanism in the region.(b)The Indus Water Treaty was signed between India & Pakistan for sharing of waters of the Indus river system on 19th September, 1960. The treaty fixed and delimited the rights and obligations of India and Pakistan in relation to each other, concerning the use of the waters of the Indus system of rivers. In spite of fighting four wars & being in conflict over the support of terrorism by Pakistan, the treaty has served as a reliable mechanism for water sharing in the region. 43. An analysis of these successful trans boundary river sharing mechanisms reveals that for achieving sustainable agreements, the under mentioned conditions / arrangements need to be ensured:-Strong & competent international river commissions systematically linked to national level authorities, thereby ensuring financial & political support within riparian country bureaucracies.(b)Joint investigations into scientific aspects of a problem & possible solutions, as well as joint projects for implementing agreed measures.(c)Joint data gathering / sharing & analysis.(d)Provisions for arbitration & a guarantor for implementation of the agreements.(e)Institution of confidence building measures in the interim to develop trust & cooperation between the parties.(f)Equitable sharing of water resources with priority given to existing uses.
Resolving Trans Boundary River Conflicts
44. As per historical records & researches carried out over the years, even though there are always some case specific causes at work, the causes of conflict / cooperation can be graphically depicted as shown at Figure 8. Normally conflict is more likely when[19]:-(a)Due to natural processes water becomes scarcer &/or more polluted i. e., the costs of environmental degradation are felt more strongly by politically important constituencies in riparian countries.(b)An upstream-downstream setting entices the upstream country to exploit its positional power & discriminate against downstream neighbours.(c)Non-water conflicts among countries exacerbate water-related conflicts.(d)Political & economic ties among the riparian countries are weak.(e)The financial or administrative capacity of key riparian countries is poor.
Causes
Indicators
Cooperation
Water withdrawal
Water Availability
Water pollution
Trans Boundary River Basin
Population Growth
Dams
Balance of Power
Floods
Dependencies
River Bed Changes
Political Structures
Conflict
Figure 8: Causes & Indicators for Conflict / Cooperation
45. In the case of India & Bangladesh, in both the countries due to lack of adequate dry season discharge coupled with over exploitation of the irrigation projects, the water scarcity has become pronounced during dry season leading to increasing salinity & arsenic contamination of water. Also, even though both the countries enjoy warm political & diplomatic ties, the quantum of trade is poor & heavily loaded in the favour of India. This problem is further compounded due to the lesser financial & administrative capacity of Bangladesh the lower riparian country. In spite of these factors in case of the Teesta River, since India & Bangladesh are more integrated due to the strong political & social ties, such problems are easier to solve due to the following reasons[20]:-:(a)Bangladesh has much to offer India in terms of transit corridors, access to ports & markets, thereby offsetting the loss of irrigation potential in West Bengal.(b)Due to partnerships in various regional forums like SAARC & BIMSTEC, cooperation on vital global issues like climate change & reforms of the UN Security Council, both India & Bangladesh have strong political & diplomatic ties that enable them to make more credible commitments to one another on bilateral matters.(c)Due to the existence of joint mechanism of “ Joint Rivers Commission” for resolving the issue, the exchange of data & monitoring of the agreements is likely to be more equitable & transparent.(d)Even though the bargaining leverage of coalition politics was effectively used by West Bengal Chief Minister Ms Mamta Banerjee to stall the agreement in 2011, such measures are unlikely to be effective in the long run due to strong national & political will of the two nations in view of their cooperation & benefits to each other in other fields.(e)Close cultural linkages across the borders are conducive to participation of non-governmental actors to influence outcome of the consultations as is evident from the pace of Track II diplomacy between the two nations.
Summary
46. In spite of various areas of discord between India & Bangladesh, in the case of the Teesta River, since India & Bangladesh are more integrated due to the strong political & social ties a solution is achievable. In addition, any treaty for sharing of the river should be based on equitable sharing with priority for existing uses. In addition, to have a sustainable agreement, it is essential that joint structures linked to both Governments be developed along with provisions for international arbitration.
CHAPTER VI
IMPACT OF TEESTA CRISIS ON SECURITY DYNAMICS IN
NORTH EASTERN STATES OF INDIA
Security Dynamics in North Eastern States of India
47. Environmental Migration. In the month of July 2012 Kokrajhar district of Assam went up in flames due to clashes between Bodos & Muslim community of immigrant origin with the violence spreading to the adjoining districts. This has once again unleashed a debate on the perils posed by alleged unrestricted illegal immigration from Bangladesh. Assam has experienced high decadal population growth rate since 1951, as per the data of Census of India cited below in Table 12[21]. Massive and continuing migration from Bangladesh is responsible for transforming the demographic profile in Assam leading to conflict.
Table 12: Percentage Decadal Growth in Population of Assam Since 1951
1951-61
1961-71
1971-81
1981-91
1991-01
2001-11
India21. 6424. 8024. 6654. 4121. 5417. 64
Assam
34. 98
34. 95
–
53. 26
18. 92
16. 93
Dhubri
43. 74
43. 26
–
45. 65
22. 97
24. 40
48. The decadal growth rate of population in the Dhubri district of Assam (Table 1), which borders Bangladesh and also has the highest percentage of Muslim population (74. 29%) among the 27 districts of Assam is the most conclusive evidence of illegal immigration with growth rates much higher than that of Assam as a whole. Also, as per the Census of India 2001, Hindus constitute 65. 60%, Muslims 20. 36% and Christians 13. 72% of population. The data on language from the Census reveals that Bodos constitute 32. 37%, Bengalis 21. 06%, Assamese 20. 28% and Santhalis 16. 70% of Kokrajhar’s population. The table reflecting the data on religion & language in Muslim dominated districts of Assam is at Table 13.
Table 13: Population in Percentage as per Religion and Language in Districts of Assam with Substantial Muslim Population as per Census of India 2001
Religion
Language
Decadal Growth Rate
Population Density per Km2
Muslim
Hindu
Assamese
Bengali
Assam
30. 92
64. 89
48. 80
27. 54
18. 92
397
Dhubri
74. 29
24. 7370. 07
24. 15
22. 97
941Goalpara
53. 71
38. 2146. 25
32. 78
23. 03
451Barpeta
59. 36
40. 1947. 00
44. 67
19. 62
521Morigaon
47. 58
52. 2166. 37
28. 21
21. 35
500Nagaon
50. 99
47. 7960. 22
31. 23
22. 26
583Karimganj
52. 30
46. 6900. 42
85. 84
21. 87
557Hailakandi
57. 99
41. 1100. 26
83. 43
20. 89
409Cachar
36. 13
67. 3700. 63
74. 63
18. 89
382Bongaigaon
38. 52
59. 1742. 61
38. 78
22. 09
355Darrang
35. 54
57. 7339. 15
30. 76
22. 18
41149. Support to Insurgent Groups. Due to the strategic location of Bangladesh a number of insurgent groups operating in North Eastern states of India like United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), Independent Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA) and the People United Liberation Front (PULF), have enjoyed sanctuaries / material support from Bangladesh . This is borne out by the under mentioned facts[22]: -(a)In 2001, the ULFA leader Anup Chetia and ATTF leader Sanjeev Deb Barman were allowed to seek political asylum in Bangladesh and their movements, activities and political statements were periodically documented by the Bangladeshi media.(b)A thorough investigation of the Chittagong arms haul case of 2004 led to the arrest of the former national security Intelligence Chief Major General (Retired) Rezaqul Haider Chowdhury and Brigadier General (Retired) Abdur Rahim. These officers were subsequently sentenced based on the confessional statements of Md. Hafizur Rahman and Din Mohammad. This highlighted the linkages between Bangladesh security agencies and Indian insurgents.(c)On July 20, 2009, notorious terrorist Moulana Mohammad Mansur Ali, an Indian national linked to Pakistan based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was arrested from a madrassa in the Dakkhin Khan area of Dhaka. Ali was also an organiser of Asif Reza commando force, the terrorist outfit responsible for the attack on American Centre in Kolkata on January 22, 2002. 50. In the recent years, Bangladesh has cooperated with India regarding its security concerns. This is borne out by the arrest and handing over of five top leaders of ULFA, including its ‘ chairman’ Arabinda Rajkhowa in November 2009. The prospects are likely to further improve post the signing of the Extradition treaty between the two countries on 28 Jan 2013. This has improved prospects for deportation of ULFA leader Anup Chetia to India[23]. 51. Political Dimensions. The BNP with the support of radical Islamic parties like JEI has traditionally been inimical to Indian security concerns. The phase between 2001- 2006 when the BNP was in power witnessed aggressive posturing by both sides & resulted in the government largely ignoring Indian security concerns. The ULFA leader Anup Chetia and ATTF leader Sanjeev Deb Barman were allowed to seek political asylum in Bangladesh and their movements, activities and political statements were periodically documented by the Bangladeshi media[24]. Ms Khaleda even termed the Indian militants as ‘ freedom fighters.’ Also, the Chittagong arms haul case of 2004 signified the tacit support of the BNP Government to the arming of Indian insurgent groups. 52. Presence of Radical Islamic Groups. Bangladesh territory has traditionally been used by pro‐Al Qaeda organizations of Pakistani origins supported by the ISI such as the LeT, HuJI, and Harkat‐ul‐Mujahideen (HuM). The support has largely been eroded by the Awami Leauge Government & the curbs placed on religious parties by the Bangladesh Supreme Court. This existence of radical groups has gained lime light post the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai when the Bangladesh Government cracked down on these cells. Some examples of successful cooperation are as under[25]:-(a)The investigation into the Mumbai attack revealed links between Pakistan based outfits and HuJI of Bangladesh. As a follow up, on May 27, 2009, Abdul Rouf Daud Merchant, an operative of Dawood Ibrahim was arrested from Brahmanbaria in the Chitttagong division.(b) Arif Hossain another Indian fugitive and accomplice of Dawood Ibrahim was also arrested from Dhaka in June 2009. 53. Naxalism. The growing spectre of Naxalism is fast proving to be a security challenge for the governments of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh & West Bengal as depicted by Figure 14 attached at Appendix H. Though the areas of Northern West Bengal comprise marginally affected districts, they are likely to be targeted by naxals as they seek to expand their influence. With their rallying call being lack of development / growth, it is essential that West Bengal ensures adequate measures to sustain economic growth in these areas. Since these areas are sustained primarily by agriculture[26], it is essential that any water sharing treaty take this into consideration. 54. Strategic Space for China. China and Bangladesh have a close relationship since 1975 which is vital for meeting the economic and needs of Bangladesh. Both sides have signed a number of bilateral agreements on economic engagements, soft loans, social contacts, cultural exchanges, academic interactions, infrastructural development and military sales. China is the largest supplier of arms to Bangladesh’s armed forces in addition to being its largest trading partner. China and Bangladesh along with Myanmar, have decided to build the 900 kilometre Kunming Highway linking Chittagong with Kunming through Myanmar to facilitate greater trade. Bangladesh and China in 2005 signed the Bangladesh‐ China Cooperation Agreement on the Peaceful Usage of Nuclear Energy which aims to assist Bangladesh in developing peaceful nuclear energy for power generation and other developmental purposes. Both countries have also signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2002[27]. Post the visit of Ms Sheikh Hasina’s Bangladesh was also reportedly engaged in persuading China to further develop and use the Chittagong port and develop a deep sea port at Sonadia Island. This is significant for India as it fears Chinese encirclement as part of its String of Pearls strategy.
Impact of Teesta Crisis on Security Dynamics
55. The increasing desertification of North Western parts of Bangladesh due to reducing flow in Teesta River will result in an environmental migration similar to the one caused by Farraka barrage. This migration could lead to changing demography in the Eastern districts of Assam, thus, leading to communal clashes as witnessed in July 2012 in Kokrajhar. 56. In assessing India-Bangladesh relations in security-related matters, one has to constantly keep in view the ground reality that there is a surviving anti-India constituency in that country supported by BNP & JEI. A lengthy & potentially acrimonious resolution of the Teesta River issue will bolster anti India sentiments in Bangladesh & jeopardise the pol standing of the Sheikh Hasina Govt. With the national elections scheduled for 2013, this issue is likely to be used as a poll plank by the opposition BNP. A change of government in Bangladesh would provide strategic space to insurgent groups / radical Islamic groups thus impacting the internal security situation in India’s North Eastern states. 57. India also needs to check the growth of Naxalism in the Northern districts of the state of West Bengal by ensuring economic development & employment in the region. 58. The warm relations between China & Bangladesh coupled with the growing support for infrastructure development & presence of China in the Bay of Bengal presents a strategic threat to India.
Summary
59. Failure to arrive at an equitable agreement for sharing of the Teesta River may pose the under mentioned challenges to India:-(a)Environmental migration initiated demographic changes in Assam leading to communal clashes.(b)Change in Government in Bangladesh leading to increased support for North Eastern insurgent groups & radical Islamic groups.(c)Growth of Naxalism in Northern districts of West Bengal.(d)Providing strategic space to China in the region.
CHAPTER VII
RECOMMENDATIONS
An Optimal Approach to Sharing Dry-season Water
During the 1st phase of implementation of the Teesta barrage (Dalia), using irrigation water, an increasing trend in productivity of land was observed. However, since the commencement of the operation of the Gazoldoba barrage at the upstream, the Dalia barrage project, due to shortage of water, stopped operating for irrigation. Through the following estimation, we have shown a possible optimal sharing of the Teesta water considering the number of affected people and land productivity of both India and Bangladesh. The barrage at Dalia point requires at least 8000 cusecs of water (Daily Star, Feb. 21, 1998), assuming 40% of the total water flow in the dry season to remain active. So far, maximum amount of land (30% of the total target area) has been cultivated in the year 1996. This cultivation produced crops worth US$ 48. 86 million. The sum of the total crop production during the last four years was valued at US$ 136 million. The total production has drastically decreased in the last two years (1998???? 1999). Assuming the ratio of the Teesta River water in dry season in India and Bangladesh as 85% (32, 700) and 15% (4, 900 cusecs) respectively, we optimize the share. 27. Bangladesh proposes water sharing on a 50-50 basis at Gozaldoba however, water falls under the state subject in India. A final decision therefore, can be reached only after consultations with the state government of West Bengal in India. Farraka Barrage. Comprehensive bilateral treaty was signed by the Indian Prime minister H. D. Deve Gowda and his Bangladeshi counterpart Sheik Hasina Wajed on 12 December, 1996. This treaty established a thirty year water sharing arrangement with guaranteed minimum quantities of water supply for Bangladesh, whose rights as a lower riparian country was recognized. The treaty envisaged that the water of the Ganges River would be distributed from Farakka for the two countries between 1 January and 31 May of each year, and that India was required to maintain the flow of Farakka at the average level of the previous 40 years including any critical period when Bangladesh would continue to receive 35000 cusec of flow. This treaty essentially regarded the lean season flows related to actual flows at various levels not exceeding 75% dependable flows, as in past agreements.(a)The treaty guarantees Bangladesh a minimum of 35, 000 cusecs in lean season.(b)If the Ganga has more than 75, 000 cusecs of water, India can divert 40, 000 cusec into the Hoogly and allow the rest to flow to Bangladesh.(c)If the Ganga flow is between 75, 000 and 70, 000, Bangladesh can withdraw 35, 000 cusecs and the rest can be withdrawn by India. If availability is less than 70, 000 cusec then the water will be shared equally by the two sides. However, the supply regulation has to ensure that each side gets alternatively 35, 000 cusec for 10 days at a stretch from March 1 to May 10, the driest period. In case of emergency situation, such as the flow at Farakka falling below 50, 000 cusec, both sides are required to hold “ immediate consultation.”(d)Both sides have also agreed to enter into Treaty/Agreement regarding other common rivers.(e)The Treaty is to be implemented by a Joint Committee. Any dispute arising in this is to be referred to the JRC (Joint Rivers Commission). If dispute remains unresolved, it should be referred to the two governments which would meet immediately at appropriate level, to resolve issues through discussion.