The approach presented In the following extract on Frank Macintosh’s understanding of appeasement is that being of structuralism. We can understand from his taken approach that Chamberlain’s actions were as a result of current situations, structures and constraints, whereby his decisions were not Immediately decided but were determined by outside Influences which controlled his decision and action making. An example of Chamberlain following a structuralism approach can be seen in the Rangeland Crisis in 1936.
After Hitler had successfully taken back the German-speaking Sara in 1 935, he decided to test his luck even further by ordering 32, 000 of his troops to openly re-enter the Rangeland, thus breaking the terms of Versailles once again. Chamberlain decided not to react and not to let Britain go to war with Germany, even after they had clearly broken one of the terms of the Versailles, due to the fact that as a whole, the nation was too weak military and economically to commit too war unless they really had to.
Hence why Chamberlain believed that appeasement should be chosen as their mall policy; because It was ore likely a policy that would maintain peace with Germany, but also, due to economic constraints Chamberlain had no other option but to comply with Hitter’s demands. Specifically from Macintosh’s extract, we can draw this result from the sentence: “ What Chamberlain brought to British foreign policy was a firmer and clearer belief that a bold effort of compromise with Germany was required if was war was to be averted. Such a structuralism viewpoint, that Chamberlains actions were shaped by current events and constraints were taken up by many historians. The Astoria, Douglas in 1977, explicitly says that: “ Chamberlain attempted the impossible.
” He then followed his argument by saying that Chamberlain had no other option than appeasement given the economic, military and political climate of the times. We know that Britain struggled economically after the First World War due to the financial costs and the result it had on living conditions, meaning the public didn’t want money spent on things as rearmament and go to wars unnecessarily.
Chamberlain did the best he could under the given situations. However, In contrast o this viewpoint, Gilbert and Got in 1963 believed that, “ appeasement resulted from mental laziness, not from political immortality.
” Appeasers only saw what they wished to see, and how it fit with what policy they had in mind. MacDougal proposes the interpretation that Chamberlain was faced with many difficulties, that being economically and politically. It was Chamberlain’s main objective to keep peace in order and to prevent war at all costs.
E H Carr, in his book “ The Twenty Years Crisis” argues this viewpoint by saying that appeasers (such as Chamberlain) were right to ruse the policy of peace as they were being realistic at the time.
It is evident from Carr that Chamberlain was left with no other option, he had no freedom of decision or action due to constraints such as economic. This Is supported In Macintosh’s extract when he says: “ the most Important assumption was that another war would be disastrous for Britain, and to prevent It was an all-consuming aim. ” It can be seen that Chamberlain was right to try and maintain peace.
Britain was facing far too to them not standing up against Germany in the Rangeland Crisis, and it can Hereford be accepted that Chamberlain would not want to spend money on rearmament, but appease instead. Specifically we can draw this evidence from the sentence: “ this fundamental desire to avoid open confrontation with the dictators and to avoid alliances determined Chamberlain’s decisions on foreign policy and led to fatal errors of Judgment. ” However, although it shows that it was Chamberlain’s idea to preserve peace, in order to avoid another World War, this policy evidently led to “ fatal errors of Judgment.
This can be particularly seen in the argument from the PM of the Tory Party, Simon Hayes view when he suggests through the approach of intentionality, that appeasers gave up and gave into the Nazi’s/Hitler by surrendering to what they wanted. This “ giving up” viewpoint can be understood when looking at ‘ The Nucleus’ in 1938, when Hitler demanded the desalination of Austria and to undermine its independence in order to unify with them. To begin with there was no political will to oppose Germany, due to the recent resignation of the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Also, Britain saw no obvious threat in allowing
Germany to gain the annexation of Austria, after all it was a German-speaking country – there was no good view why they shouldn’t unify.
However, individuals such as Winston Churchill saw that if Hitler had a true claim to Austria, he should have used negotiation and diplomacy rather than force. “ Coat – the guilty men” saw this as Chamberlain failing in his responsibility to rearm the nation. In their famous quote – “ Let the guilty men retire. ” When looking at this extract written by MacDougal, it is clear that this extract is taken from a piece of his work post the date of 1967.
In the Public Records Act of ’67, there was release of public records that were made available from the First World War – previous to this date there was nothing. Evidence from the source which suggests this is on line two when MacDougal says that the appeasement debate has revolved around “ very different interpretations of largely the same documents. ” From the release of documents there was evidence of all the constraints that existed, such as why we can initially suggest that this particular extract can be seen to follow the approach of structuralism.
