Inexamination of the most contemporary version of the United States House ofRepresentatives, a significant percentage of House legislation that is broughtto the floor does so by one of two methods. The House Committee on Rules mayprocedurally designate the bill to be subject to special rule which couldresult in privileged floor access for the bill, or the Speaker of the House maymotion to suspend the rules and then make a motion to a penultimate debate andsubsequently vote on legislation, passing with a two-thirds majority. Thissystem of agenda-setting exists on a plane parallel to the House rules forsetting the agenda via debating bills in the order in which they are brought tothe floor following committee and then subsequently added to a specific Housecalendar based on the contents of the legislation. The House has refaced itsformer policies from a previously independent and unbiased committee-heavycalendar system to the modern system which places a significant level ofdiscretionary power to party leadership.
Themajor era of transformation for House agenda-setting was from 1875 to 1895. Thechange in political environments coupled with the “ suppression of filibusteringin the U. S. House,” resulted in an increase in the majority party’s agenda-settingpower (Cox and McCubbins 2005). Due to the threat of a filibuster, agenda-setting may be influenced as legislators may obstruct as a ploy to forcea separate issue onto the chamber agenda. During this developmental reformationof the agenda-setting process, it is important to highlight the delegation fromlegislators to leaders, as individual congressmen actively decided how muchpower to delegate to committee chairs. Sinclair highlighted in 1995 thatceteris paribus legislators prefer the minimum amount of delegation to theirrespective leaders (Sinclair 1995).
Therudimentary idea of delegation is understood across a multitude of scenarios. Poweroriginates from a principal actor whom, in exchange for a form compensation, will delegate that power to an agent. In consideration, the principal must nextdetermine how best to monitor the agent, and the incurring costs of thismonitoring, ideally resulting in the minimization of the agent’s ability toadvance their personal interests or that of their agency. The resultingdecision will only yield in delegation if by doing so enough surplus is gainedto offset the cost of the compensation and monitoring of the agent and risk ofagency loss. By applying this general idea to that of the legislature, theprincipal may be regarded as the collective membership of the body. Committeeleaders are agents, as is the Speaker of the House as well as both minority andmajority party leadership. The different varieties of political surplus gainsdirectly resulting from the delegation of agenda-setting are:
Efficiency: the resulting transactional costs resulting from collectively setting theagenda may be reduced through delegation. Costs here may refer to time consumedfrom debate and voting on personal or party agenda interests.
Selection: An agent may assuage interests that procure maximum levels of payoff if therequested floor time exceeds maximum availability. This is the definition ofpositive agenda-setting (Cox and McCubbins 2005).
Suppression: Costs may be incurred from debate of specific pieces of legislation. Thisoccurs when subjects that majority party members are not in agreement (Cox andMcCubbins 2005) or issues that would prompt legislators to decide betweenconstituencies or to make a statement regarding solid policy against thepopular opinion. Agenda-setting may provide gains to agents from keepinglegislation closed from debate.
Legislatorsmay be held accountable for providing recompense to their leaders. Despitecurrent day Speakers enjoying increased salary and resources for staff, historyhas only strengthened the prestige and power that accompanies holding office. This idea echoes Sinclair (1995) in that ceteris paribus legislators havepreference to reserve delegation to further their own agendas and also simultaneouslyaccept accolades for them. Two primary problems result from monitoring and lossfrom agency. The first is that leadership may actively decide scheduling questionsthat are out of line with the primary interests of their principals. Pushingagendas for bills that do not make it past the floor, coercing votes, andlegislative suppression all may result in a net constructive payout to most oftheir principals. Such behavior could result in harsh contention with partyleadership and may pose potential to conceive challenges in the current orsubsequent Congress. Secondly, the idea that once a legislature begins theoccupancy of their office, they are naturally in a position to crucifyadversaries, reward allies and possibly raise challenges for the next leader. Because of this, legislative members are more inclined to favor leadershipdelegation as political opportunities.
Legislatorstend to show preference to leaders whom have secured seats and territories anddistricts that are considered safe for their party since this will produceminimum levels of agency loss (Cox and McCubbins 2007). In close relation tothis, conditional party government is grounded in the belief that the positiveoutcomes stemming from delegation will only increase as the opposing partieshave increasingly different agendas (Rohde 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 2000). Theempowerment of the leader can result in an increased ability to steer legislativepolicy steering while the delegation costs decrease as majority party member’s preferencein the chamber becomes more unified. This idea gives way for alternativemotivational factors for delegation, however. The positive outcomes ofdelegation allow for efficiency to increase in the legislative process (Cooper1970). Additionally, as the measures available for consideration by the chamberdecrease the more incentive there is to reserve delegation of agenda control toleadership. This is crucial to understanding the decision making process oflegislators as they barrel through floor procedures and then authorizedelegation to party leadership.
Thecalendar system that resulted from the first ninety years of practice no longerprovided support for consideration of significantly larger amounts oflegislation, nor allowed for proper deliberation over key pieces oflegislation. The procedures observed in the House in 1870 were structured toempower committees with automated and just access to the floor. Afterconsidering legislation, committees then brought the legislation to theCommittee of the Whole. If the bill failed to immediately pass, the Housedesignated the issue to be reserved to one of many legislative calendars. Thepolitical definition of a calendar is a list of legislation presented in theorder in which they were reported that are waiting to be heard. Theoretically, the House was able to then hear issues that had waited the longest. Thisallowed committees the opportunity to finally consider these pieces oflegislation for future report for the consideration of the full House. (Cooper1970).
Dueto the power invested in the Speaker to appoint members to committee, partieswere enabled to push their personal legislative interests. As stated by therules of the first Congress, the majority elect their leader (the Speaker) whothen possessed the power of appointment. This process is complex and requires district-basedbalancing, inter/intraparty impartiality, and fulfilling necessary experiencerequired for the office (Alexander 1915, 67-8; Follett 1973). Within theseoriginal restrictions, the Speaker was able to form committees with minimalconsideration given to other unspoken rules of the House such as seniority andmost favorable policies to the party. Political scientists and critics alike makemention that “ the Speaker is responsible for the constitution and forming ofCommittees in tandem with his own political ideologies, and that the candidateis in the maximum level of agreement among party members…due to the morepopular opinions regarding the most prominent questions of the day,” (Wilson1884). Therefore, parties are apt to seek out their own policy choices with auniversal response by placing faith in a double-tiered delegation process. Non-leadership legislators have designated a Speaker whom has the ability tostack committees.
Nearthe commencement of the 41 rd Congress, Garfield wrote, “ business ofCongress must have more than tripled during the last fifteen years. I cannot beaway a week without discovering a large amount of departmental businessaccumulating while requiring immediate attention,” (Binder 1998). Historically, accounts of the House workload increasing have been preceded by taking on moreresponsibilities, allowing for more legislators, and increased levels oflegislation brought before Congress. As Civil War pensions and claims werefiled, the complex nature of interstate commerce required federal solutions. Additionally, the number of congressmen did not change drastically, from 178 in1860 to 357 in 1900.
Allowingfor the increase of size of the House and number of responsibilities broughtabout challenges for legislators. The effectiveness of dilatory tacticsincreased due to the pressure surrounding legislation increased the likelinessof spending erroneous time debating controversial measures (Cooper 1981). Incontrast, the accumulation of legislation was made worse by the obstructionismmade possible by rules allowing each legislature to act as a player with aveto. Additionally, the former formal system of House rules was unable tosupport the processing of legislation in time to keep up with legislation thathad already been introduced. This is to say that new bills were being createdmore rapidly than the system of rules allowed the House to process prior bills.
Themost effective way of quantifying these expectations is the number of billsreported from committee to the amount of legislation considered by the House. This is the unofficial standard by which members consider reformation of theirfloor procedures. Within the duration of the 45 th Congress, theHouse was unable to consider 1300 committee reports. In the 47 th congress the number had been reduced to under one thousand pieces oflegislation. These figures compared to the fact that in 1860, the House votedto reform its procedural rules because “ nearly half” of the 600 bills on allcalendars received floor consideration (Cooper 2015).
Thesurge of members and bills that had been introduced resulted in high levels ofpressure on the standing calendar system that had originally been framed toallow for “ automatic and fair” considerations of committee reports. Out ofnecessity, the amount of bills that committees were forced to veto throughinaction increased alongside the number of bills which died on the calendars ofthe House.
Despitethe normal disagreements felt over legislators considering various policies tobe adopted, the inability of the House to pass good legislation coupled withits failure to clearly set an agenda was more broadly a problem with the institutionas the whole. Legislators eventually forced to adopt the new set of rules tocontinue governing despite long arduous battles on the floor of the Houseduring the 19 th century. Despite legislators needs to quickly passlegislation or to grant priority to important bills, the calendar system wasdiscouraging of this special rule to specific bills. Members were able tosidestep the calendar system for crucial bills such as motions to suspend rulesthrough supermajorities and often resulted in controversial or partisanlegislation.
Tocombat these and other challenges related to agenda-setting in the House, members adopted two varieties of efficiency reformation. The first was toeliminate and completely gut all time deemed unnecessary from the daily schedulesuch as nullifying procedures that required legislators to make a motion forpermission for the introduction of a bill (Cooper and Young 1989). The secondwas a reformation of rules which dealt with obstructionist tactics to allowdeliberation and consideration of controversial legislation.
On May 1, 1879 the House Rules Committee made a proposal which was then later adopted which called for the removal of first names and any initials from legislators’ names from roll call. According to congressional records, while the number of members increased the amount of time necessary for one single roll call had risen to forty minutes (Congressional Record, 46-1, 1017). This is an example of efficiency reform; the cost of saving time came at a minimal one to the members and the normal procedure of governing had not been disturbed. Garfield reported this rule from Committee as a minority member and motioned to adopt without the presence of a roll call.
Anothermajor component of the 1880 reform was to ensure that members could filereports without being filibustered by changing the daily schedule. Through thisrevision, an additional number of committees were able to get their legislationon a calendar in ultimate hopes of consideration. Again in 1885, the houseunderwent further efficiency reformation. This eliminated the debate on motionsto stop debate in the Committee of the Whole. Furthermore, correspondences fromthe President and the Senate were now to be kept and read on the floor at thebeginning of the next day, disallowing the interruption of these messagesduring floor debate and proceedings.
TheReed Rules of 1890 presented a clear and undeniable simplification of Houserules. As previously discussed, these enabled legislators to report directly tothe Clerk as opposed to wasting hours on every Monday. Also, this allowed formembers to directly submit their reports to the clerk allowing or the saving ofroughly an hour of attempting to sidestep efforts to filibuster reports out ofcommittee. The commonality found within all efficiency reformation is that eachwas objectively uncontroversial and acted as beneficial measures to mostmembers of the House.
Increasesto efficiency via means to suppress and obstruct were much more provocative. After losing in the 1874 cycle and during the 43 rd Congress, republicans in the house were forced to confront the inevitable downfall of thefifteen-year control of the House and the opportunity that they could alsoloose the Presidency (Bates 1936). It was clear to republican members that theyneeded to vote and approve a significant amount of their shared agenda beforebeing voted out of power, but obstructionist methods such as constant motionsto adjourn retarded consideration of the civil rights legislative package. Legislators actively fought to suspend the Rules and vote on a resolution whichwould allow the Rules Committee to present a new variety of rule which would beimmune to tactics involving filibusters. Despite the Republican majority in thehouse, members could not get to the necessary two thirds majority becauseRepublicans were skeptical of the greater Democratic agenda which included areformation to jurisdiction of federal courts (Binder 1997). Similar accountsfrom Democratic struggles exist throughout history as well.
Itis obvious that the U. S. House of Representatives and the agenda-settingprocedures and policies have shaped this nation. By examining the differentgains that legislators may receive from these agenda-setting decisions, it isdiscernable that due to the nature of the bicameralism of the United Statesgovernment these policies greatly impacted pieces of legislation that werecrucial to the development of this country. Originally, the process ofagenda-setting was painfully slow and did not properly allow for a moresignificant portion than not of bills to be considered, effectively renderingthe legislative body unable to govern. However, due to several reformationprocesses that the House has underwent, the policies in question have sincebeen replaced with those that can handle the current infrastructure of theUnited States government.
SOURCESCITED
- Bates, Ernest Sutherland. 1936. The Story of Congress , 1789-1935. New York: Harper & Row.
- Binder, Sarah. 1997. Minority Rights, Majority Rule . New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cooper Joseph, and David W. Brady. 1981. “ Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn .” American Political Science Review , 75: 411-25.
- Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 2007. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. 2nd edition.
- Follett, Mary Parker. 1974. The Speaker of the House of Representatives . New York: Lenox Hill
- Garfield, James A. 1981 . The Diary of James A. Garfield , ed. H. J. Brown and H. D. Williams. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
- Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 , Vol. 2. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1975.
- James, Scott C. 1999. Presidents, Parties, and the State . Forthcoming from Oxford University Press.
- Revision of the Rules of the House of Representatives in the Thirty-Sixth and Forty-Sixth Congresses . Miscellaneous House Document No. 16, 49th Congress, 1st Session.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 1994. “ House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy.” Legislative Studies Quarterly, XIX, 4: 477-494.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 1995. Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: the U. S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
