Why do states want nuclear weapons

Sociology



First and foremost we have to understand that many states view the nuclear club as a prestigious guild, for them, it is a quick and sure-fire way to not only gain entry into the club but also gain international standing and stature. (Perkovich (1998) p. 2)

The double standards of the world's only superpower the US, towards Israel have caused some dissent in other nations. This has caused a letup in nonproliferation efforts and leads to decreasing pressure on countries trying to acquire nuclear status, hence more countries try to acquire these weapons. (Perkovich (1998) p. 3-4)

Another possible reason given to justify the acquisition of nuclear capability is that nuclear weapons can prevent regional and international conflicts due to the threat of mutual destruction. The apprehension countries with regards to its adversaries' present or future strength can serve as a strong motivation for a country to go nuclear as nuclear weapons may be a cheaper (on the whole) alternative to an economically disastrous and militarily dangerous conventional arms race. (Perkovich (1998) p. 4) India and Pakistan as well as Israel, the U. S, Russia, and China all developed nuclear weapons for reasons of national security. But in some cases, as mentioned earlier security was not the only concern. India, U. K, France, and even South Africa (which later abandoned its nuclear program and was declared a nuclear-weapons-free country) all developed nuclear weapons to further their standing in the regional and international arena, to show-off their national scientific competency and establish themselves as key players in regional and international politics. (Perkovich (1998) p. 6)

Finally, there can only be two views of the current situation and the future line of action. One idea is allowing the induction of more states into the https://assignbuster.com/why-do-states-want-nuclear-weapons/

nuclear club i. e. allowing them to have the weapons. Since the threat of mutual destruction increases, the idea of minimal deterrence pops up. The other option is to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons moving into the phased reduction of weapons until the ultimate goal of de-armament is achieved (Perkovich (1998) p. 10). But one has to admit regardless of however much optimistic one might be that this scenario at least in the present or in the near future is not probable " at all", given the never-ending quest of countries to acquire nuclear capability and the disagreement amongst the members of the nuclear club on major non-proliferation issues.