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that the



**ASSIGN  
BUSTER**

When an act is abetted with the intention on the part of the abettor causing a particular effect, and an act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment, causes a different effect from that intended by the abettor, the abettor is liable for the effect caused, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had abetted the act with the intention of causing that effect, provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect. Section 113 lays down that when an act is abetted with the intention on the part of the abettor of causing a particular effect and an act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment, causes a different effect from that intended by the abettor, the abettor is liable for the effect caused, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had abetted the act, with the intention of causing that effect, provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect.

Illustration: A instigates B to cause grievous hurt to Z. B in consequence of the instigation, causes grievous hurt to Z; Z dies in consequence. Here, if A knew that the grievous hurt abetted was likely to cause death; A is liable to be punished with the punishment provided for murder. Sections 111 to 113 make it abundantly clear that if a person abets another in the commission of an offence and the principal goes further thereafter, and does something more which has a different result from that intended by the abettor and makes the offence an aggravated one, the abettor is liable for the consequences of the acts of his principal. The crux of the problem in an inquiry of this sort is whether the abettor as reasonable man at the time of his instigation or intentionally aiding the principal would have foreseen the probable consequence of his abetment.