

# [International relations](https://assignbuster.com/international-relations-essay-samples-3/)

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International Relations Midterm Part A The idea of collective security was pioneered by Woodrow Wilson in 1916. In 1941, PM Churchill broached theidea to President Roosevelt while WWII was going on, envisioning the creation of an international organization that would ensure “ safety of all by all,” among others. The Declaration of the UN was signed by 45 countries on January 1, 1942. In 1945, these states, along with 5 new members, convened to sign the Charter of the UN (Ray pp. 7-10). Organski, outlined the basic assumptions underpinning collective security: all nations can agree as to who is the aggressor; all nations will cooperate to contain aggression; all nations are free to join to suppress the aggressor; the nations collectively will overpower the aggressor, and; it is certain that collective power of nations will defeat or force the surrender of the aggressor (Ghosh p. 89).
Recent events seemed to prove that the concept is flawed and has even become obsolete. The Korean War of 1950, the Gulf War in 1991 and the 2003 Invasion against Iraq – all had no pure collective security. In the Korean War the US resorted to the non-binding recommendation of the General Assembly, where it had considerable influence, to lead an attack against NoKor (Neack p. 159). In the Gulf War, albeit the UN Security Council sanctioned the action against Iraq, it never gained control of the US-led operation against the aggressor. In 2003, the US, the UK and Spain invaded Iraq without prior approval from the Security Council relying instead on an old 1990 resolution (Copson p. 69). In all these cases, collective security failed because the mechanism itself is faulty. There is no real collective security if only a few countries can determine the existence of aggression, and where one vote can veto all other votes. In addition, there must be a detailed mechanism in force deployment and forces must not be only distinct from state forces but must have teeth to enforce itself against the aggressor.
Part 2
It is claimed by some psychiatrists that Milosevic has a malignantly narcissistic personality that sets aside information that does not conform to his perspectives. Although he is not completely detached from reality, he believes in his own lies so much that he is willing even to cross the line to unreality. Thus, Milosevic often lied about what was happening in Kosovo, to the extent of claiming that there were no deaths in Kosovo when the truth was that genocide and ethnic cleansing were rampantly going on. According to psychiatrists, this kind of personality has a sham for its core and for that person to admit any truth would be tantamount to destroying his being. Thus, even if Milosevic understood that the world knew what was actually happening in Kosovo, he always stuck to his own version even calling the NATO murderer refusing to accept any term for ending the war and vehemently asserting his innocence (Sell 174).
According to close observers, Johnson was an ambitious man who wanted to make up for the insecurities he suffered as a child in the hands of a mother who conditioned love upon performance and an overbearing father. It would seem that from this account, LBJ was always wanting to prove himself. This was compounded by the fact that he was no ivy leaguer and was not born with a silver spoon in his mouth like the person who preceded him in the Oval Office. This unconscious desire to be great, popular and successful probably spurred him to escalate the US involvement in the Vietnam War, believing correctly that US involvement in the Vietnam War was a popular choice and therefore believed his decision to get involve with it was going to be a popular one. In addition, LBJ’s mind was characterized as practical albeit shallow, with no predisposition for deep analysis, which probably accounted for his failure to determine when to stop US intervention in Vietnam.. Along the way, LBJ was slowly losing his composure, the thought of losing in the war slowly devastating him (Heinrichs pp. 9-30)
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