# Example of essay on great philosophy question

**Philosophy** 



### Part I Question 2: Plato's theory of forms

Forms, as displayed by Plato's perspectives, are an imagination of a real object. As a matter of fact, what we perceive by sight are not the actual objects. His theories revolve around the belief that the reality in objects is floating. While the forms may be invisible to the human eye, our souls have engaged in the eternal world prior to being assimilated in a physical human body, and retain a memory of them (Field). From Plato's perspective, forms are the imaginative part of the objects that are created in our minds. In reality, they are things that do not exist and can only be pictured in minds. However, Plato maintains that the philosopher can achieve a state of perceiving forms directly, through his mind, by developing skill in astute the conceptual quality, common to groups of things and ideas, in the sequential globe; by realizing this dialectic, to group the qualities in their correct order relationships. According to Plato, all learning is just but a recollection of what our soul already knows. He agrees that an inquiry is impossible unless the already known object would not recognize the subject. On the hand, sensible is tangible objects that can be seen and felt. Forms and sensible are related in that objects can be created from imaginations, therefore, for tangible objects to exist there must have been drawn in the mind.

## Part II Question 3: Aristotle's Inversion to Plato's Metaphysical Ideas

Aristotle as a philosopher believes in forms. Contrary to Plato's perception of the real objects floating somewhere in the air (Watt), Aristotle believes that the real objects exist inside the objects themselves. For instance, there can be an imagination of a perfect cup floating in one's mind when the perfect

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cup can be found inside any cup. The two philosophers also differ on their perception on what is true and what is not true. Plato believes on what he reasons to be true totally different with Aristotle, who believes on what he has seen, and he knows to be true. On a different note, Aristotle engaged scientific methods to determine the truth physically before concluding whether they are true or not contrary to Plato, who would only use common sense to determine if something is true or not. Aristotle as a philosopher retains an idea of forms from his teacher Plato. He also continues to believe that all that we see and imagine of things are not the real things when it comes to the reality of the object (Conford). Contrary to his teacher, he believes that forms exist inside the objects themselves. The divergence in ideology displayed by these philosophers will be best understood if someone evaluates the essentials of their theories. In fact, they seem to develop their ideologies from the same object but develop deviating perspectives.

#### Part III: Question 6 Leibniz on Substance

Leibniz believes that there are very many substances whose originality can only be traced to God's creation. Therefore, according to the theoretical explanations provided in his explanations, substances are only magnified to include wider perspectives of the same thing. In the real sense, a substance is not divisible according to his theory of indivisibility. Therefore, the wider perspectives we create of a single substance are merely the aspects of the substance and are not newer in any sense. Leibniz's concept engulfs a wider relation for a variety of substances. The reason Leibniz gives as to why these are mere aspects of the same substance is because all the newer ideas that revolve around the main subject all converge to its existence. Therefore, all

aspects of substance should be relative and descriptive enough to make the substance distinct (Woolhouse and Francks). The difficulties that arise from this perspective are the isolation principles of the numerous aspects of a substance in order to make it distinct. Fundamentally, it is hard to isolate all the aspects of a certain idea to make it distinct and independent for it to qualify as a substance in Leibniz' perspective. Additionally, this theory tends to conflict the theory of interdependency between different aspects of the same substance. However, it is clear that, certain substances, especially those whose originality can (to some extent) be traced directly from creation are distinct and can be isolated.

#### **Part IV Personal View of Metaphysics**

I find Aristotle's concept of forms to be compelling and directly related to the contemporary social forms if a comparative analysis is considered with respect to the other theories. In fact, virtually everything we interact with can be explained with respect to this theory. I believe that this explains the fact the same tool or equipment can be used to perform or accomplish divergent activities without having to modify it. For instance, tables in other parts of the globe are strictly used for working on while, in other regions of the globe, it is viewed as a support that one could sit on. It is also commendable that Aristotle embedded scientific reasoning before formulating his theory. Essentially, the contemporary world is shaped by both scientific and social aspects of every activity that happens in the settlement areas we live in. Having a theory that could help make significant meaning of even the simplest of reflex activities is commendable. It is even possible to create a theoretical comparison in a different region of the globe

and compare its validity in a different region. However, it is an interesting fact how these theorists combine the principles of imagination and reality to come up with conflicting but valid theories.

#### **Works Cited**

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