Mill's utilitarianism

Philosophy



Mills Utilitarianism Mill begins his work by noting that very minute progress has been achieved towards developing a group of standards that can be used to judge the moral right and wrong. For over decades, human beings have been pursuing the basis of morality, but yet have not come near to consensus. Mill argues that for one to know what morality dictates, it is important to know by what standards human actions should be judged. It is necessary to note that Mill defines purpose of morality as creating a particular state of the world; Mills stand out to clarify morality as the essential one.

According to Daniel Bonevac, another implication of utilitarianism is universalism: people should mind the consequences of choices on everyone it affects. We should not consider ourselves, or simply our friends, or community members; we must consider everybody in the society. It is fortunate that most decisions made affect a portion of citizens; this will deny others the pleasure to enjoy the freedom they have. In as much as some pleasures were not intrinsically more valuable than others, nevertheless, utilitarianism would not be "a pig philosophy" – "you'd rather be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied"; the use and development of our higher facilities would be virtuous solely by virtue of their benefits to other people. Mill argues that "Pleasure vary in quality as and at the same time quantity." Mill stresses that the principle of utility justifies the right actions (Bonevac, Daniel, and Phillips 177). It tries explaining what makes them right. But the principle does not have to be conscious motive.

themselves are not unswerving with his utilitarianism since in differentiating

between lower and higher pleasures, and in Mill's argument that the higher

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pleasure are more desirable, he (Mill) is forced to appeal to non-utilitarian values. In the article, T. G. Miles attempts to criticize Tarrant's argument against Mill.

Mill's defense of higher pleasure preference is undermined in two forms; firstly, because introduces a different value besides happiness, called dignity, and send, because Mill introduces the phrase 'content,' which according to Tarrant considers to be 'a correlate of dignity and a function of the higher pleasure' and construes as intended stand for "the sensation attended upon the satisfaction of the desire for higher pleasures' (Pojman, Louis, and James, 320).

Not only is Mill playing up and down between dissimilar happiness concepts, but at the same time he is also appealing to the non-utilitarian dignity value for the purpose of upholding his case. From the book, it is evident that Mill does not consider putting much weight on the concept of dignity; it is just the label Mill attaches to the supposed preference for higher pleasures. Mill's test avails a way of establishing to what extent those of higher faculties find higher pleasures more adorable (Cahn, & Steven, 123).

I disagree with Mill that utilitarianism is a satisfactory philosophy and as such can provide enough bases for education. There are a number of well-known utilitarianism objections, such as its neglect duties and rights or its challenges in accommodating backward-facing attitudes such as resentment and gratitude, but in this setting maybe the most telling objection is its oversimplification of the nature of happiness. It is true that Mill's differentiation between lower and higher pleasures rest on non-utilitarian values. It should be maintained that neither happiness nor pleasure is on their own independent of other values.

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