Introduction to science

Science

2 Moderately unfamiliar Assumptions About AY-Qaeda Introduction to Homeland Security Research Paper August 17, 2013 Mr.. William R Did Lori 2 moderately unfamiliar assumptions about al-Qaeda Abstract From intellectuals to policy-makers alike. All of the extraordinary output on the subject of al-Qaeda, has recently led to a number of far-reaching theories about the group which remain startlingly unexplored.

The two assumptions, this paper examines and reveals each one's foundational role in assertions as well as debates about leaked, despite the relatively unexplored status of each. These 2 assumptions relate to: (1) the role of the internet in actual terrorist activity; and (2) the association between combating a global " AY-Qaeda and combating al-Qaeda In Iraq". Introduction Miller's ever-burgeoning bookish literature which anyone familiar withterrorismwould recognize, quickly titled the 'Six rather unusual propositions about terrorism'.

Is what my research paper plays off. In 2005, Miller's astute and incisive piece brought to the forefront six unfamiliar assumptions about terrorism that should already have spawned discussion among intellectuals In the field, but ad not, until his work provocatively presented those propositions. In a similar stratum, this research paper focuses on 2 rather unfamiliar theories about al-Qaeda which I think demand far greater research, attention, and debate than Miller's had received thus far.

It Is my Intention to focus these reflections on some Insufficiently explored theories regarding particularly al-Qaeda. However, most of the theories relate more broadly to terrorism concerning Issues In general. What Is meant

here by the phrase moderately unfamiliar assumptions ? By ' unfamiliar this dialogue reposes that the thinking explored here prowl beneath many of the affirmations made by intellectuals on al-Qaeda. This coupled with getting beneath many of the affirmations frequently put forward by political types (politicians and policy-makers).

Humbly, this Is not to Imply that these particular assumptions are shared universally: in fact, many of the theories are really opposing pairs of, dichotomous conjectures, Witt those partisan to one side to a certain debate embracing that conjecture while their opponents reciprocate the other. Centrally the point is that these outright and racial foundational notions concerning al-Qaeda, are for many assertions made by those addressing key issues and debating in the field.

By ' assumptions these reflections suggest that Miller's six assumptions have been given inadequate attention in terrorismscholarshipand dialogue. Not saying that these assumptions have been converted into the bases for other claims because they have been considered so obviously true and were taken for granted, or so indispensable research as to be automatically accepted for any scholarship whatsoever to continue. Contrarily, these assumptions engross some complex, inconsequential matters.

This being said too often they have been accepted and neglected in favor of important research in other directions. What I hope to achieve with this paper is to draw attention to them, and in doing so, persuade their investigation through due diligent research and in depth analyses. Far too often these assumptions have not been totally ignored, but they have been

left moderately unexplored. In addition, they also have been taken as the basis for other claims and assertions.

For this reason, this research paper investigates 2 of the six assumptions, n an attempt to reveal what is habitually taken for granted in many conversations about al-Qaeda. This coupled with the consequent penalty for assertions made about counterterrorism and terrorism. In addition, proposals for how each assumption could be explored more completely and systematically are offered. This research paper then concludes by making a note of socialscience, and that it may never offer perfect answers on issues such as those brought up earlier.

Moreover, headway towards a more scrupulous and more researched deliberation on these matters would represent significant progress. Assumption 1: The role of the internet The first moderately unfamiliar assumption requiring in depth research concerns the function of the internet in the dynamics of al-Qaeda, and its product of terrorism. Generally it has become normal to refer with awe to the purportedly amplified central - role that the internet has assumed in the progression of terrorist activities regarding al-Qaeda and its cells .

As for the most part, in a thorough discussion, Atman (2006) suggesting that it 'is no embellishment to say that the Internet is the solitary most significant factor in transforming mostly local Jihad concerns and actions into the truly universal network that al Qaeda has developed into today', and culminating in the claim that 'al Qaeda is hastily becoming the foremost web- directed guerrilla network in the world' (up. 124, 149). Atman and others who

trenchantly talked about the position of the internet in al-Qaeda progression collects evidence of vast amounts of Jihads online activity to craft their case.

Chat rooms, emails and Web sites all bristle with Jihads discussion, dissemination, and debate, providing resources vital to individuals studying al-Qaeda. However, the real mentality of such virtual movement to al-Qaeda and its acts of terrorism remains a relatively unexplored theory in these intellectual accounts of the internet transformation role for al-Qaeda. Some questions some, are internet-based communications in tact bringing together factions who would not otherwise have met?

Or question two dose it Just simply provides an easier, less costly, and more rapid platform for terrorist or radical type exchanges that nevertheless would likely have otherwise taken place? Thirdly, do the social networks acknowledged by Seaman (2008, esp.. up. 109-123) being facilitated ND amplified through use of the internet, or is the primary meaner of face-to-face contact still the way in which definite terrorist goings-on come about? Lastly, is virtual training materials replacing actual physical terrorist training camps.

Or dose those found guilty of the 7 July 2005 bombings in London, demonstrate connections to 'conventional', physical training camps and are they still a key element of terrorist activity? Moreover, dose a rather simplistic, but nevertheless helpful, similarity underscores the point and again asks this question. If an unfamiliar person were to investigate my wan communications, they would surely find an enormous amount of correspondence taking place over the internet, mostly through emails and

research. They might be coaxed to conclude that such correspondence would not be taking place if I were lacking access to the internet.

Now a conclusion such as this is not inevitably warranted however, as many of the very same correspondence that I currently converse through emails are the very same I would communicate if the internet didn't exist. Instead I would use phone calls, letters, and face to face letters, meetings. So, my use of the internet definitely would exhibit an advancement in my earns ofcommunication, the real effect if truth be told would be a displacement of associations and communication that would on the other hand occurred otherwise. So that meaner that the substantive effect would, in reality, be far slighter than it first appeared.

Scholarly Works such as that of " Limit already have begun to suggest that at least somewhat similar phenomenon may characterize the role of the internet in radical Salamis discussions and activity. " [1] " Limit (outwitted a doubt, the internet has played an important and significant role in spreading al-Qaeda ideology and usage, especially as images and videos from Iraq have disseminated quickly and widely around the country, and indeed, around the world. But the oft-asserted and oft-bemoaned link between the role of the internet and actual terrorist activity remains undocumented, unclear - and a sixth rather unexplored assumption.

Research must continue in the direction provided by Bunt (2003), Wingman (AAA, Bibb), and others, and evolve further still from an analysis of what terrorists try to accomplish over the internet to what in fact the actual effects and consequences of such virtual activities are. " Assumption 2: The

relationship between fighting 'AY-Qaeda in Iraq' and fighting al- Qaeda globally On November 16, 2002 in a notoriously proclaiming speech President George W. Bush stated that " We're taking the fight to the terrorists abroad, so we don't have to face them here at home. [3] This bold statement that he and several of his constituents have repeated numerous times since. In response, pundits , scholars, and critical politicians, like Simon and Benjamin (2005, up. 192-193), have retorted that such a notorious proclamation coupled with the conception of the threat faced in Iraq by Americans and its allies alike, is deeply misguided. Several of these critics push and take it a step turner still, declaring Nat t there is little to no correlation between now America fares in Iraq as well as how a global counterterrorism campaign in opposition to al-Qaeda would proceed.

The dichotomy of these opposing views constitutes some relatively unexplored yet significant opposing assumptions. Of course Bush and his constituents reciprocated several arguments in their favor as well fore example: " not only that killing or capturing terrorists in Iraq prevents them room ever getting to American shores,"[3] also, and probably more convincingly, " that dealing " AY-Qaeda in Iraq" a visible defeat will turn the tide of global support against the group. [3] Supporters of these views in particular are later fond that invoking Osama bin Alden's own claim that " when people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they will like the strong horse. " This statement by Bin Laden was used to the advantage of Bush which meet that, for those who supported his comments, meet that success in Iraq holds the the key and potential of becoming a success globally in slowing the momentum spawned by al-Qaeda in recent years. By

saying this the assumption of the right is that crushing 'AY-Qaeda in Iraq' can and will contribute to crushing al-Qaeda globally.

Conversely, Left wingers (Bush's critics) uphold that there was little to no al-Qaeda presence in Iraq before the American invasion in 2003 coupled with the notion that America's expensive and gory efforts in Iraq are in fact, purely a distraction of capital and attention from the global operation against the terrorist group that actually attacked the US on 11 September 2001. The left wingers in general focused on the first and weakest of Bush's two main arguments.

The Intel into Iraqis show that terrorist cells in Iraq are in fact mostly Iraqis as opposed to outsiders who were not affianced in terrorist actions before America entered Iraq. Consecutively, critics assert that even dealing " AY-Qaeda in Iraq" a evident defeat will yield little to hinder al-Qaeda globally. This assumption in this regard by left wingers is that even a comprehensive defeat of " AY-Qaeda in Iraq" would offer an immaterial role to America's global counterterrorism efforts. So the question is which one these partisan assumptions " if either" are correct.

This is enormously the meat of today's debate/research concerning forward momentum in Iraq. The dichotomy of opposing assumptions sadly, and shockingly, had been given virtually no attention by intellectuals at the time. Scrupulously, the question of whether an observer crushing of 'AY-Qaeda in Iraq' would persuade Shadiest and potential Shadiest worldwide hadn't been the subject matter of almost all detailed research at the time. Cook's (2003) intuitive paper entitled, " The recovery of radical Islam in the wake of the

defeat of the Taliban," spelled out the type of research that could be a necessary modeled.

In that paper, Cook traces Jihads debates and proclamations to reveal the ways in which America's notable but incomplete defeat of the Taliban in late 2001 was hastily rationalized and explained away by Shadiest globally. This left them with little if no impression helpful to America's counterterrorism efforts. [10] Some would say that what is needed for success in Iraq is a parallel study, tracing Jihads debates since 2003 coupled with investigating whether the evident success orfailureof " AY-Qaeda in Iraq" shows to have had any impact on generating or dampening though undoubtedly more difficult concern for al-Qaeda globally.

Also it is by no meaner definitive as to the probable results of future developments in Iraq, such a study of the past ten years would provide enormous input to ongoing debates coupled Witt laying the dauntlessly tort evaluating, in a grounded and intellectual manner, the inferences that success by the US against " AY-Qaeda in Iraq" either will or will not yield useful effects against al- Qaeda on a broader scale. In addition, exploring another prospectively intuitive approach to these dichotomies of assumption could emulate Shannon and Tennis's (2007) fascinating " Militant Islam and the futile fight for the reputation". 27] Just as these intellectual types examine past manifestations of American determination in order to evaluate whether militant Psalmists ever truly rework their opinion of the US as wish-washy, current and future research can and should explore whether defeats in one ring for worldwide terrorist groups in reality have any impact on the drive of such groups globally. Research down both these positions, and in

other directions additionally one hopes, would fall short of providing any definitive answers as to the connection between the war against " AY-Qaeda in Iraq" and the war against al-Qaeda globally.