

Lead-obstacles to peace, jeff halper



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OBSTACLES TO PEACE A REFRAMING OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN

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78 Maps DESCRIPTIONS OF MAPS Map 1: 1947 UN Partition of Palestine The UN

Partition Plan tried to divide the country according to demographic

concentrations and national geography, but the Palestinian and Jewish

populations were so intertwined that that became impossible.

Although the Jews comprised only a third of the country's population (548,

000 out of 1,750,000) and owned only 6% of the land, they received 55% of

the country (including both Tel Aviv/Jaffa and Haifa port cities, the Sea of

Galilee and the resource-rich Negev). In the area allocated to the Jewish

state, only about 57% of the population was actually Jewish (538, 000 Jews, 397, 000 Arabs). The Jewish community accepted the Partition Plan; the Palestinians (except those in the Communist Party) and the Arab countries rejected it. Map 2: Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories By the end of the 1948 war ??” called the War of Independence by Israel and the Naqba(??? Disaster???) by the Palestinians ??” Israel controlled 78% of the country, including half the territory that had been allocated by the UN to the Palestinians. Some 750, 000 Palestinians living in what became Israel were made refugees or ??? internally displaced??? people; under 200, 000 remained in their homes. More than 418 villages, two-thirds of the villages of Palestine, were systematically destroyed by Israel after their residents had left or been driven out.

Of the Arab areas, now reduced to 22% of the country, the West Bank was taken by Jordan and Gaza by Egypt. The 1949 Armistice Line, today known as the ??? Green Line, ??? de facto demarcates the State of Israel until today. Since 1988, when the Palestinians recognized Israel within that boundary, it has constituted the basis of the two-state option, with the Palestinians claiming a state on all the lands conquered by Israel in 1967: the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. Maps 3-7: Five Elements Defining the Palestinian Bantusan Israel defines its policy of ensuring permanent control over the Occupied Territories as ??? creating facts on the ground.

??? In this conception, Israeli control must be made immune from any external or internal pressures to remove Israel from the Occupied Territories (which Israel vehemently denies is an occupation at all), as well as to foreclose forever the possibility of a viable and truly sovereign Palestinian

state. Nevertheless, even Sharon recognizes that Israel needs a Palestinian state, since it can neither extend citizenship to the TerritoriesTM three and a half million Palestinians nor deny it to them. It also needs a Palestinian state to relieve itself of the necessity of accepting the refugees.

A Bantustan, a cantonized Palestinian mini-state controlled by Israel yet possessing a limited independence, thus solves IsraelTM's fundamental dilemma of how to keep control over the entire country yet TM get rid ofTM its Palestinian population (short of actual TM transferTM). The contours of that Bantustan are defined by five elements comprising IsraelTM's Matrix of Control as illustrated in the following maps: (1) Areas A and B; (2) the closure; (3) the settlement blocs; (4) the infrastructure; and (5) the Separation Barrier/Wall. A full (if complex) picture of the Matrix of Control is depicted in Map 10, and the truncated Palestinian mini-state Israel is creating in Map 11.

Map 3: Defining the Palestinian Bantustan. Element #1: West Bank Areas A, B and C In the Oslo II agreement of 1995, the West Bank was divided into three Areas: A, under full Palestinian Authority control; B, under Palestinian civil control but joint Israeli-Palestinian security; and C, under full Israeli control. Although Area A was intended to expand until it included all of the West Bank except IsraelTM's settlements, its military facilities and East Jerusalem TM whose status would then be negotiated TM in fact the division became a permanent feature.

Area A comprises 18% of the West Bank, B another 22%, leaving a full 60%, Area C, including most of Palestinian farmland and water, under exclusive Israeli control. These areas, comprising 64 islands, shape the contours of

the ??? cantons??? Sharon has proposed as the basis of the future Palestinian state. Taken together with Gaza, which Israel will relinquish, the emerging Bantustan will consist of five truncated cantons ??“ a northern one around Nablus and Jenin; a central one around Ramallah; a southern one around Bethlehem and Hebron; enclaves in East Jerusalem; and Gaza. In this scheme Israel will expand from its present 78% to 85-90%, with the Palestinian state confined to just 10-15% of the country. Map 4: Defining the Palestinian Bantustan. Element #2: The Closure and House Demolitions At the very beginning of the Oslo peace process Israel established an ever-constrictive system of permanent ??? closure??? over the Occupied Territories, a regime both arbitrary and counter-productive.

Arbitrary because there was no particular rise in terrorism or security threats during this time; the security situation was certainly better than it was during the first Intifada, when there was no closure whatsoever. And counter-productive because, rather than benefiting the Palestinians, it meant that the ??? peace process??? had actually impoverished and imprisoned them, destroying their commerce and industry and de-developing their emerging country. The permanent checkpoints depicted on the map, together with hundreds of other ??? flying??? checkpoints erected spontaneously throughout the Territories and earthen barriers to the entrances to virtually all the Palestinian cities, towns and villages, present 600+ obstacles to Palestinian movement on any given day. They serve to accustom the Palestinians to living in a collective space defined by Areas A and B. When these cantons finally become a truncated Palestinian state, the Palestinians will already be adapted to its narrow confines. So minimal will be the

Palestinians??™ expectations that the addition of corridors linking the cantons will give them the feeling of ??? freedom,??? thus leading them to acquiesce to the Bantustan. Israel??™s policy of house demolitions, by which over 24, 000 Palestinian homes have been demolished since 1967, is designed to confine the Palestinian population to the islands of A and B as well as small enclaves in East Jerusalem.

(It is also a policy that impacts seriously on the Palestinian population within Israel.) Map 5: Defining the Palestinian Bantustan. Element #3: Israel??™s Settlement Blocs When Ehud Barak proposed to ??? jump??? to final status negotiations in 1999, he consolidated the settlements Israel sought to retain into ??? blocs,??? leaving the more isolated and less strategic ones vulnerable to dismantling. Thus, instead of dealing with 200 settlements, Barak had only to negotiate the annexation of seven settlement blocs: (1) the Jordan Valley Bloc; (2) the Ariel Bloc that divides the West Bank east and west and preserves Israeli control over the Territories largest water aquifer; (3) the Modi??™ in Bloc, connecting the Ariel settlements to Jerusalem; a ??? Greater Jerusalem??? consisting of (4) the Givat Ze??™ev Bloc to the northwest of the city, (5) the expansive Ma??™aleh Adumim bloc extending to the northeast and east of Jerusalem and (6) the Etzion Bloc to the southwest; and (7) a corridor rising from the settlements in the south to incorporate the Jewish settlements in Hebron. While the extent of these settlements blocs is to some extent subject to negotiations, their function, however, is to further define and divide the Palestinian cantons. Representing some 25% of the West Bank, their annexation to Israel has been approved by the US in the bilateral Bush-Sharon Exchange of Letters in April 2004.

(Within the settlement blocs are depicted both the settlements themselves and the master plans that surround and extend them.) Map 6: Defining the Palestinian Bantustan. Element #4: The Infrastructure of Control In order to incorporate the West Bank and East Jerusalem permanently into Israel proper, a \$3 billion system of highways and ??? bypass roads??? has been constructed that integrates the settlement blocs into the metropolitan areas of Tel Aviv, Modi??™ in and Jerusalem, while creating additional barriers to Palestinian movement. This ambitious project articulates with the Trans-Israeli Highway, now being built along the entire length of the country, hugging the West Bank in its central portion.

Shifting Israel??™s population center eastward from the coast to the corridor separating Israel??™s major cities from the settlement blocs it seeks to incorporate, the Trans-Israel Highway will become the new spine of the country, upon which the by-pass road network can be hung. The result is the reconfiguration of the country from two parallel north-south units ??“ Israel and the West Bank, the basis of the two-state idea ??“ into one country integrated east-west. Besides ensuring Israeli control, the reorientation of traffic, residential and commercial patterns further weakens a truncated Palestinian mini-state; each Palestinian canton is integrated separately into Israel, with only tenuous connections one to the other. Map 7: Defining the Palestinian Bantustan.

Element #5: The Separation Barrier/Wall The final defining element of the bantustan is the Separation Barrier, known by its opponents as the Apartheid Wall both because it serves to make permanent an apartheid situation between Israelis and Palestinians, and because it rises to a massive

concrete wall of eight meters (26 feet) when reaching Palestinian population centers. It is replete with prison-like watch towers, gates, security roads, electronic fences and deadly armaments. While sold to the public as an innocent security device, the Barrier in fact defines the border between Israel (including the areas of the West Bank and East Jerusalem Israel seeks to annex) and the Palestinian mini-state. It follows not the Green Line but establishes a new demographic line that extends Israel eastward into the West Bank. Although the Barrier's overall route has been moved closer to the Green Line in light of the International Court of Justice's ruling, the addition of supplementary security zones and special security zones to the Barrier's complex still retains the convoluted route around the settlement blocs in order to ensure they are on the "right" side of the Barrier. When completed the Separation Barrier will be five times longer than the Berlin Wall (some 700 kms versus 155), in places twice as high and will unilaterally annex East Jerusalem and some 8% of the West Bank. As an installation costing over \$3 billion, it is not designed to be dismantled.

Map 8: The Palestinian Bantustan in the Gaza Strip The Gaza Strip is a tiny area of land 45 km (30 miles) long and 5-12 km (3-9 miles) in length, surrounded by Israeli settlements and electronic fences and gates. As of this writing, almost four years after Sharon's plan of disengagement was completed, its 1.5 million Palestinian inhabitants live on just 139 square miles.

Gazans, once farmers, are today impoverished, their lands cleared of fruit and olive trees and other crops as security measures. Some 75% of Gazans live on less than \$2 a day, 80% are refugees living mainly in squalid

camps. Gaza has one of the highest population densities in the world ??” 10, 665 persons per square mile, almost four times the density of Bangladesh. Malnutrition among children is rampant; most of its water is taken by the settlers or is highly polluted; and more than 5, 500 homes have been demolished and tens of thousands of more damaged in the course of the second Intifada and Operation Cast Lead.

Gaza is divided into white, yellow, blue and green areas that divide Israelis and Palestinians. The settlements inside of Gaza have been removed, but post-??? disengagement??? Palestinians still live in a cage, blockaded by sea, fenced in by land, unable to travel by air, prevented from seeking employment in Israel. Map 9: The Matrix of Control When all the elements are put together, the full extent and complexity Israel??™s Matrix of Control becomes evident.

This raises the major question before us: Is the Occupation reversible? If it is not, if the Occupation can never be dismantled to the extent that a viable Palestine emerges, then should we continue supporting a ??? two-state solution??? To do so places us in a position of advocating for a Bantustan. If the Occupation is reversible, then we must ensure that the minimal conditions for a viable Palestinian state are achieved. In either case Israel??™s ??? facts on the ground,??? its Matrix of Control, are essential parts of the political equation. Map 10: The Emerging Palestinian Bantustan in the West Bank When the elements of the Matrix of Control are combined with American agreement for Israel??™s annexing its major settlement blocs, the outlines of a Palestinian Bantustan clearly emerge. It is a mini-state of four islands occupying 10-15% of the country with no international borders, no

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territorial contiguity, no freedom of movement internally or externally, little economic viability, limited access to Jerusalem, no control of its water or other major resources, no control of its airspace or even its communications sphere, a demilitarized entity lacking even the authority to enter into foreign alliances without Israeli approval.

If Israel has succeeded in rendering the Occupation permanent, it is not because of the logistical difficulties in removing the settlements. A Peace Now poll found that fully 90% of the settlers (most of whom live in the Territories for economic and ??? quality of life ??? reasons) would leave if they were offered comparable housing inside Israel. It is only that they will if the international community to force the Israel government to abandon its settlement enterprise that is lacking.

If that is the case, the international community is confronted with two stark choices: either to accept and condone a new apartheid situation, or to work towards another just and sustainable solution ??? a single democratic state in the entire country, a regional confederation or some other option. It is to be hoped that apartheid, the only ??? solution ??? Israel is offering by rendering its Occupation irreversible, will not be acceptable. Map 11: Three Alternative Bantustans

The problem is not obtaining a Palestinian state. Israel itself desperately needs a Palestinian state, since it can neither bestow citizenship on the Palestinians nor deny it to them permanently. In order to retain its Jewish character yet control the entire country, Israel must somehow ??? relieve itself ??? of the Palestinian population.

The only way out (except for transfer, which is impossible in the present circumstances) is to establish a Bantustan. Sharon has suggested a Bantustan (he calls it a plan of ??? cantonization???) on 40% of the West Bank, but has indicated that he is willing to unilaterally ??? give??? the Palestinians 60%, perhaps even a bit more. Labor, wishing to make a Bantustan cosmetically acceptable, would offer up to 85% of the Occupied Territories, knowing that Israel needs just a strategic 15% to retain control.

Map 12: Moveable Borders: 1947, 1949, 1967 and On These maps illustrate the changing borders at the expense of the Palestinians over the years. The picture that emerges is one of displacement, whether actually driving the Palestinians out of the country or confining them to a sort of reservations.

Map 13: Municipal Jerusalem, with the Separation Barrier In 1967 Israel annexed an area of 70 sq.

kms., which it called ??? East??? Jerusalem, to the 38 sq. kms. that had comprised Israeli ??? West??? Jerusalem since 1948, even though the Palestinian side of the city under Jordan was just 6 sq. kms.

It gerrymandered the municipal border according to two principles: incorporating as much unbuilt-upon Palestinian land as possible for future Israeli settlements (the ??? inner ring??? of settlements depicted in blue), while excluding as much of the Palestinian population as possible so as to maintain a 72% Jewish majority in the city. As the concentrations of Palestinian population show (in brown), the municipal border cut in half a living urban fabric of communities, families, businesses, schools, housing and roads. Its placement of settlements prevents the urban development of Palestinian Jerusalem ??? the economic and cultural as well as religious

center of Palestinian life ??” transforming its residential and commercial areas into disconnected enclaves. There are today more Israelis living in ??? East??? Jerusalem (more than 200, 000) than Palestinians.

Since Palestinians cannot live in ??? West??? Jerusalem, Israeli restrictions on building (combined with an aggressive campaign of house demolitions) have confined that population to a mere 6% of the urban land ??” although they are a third of the Jerusalem population. Discriminatory administrative and housing measures have led to the ??? Quiet Transfer??? of thousands of Palestinian families out of the city, and to the loss of their Jerusalem residency. Map 14: The Three Jerusalems: Municipal, Greater and Metropolitan The ??? inner ring??? of settlements that defines municipal Jerusalem is today being linked with an ??? outer ring??? of settlements to transform Jerusalem from a city into a region that controls the entire central portion of the West Bank. ??? Greater Jerusalem,??? the master plan of which was formalized already in 1995, extends the city far into the West Bank. Yet an even more extensive ??? Jerusalem??? exists: Metropolitan Jerusalem. Though not intended for annexation, it forms a planning unit designed to ensure that Ramallah and Bethlehem remain undeveloped satellite cities dependent upon Israeli Jerusalem even if they eventually fall across a political border separating Israel from Palestine. Indeed, by creating extensive buffer zones between the city of Jerusalem and the surrounding West Bank, Israel is eliminating the economic heart of any Palestinian state. In this way Israel keeps all the developmental potential of the city — and the country as a whole ??” firmly in its hands, rendering the

Palestinian state anon-viable entity existing on a Third World subsistence level.

The map also shows the ??? E-1??? area, 4000 acres annexed to Ma??™ aleh Adumim in a combined move by the Netanyahu and Barak governments.

With the addition of E-1, Ma??™ aleh Adumim??™ s master plan extends entirely across the West Bank from Jerusalem to Jericho, effectively severing the northern West Bank from the south. Palestinian traffic will likely be diverted into Israeli territory (along the ??? Eastern Ring Road??? now being constructed in East Jerusalem), allowing Israel to control Palestinian movement even in the event that a Palestinian state emerges. E-1 reveals the subtle, sophisticated and effective use of planning for control employed by Israel. Map 15: The Colonization of Jerusalem??™ s Old City The settler movement has long had its eyes set on increasing Jewish control inside the Old City of Jerusalem. Few parts of the Old City are without settler encroachment. Even Damascus Gate, the famous entrance to the Muslim Quarter, is framed with settlements including a house owned by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (No.

6 on the map). Map 16: Settlement activity in East Jerusalem The Israeli government, the Municipality of Jerusalem, and settler organizations are working to strengthen the control settlements and Israeli infrastructure have in East Jerusalem. Individual properties are bought, stolen and confiscated by settlers and large swaths of land are expropriated by the government for new, large settlements. Just as the government wants to establish facts on the ground with settlements surrounding East Jerusalem, so too do the East Jerusalem settlements movements, led by the Elad and Ateret Cohanim

groups, wish to surround the Old City of Jerusalem with a sufficiently dense Jewish population to prejudice the status of the land in future negotiations.

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checkpoints and other obstacles to movement, policies of house demolition and land expropriation, the creation of a ??? Greater??? Israelijerusalem, Israeli control of Palestinian water and other natural resources (including theairspace and even the electro-magnetic sphere), the ??? Separation Barrier??? and more.

Butit then goes on to examine what we call Israel??™s ??? Matrix of Control,??? a layered system ofadministration, planning, law and policies (such as economic ??? closure???) which, togetherwith the facts on the ground, lay the infrastructure for permanent Israel control of theentire country from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean. Throughout we also identify theideological underpinnings, military logic and ultimate goals of Israeli policies of expansionand control. Moving from description to analysis, we ask: Where is Israel headed in its four decadeold(and counting) Occupation Are we moving towards a genuine attempt to resolve ourcentury-long conflict with the Palestinians or, more chillingly, towards a state of permanently??? warehousing??? them We also examine the mechanisms by which Israel has managedto perpetuate its control over the Palestinians and their lands, what we call ??? framing??? inparticular: How officials of successive Israeli governments and their spokespeople succeedin ??? selling??? their country??™s heavy-handed control over millions of people deprived of theirlands and rights as somehow justifiable How they convince not only its own peoplebut also otherwise liberal people abroad ??“ political leaders, journalists, academics andmuch of the Diaspora Jewish community, not to mention the ??? man on the street,??? ??“ tosupport policies which are manifestly unjust, which plainly violate international law andfundamental

human rights and which serve to destabilize relations between the West and the entire Muslim world. How do they succeed in casting Palestinian resistance as base terrorism while casting Israel, one of the world's strongest military powers and one of its longest standing Occupying Powers, as a mere victim? Finally, and most important, we pose here the question of whether it is still possible to end the Occupation and salvage the two-state solution, or do we have to begin considering other options? Will the new Obama Administration depart from American policy over the past half-century of offering absolute support to Israel no matter what the political costs? More pointedly, will the Obama Administration succeed in persuading Congress, Israel's bi-partisan trump card, to support a more assertive policy of finally ending the Occupation in favor of a just and lasting peace? And what is our role as peace-makers and concerned members of the international civil society in bringing about the end of this increasingly bloody and globally destabilizing conflict? Besides imparting information and addressing these fundamental questions, this book is intended to help advocates of a just peace reframe the conflict in ways that offer just, workable and sustainable (if often creative) solutions to the conflict. Since this is a book published by a critical Israeli peace and human rights organization focused on ending the Occupation, it does not hesitate to place responsibility for resolving the conflict mainly at Israel's doorstep.

This is not to absolve the Palestinians of responsibility; it simply recognizes the tremendous imbalance of power between the two sides, and thus of their respective abilities to end the conflict. Thus our reframing stresses three key elements: that an Occupation indeed exists and is the center of the

conflict (since 1967 Israel has officially denied that fact); that Israel is the strong party in the conflict, the only one that can actually end the Occupation, and which therefore can be held accountable for its policies and actions (rather than Israel's disingenuous presentation of itself as the victim); and that the Occupation is pro-active, a vehicle for establishing Israel's permanent control over the entire country, not defensive or reactive. Our reframing also critically questions the concept of terrorism and its role in the conflict. Only by reframing the conflict, we believe, will we be able to formulate an approach which will effectively lead to its just end. Toward that goal we also suggest alternative outlines of a just peace based on a regional win-win approach. The picture presented here is bleak. While early signs that Obama is treating the conflict seriously are encouraging (the appointment of George Mitchell as his envoy, in particular), there is little evidence, given Netanyahu's recent election and the formation of his extremely hard-line government, that anything less than major pressure applied by the US on Israel will end either the Occupation or the conflict and that pressure remains a distant possibility at best.

Still, this book is not defeatist. Every occupation, every instance of oppression, can be ended. The action-oriented campaigns sponsored by ICAHD and its partner organizations, Palestinian and Israeli, seek to mobilize your support in our common struggle to achieve a just peace. The Occupation challenges all of us – governments, faith-based communities, trade unions, human rights organizations, activist groups and concerned individuals alike. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we contend, is far more than a localized war between two peoples in a remote land.

It is nothing less than a conflict with fundamental significance for the global community. Being emblematic for the Muslim world as a whole – the “clash of civilizations” from a Muslim point of view, an American and Western-backed occupation and not merely an Israeli one – it is inconceivable that stability be restored to the broader Middle East and security to the West unless this conflict is resolved. No less important, Israel’s Occupation represents a profound challenge to a global system based on international law and universal human rights.

What does it mean to peoples the world over if a regime of control, displacement, a denial of fundamental rights and repression actually prevails, in defiance of international law and more than 200 UN resolutions? If occupation and repression actually defeat a people’s aspirations for freedom and fundamental human rights, then what are the implications for oppressed peoples in other parts of the world far from public attention? Here, and we will have a much tougher time prevailing over oppressive regimes in the future. Indeed, as 9/11 dramatically illustrated, in a global reality it is impossible to insulate ourselves, the privileged of the world, from the effects of grievances, suffering and violence in even the furthest corners of the earth. This manual is intended to empower you to act together with us, Israelis and Palestinians seeking a just peace in the Middle East, to bestow upon all of us a truly new, inclusive, just and peaceful world order.

REFRAMING THE CONFLICT – Kill as many Arabs as possible and talk as much as possible about peace. – The formula of political strategist Reuven Adler used to lead Sharon and Olmert to power and repeated in Livni’s successful election campaign of 2009. When it comes to resolving

conflicts such as that pitting Israeli Jews against PalestinianArabs, framing is more important than the facts. Everyone agrees that around 2800Palestinians and less than 35 Israelis were killed in the Israeli assault on Gaza in December, 2008/January, 2009, and in the two years leading up to it. Most Israeli Jews, however, sawthemselves as innocent victims of terror while viewing the Palestinians as terrorists whomerely got what they deserved. Palestinians, by contrast, see their dead and woundedas casualties of a struggle for independence and victims of Israeli State Terror. In theireyes, while the Israeli dead were the unfortunate victims of their own government??™srepressive policy of Occupation, they, the Palestinians, had been left by both Israel and theinternational community with little choice but to strike out and resist.

Both peoples professa desire for peace, yet both blame the other for the continuing conflict. These are not minordifferences, but the very ground on which political solutions can or cannot be formulatedand successfully promoted. Israel??™s ??? Security???" FramingIsraeli governments ??" all of them, Labor, Likud and Kadima together ??" have advancedamong the Jewish public a framing based solely on Jewish rights and security. Briefly, itgoes like this: The Jews of ancient times (including the Hebrews, Israelites and Judeans, since the term???" Jew???" appears in the Bible only in the Book of Esther) constituted a nation with all thetrappings of nationhood.

They had a country that encompassed greater or lesser parts of theLand of Israel, a language, a religion, a national history, a literature and, above all, a tribalsense of identity based on ties of blood. After two abortive revolts against the Romans, thenation-tribe was exiled from its country. For two

millennia it existed among the nations as a people apart –“ alien, persecuted, ghettoized, clinging to its national identity and longing for its return to Zion.

In the late nineteenth century, spurred by nationalist movements throughout Europe, Zionism emerged as the national expression of Jews seeking a return to the Homeland from which they had been forcibly expelled so many centuries before. This right of return, of self-determination, conforms to that of all other nations who have sought political independence in the past two centuries. After a period of nation-building, the State of Israel arose triumphantly in 1948, defeating five Arab armies. Since then the tiny state, a Western (albeit Jewish) democracy, has persevered despite constant Arab threats to its existence. Throughout, Israel has aspired to peace, only to be frustrated by its intractable enemies.

All its actions against the Palestinians and other Arabs are merely reactions of self-defense foisted upon the small Jewish state. David and Goliath. Israel desires peace, but it has no Palestinian – partner. – The Palestinians want only to throw the Jews into the sea.

What is wrong with this story First off, if you notice, there is no mention of Occupation, all – Arab – resistance (the term – Palestinian – does not enter into the framing, since it admits to another people living in – our – country which we do not wish to acknowledge) cast as mere – terrorism. – But it also contains elements not stated explicitly, without which one cannot understand Israeli policy. According to mainstream Zionist ideology, the entire Land of Israel – belongs – exclusively to the Jewish people, an

assertion that nullified any Palestinian rights or claims to the country, together with their very identity as a people and historic presence in a place called Palestine. Since the Palestinians understandably would have none of this, their very assertion of Jewish exclusivity made them, in fact, permanent enemies at least enemies until such a time as Israel would acknowledge their own national presence. Unwilling to do this, Israel then found itself burdened by a permanent security threat which, paradoxically, required it to gain and maintain control of the entire country, thereby eliminating the possibility of a viable Palestinian state and perpetuating the conflict eternally.

From right to left Israeli political and military leaders have inculcated among the Jewish public the conviction, almost a fixed assumption, that there is no political solution to the conflict, that one side or the other must win and that side has to be, of course, Israel. Needless to say that a broader implication of this is that Israel belongs to the Western world and has little if any interest in integrating into a hostile Middle East. This framing has great implications. Since the Arabs, all of them, including Arab citizens of Israel, are Israel's permanent enemies, there can never be genuine or lasting peace. I argue, says Alan Dershowitz (2003: 7), perhaps Israel's most strident advocate, that it is impossible to understand the conflict in the Middle East without accepting the reality that from the very beginning the strategy of the Arab leadership has been to eliminate the existence of any Jewish state, and indeed any substantial Jewish population, in what is now Israel.

...The goal has always been the same: eliminating the Jewish state and transferring most of the Jews out of the area.??? The best Israelis can expect, then, are tenuous periods of quiet, a fragile security based solely upon their military superiority and control of the entire country ??? from the [Jordan] river to the [Mediterranean] sea.??? Any possibility of peace with the Palestinians is ruled out in this framing; the Israeli public is sentenced to a war with them until they either submit to Israeli dictates or are driven out of the country altogether ??” the central demand of Avigdor Lieberman??™s ??? Israel Is Our Home??? party, whose rise to power in the February, 2009, elections was due in large part to its attraction for Jewish youth. Indeed, the implications of the security framing explain the ferocity by which Israel suppressed the second Intifada and attempted to pacify Gaza, the unrestrained use of military force against a civilian population and a degree of destruction so greatly disproportionate to the actual threat. The ??? Arabs??? must be put in their place.

They must be disabused of the notion that they are equal partners in a peace process. As far back as 1923, long before organized popular Palestinian resistance to Zionism emerged, Ze??™ev Jabotinsky, the 22 founder of Revisionist Zionism and the ideological father of today??™s Likud Party, formulated the seminal ??? Iron Wall??? doctrine evident today in Israel??™s political and military policies.??? Every indigenous people,??? he wrote, will resist alien settlers as long as they see any hope of ridding themselves of the danger of foreign settlement. This is how the Arabs will behave and go on behaving so long as they possess a gleam of hope that they can prevent ??? Palestine??™ from becoming the Land of Israel.??? [The sole way to an

agreement, then,] is through the iron wall, that is to say, the establishment in Palestine of a force that will in no way be influenced by Arab pressure....

A voluntary agreement is unattainable.... We must either suspend our settlement efforts or continue them without paying attention to the mood of the natives.

Settlement can thus develop under the protection of a force that is not dependent on the local population, behind an iron wall which they will be powerless to break down. In more recent times the Iron Wall doctrine has been reaffirmed, if in even more brutal terms. In 2002, during the second Intifada, Moshe (??? Boogie???) Ya??™ alon, the Israeli army Chief of Staff, declared: ??? The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people.??? The exclusivist Zionist security framing explains the why Israel chooses to take ??? unilateral steps??? in trying to impose its own ??? solution.??? The exclusivist security framing also explains why Israeli governments adopt, in the words of then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak (also a former Chief of Staff), a ??? take-it-or-leave-it??? approach to negotiating with the Palestinians, why they have destroyed Palestinian infrastructure with impunity, including more than 25, 000 homes in the Occupied Territories since 1967 and tens of thousands more of its own (Arab) citizens within Israel, and why they are able to imprison an entire people within a wall that, in the words of a prominent Israeli military historian, Martin van Crefeld, should be so high ??? even the birds cannot fly over it.??? All this has given rise to what the Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling (2001: 109) calls ??? civilian militarism,??? a central component of Israeli culture.

Conflict and war, he argues, have become ??? a self-evident and routine part of everyday life.??? Civilian militarism is systematically internalized by most statesmen, politicians and the general public as a self-evident reality whose imperatives transcend partisan or social allegiances. The gist of civilian militarism is that military considerations, as well as matters that are defined as national security issues, almost always receive higher priority than political, economic or ideological problems. Thus, dialectically, making peace is also a military matter [the election slogans ??? Peace with Security being prime examples]..

.. This, then, helps explain why 85% of Israeli Jews support the construction of the Wall and more than 80% supported the assault on Gaza. It addresses a question frequently asked by visitors when they view the suffering and destruction caused by Israel in the Occupied Territories: ??? Why, especially given what the Jews have suffered in the past, does the Israeli public allow this??? The answer is framing, a combination of an exclusive claim to the land, denial of the rights and very existence of another people there, and an entrenched notion that the ??? Arabs??? are and will always be Israel??™s enemy ??? and no reference at all to occupation or any form of oppression that might explain ??? or justify ??? Palestinian resistance.

If, as Ehud Barak and most other Israeli leaders say, is true, that there simply is no political solution to the conflict because of ??? them??? (not, of course, because of us), then there is nothing left but to accept the bitter fact that peace is impossible. Although not committed to the Greater Land of Israel ideology or to the Occupation (two-thirds of Israeli Jews supported the

Oslopeace process), the Israeli Jewish public is reduced to demanding one thing of its leaders: personal security. If not peace, then peace and quiet. They support whatever brings them that: a Palestinian state in all of the Occupied Territories or loading the Arabs (citizens or not) on trucks and shipping them out of the country. Whatever works, the suffering and the fate of the Palestinians being of little concern. ??? We??™ ve offered them peace,??? Israeli Jews say,??? and they refused in violence.

They deserve no sympathy. They deserve anything they get. The hell with them. They brought their suffering on themselves.

??? Or, as David Ben-Gurion said after the outbreak of the Palestinian Revolt in 1936: A comprehensive agreement is undoubtedly out of the question now. For only after total despair on the part of the Arabs, despair that will come not only from the failure of the disturbances and the attempt at rebellion, but also as a consequence of our growth in the country, may the Arabs possibly acquiesce to a Jewish Eretz Israel. Finally, the security framing leaves out, or misrepresents, the issue of power. Israel has managed, in a wonder of framing, to successfully present itself as the victim, the hapless little kid in what Netanyahu calls ??? a tough neighborhood of bullies.??? This is a crucial part of the security framing since it relieves Israel of all responsibility. A victim, after all, is a victim and cannot be held accountable, since his or her actions come merely out of self-defense. Being a victim, however, is a very powerful place to be.

Israel can be a regional superpower and an occupying power, yet have responsibility. Indeed, it is the flight from responsibility that impels the

security framing. Casting itself as the victim only distorts the power balance between Israel and the Palestinians and the fundamental fact that only Israel can end the Occupation and thus, through good faith negotiations with the Palestinians, the conflict as a whole.

Israel, and the pre-state Zionist community that preceded it, has always enjoyed disproportionate power, control and responsibility. Since the turn of the twentieth century the Zionist movement garnered international support denied to the Palestinians and other Arabs, as well as economic and military superiority. Israel is the regional super-power. It is a state recognized by the international community with an economy three times larger than Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon put together, more than 40 times the size of the Palestinians' (\$80+ billion compared to less than \$2 billion). It has a formal military alliance with the world's largest superpower, from which it receives more than \$3 billion in annual military assistance. It is the world's fourth largest nuclear power, possessing up to 300 nuclear warheads. And it is an occupying power. The Palestinians, by contrast, have no state, no functioning economy, no army, not even the ability to move freely from village to village within their own areas.

This asymmetry of power, even within the Arab world as a whole – a world with which it has largely achieved peace, at least on the governmental level – thrusts upon Israel an asymmetry of responsibility. A Rights-Based Reframing of the Conflict Needless to say, as progressive Israelis who do not accept the notion of permanent enemies or other attempts to mystify the conflict for self-serving reasons, we find Israel's security framing

neither acceptable nor true; neither is it helpful for achieving a just and lasting peace. Our reading of the history of the region, our understanding of how the security framing justifies and enables Israel's Occupation, our experiences with Palestinians who certainly do desire peace if it is accompanied by a just solution to the conflict which includes their own narrative and national claims, as well as our commitment to the prophetic Jewish values of social justice, all lead us to a very different framing, one based on universal human rights and a conviction that every political conflict has a solution. It is a reframing that offers hope of a better future for both peoples rather than ceaseless conflict and suffering that envisions one side winning over the other. Our reframing, then, starts with the obvious proposition that two peoples live in Palestine/Israel, each aspiring to national self-determination yet each having to recognize the collective existence and rights of the other. While holding different visions of desirable and possible solutions to the conflict – some of us favor a two-state solution, some a binational or democratic state, others a regional confederation – we share the belief that the conflict can be ended in a way that respects and protects both sides (although we tend not to accept the notion of sides; one of the slogans of the Israeli peace camp is: We refuse to be enemies). We reject, then, not only the premise that the Arabs are our permanent enemies but even the proposition that Jews and Arabs have been enemies from time immemorial or that we are embroiled in a clash of civilizations. We reject as well the notion that terrorism lies at the root of the conflict.

Both the PLO and the Arab League, after all, have recognized Israel within the 1967 borders, Israelis and Palestinians have engaged in prolonged negotiations in the past and Israel has achieved peace with many Arab and Muslim countries and is steadily expanding its relations throughout the Arab and broader Muslim worlds. We also insist, in opposition to the security paradigm which asserts that Israel's policies and actions are only defensive in nature, which they are not. There is no reason why Israel should not be held accountable for an Occupation which is pro-active and intended to establish permanent Israel control over the entire country while denying the Palestinians a viable state of their own. 25 Framing is a powerful weapon.

Our task, if we aspire to bring about peace and security for both peoples, is to debunk the security framing while replacing it with a more constructive and inclusive one based on universal human rights. Reframing is not easy. In any debate, the party which succeeds in framing the issue and determining the terms of the discussion (such as terrorism) wins, since by capturing the logic of the debate its arguments lead inexorably to its desired conclusions. Here Israel enjoys a great advantage. Its framing, lavishly funded by state agencies, painstakingly constructed by PR agencies and communicated by professional spokespeople, benefits from a grossly unbalanced access to the media. The other side to the discussion, that of the Israeli peace camp or the Palestinians themselves, lacks the resources, access and image to make their voices heard.

We are thus thrust into the weak position of refuter, left only to respond to Israel's charges yet without the space to present a coherent, credible and

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persuasive alternative framing of our own. Confined to countering the arguments of the ??? framer, ??? respondents (called the ??? negativeside??? in debates) invariably come across as defensive, inarticulate and unconvincing. Given Israel??™s success in presenting its case in a clear and concise manner, it is imperative that we step back from merely rebutting in order to present a coherent and compelling ??? reframing ??? of our own. In contrast to Zionist exclusivity and Israel??™s security framing, our alternative rights-based framing (though it is by no means the definitive one) may be put as follows: Two peoples defining themselves in national terms and claiming the right of selfdetermination are locked in a bloody contest over both fundamental claims to the country and ways in which they can share it. Both consider themselves the native inhabitants. Here the symmetry ends. We must break the narrative of ??? both peoples ??? so as to see the very different positions of each side and the asymmetry of power between them.

Israeli Jews represent the dominant party and have since well before 1948. They possess a state that has been recognized, by the Palestinian leadership, the Arab League and the international community alike, on 78% of the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. Since neither its national existence nor its right to live in security within the ??? Green Line ??? is challenged, the cause of Israel??™s continued war against the Palestinians is over control of the entire country, coveted by Israel for religious and national reasons, as well as (it claims) security concerns.

Israel seeks to be a Jewish state which nevertheless permanently controls all of Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Israel??™s attempt to deny

its occupation and to make its presence permanent flies in the face of international law which defines an occupation as a temporary situation of conquest that has to be resolved through negotiations, and is patently illegal. Israel has adopted a unilateral position, backed by its policy of creating facts on the ground, that prevents, or at best stunts, any Palestinian state, since Israel has never officially acknowledged the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Similarly, the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their country and homes is guaranteed in international humanitarian law.

Israeli insistence that they may return only to a Palestinian state (if there is one) violates those rights. The Palestinians' position, though lacking today an authoritative voice due to deliberate attempts on the part of Israel to either fragmentize their leadership or eliminate it, does not present as clear and comprehensive a framing as the Israeli one. In principle, it sees the entire country as Palestine but recognizes the existence of Israel as a given and is willing to accept a two-state solution by which the Palestinian state encompass all the Occupied Territories, the 22% of the country conquered by Israel in 1967 (with some minor border adjustments). Israel must also recognize the refugees' Right of Return and acknowledge its role in creating the refugee problem, although the Palestinians are willing to negotiate the actual return. The two-state solution is far from just (leaving the Palestinians with less than a quarter of their historic homeland). Still, all Palestinian factions, including Hamas, have indicated it is one with which they could live. It represents a compromise that could be sold to both peoples, but if Israel continues to resist it, we must be prepared for a transition to a one-state struggle for equal civil rights.

Only the Palestinians can signal that switch. This reframing rests on a number of key re-conceptualizations: Israel as the strong party in the conflict. Recasting Israel as the strong party in the conflict rather than as a victim enables us to demand accountability under international law – demanding, in particular, that the Fourth Geneva Convention be applied – as well as conformity to UN resolutions. It also facilitates effective campaigns of boycotts, divestment and sanctions on the part of citizens and governments aimed at bringing pressure to bear on Israel to change its policies. The Occupation as a pro-active policy.

A peace and human rights reframing must place the Occupation properly at the center of the political discussion over the conflict. It must then go on to make a telling point: rather than simply defensive responses to Palestinian terrorism, Israel's occupation policies represent a pro-active claim to the entire country. Below I will make the claim that no major element of Israel's Matrix of Control – settlements, infra-structure, the closure, land expropriation and house demolitions, the destruction of Palestinian agriculture and other policies of economic de-development or the construction of the Wall – can be explained in terms of security and defense. The contention that Israel would be willing to meet Palestinian demands for self-determination if only Palestinian violence ends is simply wrong. The issue is Israel's exclusive claim to the entire country, not security.

Only a win-win scenario will secure a just and lasting peace. Whatever the ideological claims or disparities of power between the sides, one thing is certain: neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians will defeat the other. The

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notion that Palestinians and Israelis are enemies, that they constitute two irreconcilable sides, leads nowhere. It ignores the political sources of the conflict, without which there is, indeed, no solution. It also contradicts the global realities in which we live: the inadmissibility of neo-colonialism, intertwined economies, international law and much more. The fall of the Soviet Union, of apartheid South Africa, of the Shah, of Marcos, of the Latin American generals, of the Greek colonels, of Milosevic all exemplify the ultimate inability to sustain unjust regimes over time.

Only a win-win scenario based on universal human rights can address the fundamental elements underlying the conflict and offer ways out. The Israeli people do not support the settlements or seek a Greater Israel. The pro-active, expansionist policy of Occupation, it must be stressed, does not represent the will of the majority of Israelis. Palestinian citizens of Israel aside, polls consistently show that two-thirds of Israeli Jews desire separation from the Palestinians “us here, them there” as Barak’s selection slogan had it even if that means dismantling the settlements. True, the second Intifada and subsequent events strengthened Israeli distrust of the Palestinians, expressed in wide popular support for the construction of the Wall and attacks such as those on the cities of the West Bank and on Gaza, but it arises from a simple desire for personal security rather than from any ideological aspiration to control the Greater Land of Israel. Israel’s unique system of proportional elections also tends to disenfranchise the public by granting tremendous autonomy to the political parties that make up all government coalitions. It gives far greater power to tiny single-issue groups, such as settlers, than to large but

less organized sectors of society. Thus the ??? disconnect, ??? so evident in the 2009 elections that imposed on the public an extreme right-wing government, between a populace desiring peace and territorial compromise (albeit with ??? separation???) and its governments'™ policies of territorial expansion and military ??? victory??? over the Palestinians.

Both the Palestinians and the wider Arab and Muslim worlds support a just peace. The contention that the Arabs do not want peace, a view that makes sense to people given Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians, not to mention the post-9. 11 stereotype of Arabs and Muslims as supporters of terrorism, finds no empirical support. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and other Palestinian ??? rejectionist??? groups that reject peace with Israel and have turned to violent means of resistance represent about the same proportion of Palestinian society in the Occupied Territories ??” say 15-20% ??” that extreme settler and other right-wing rejectionist groups represent in Israeli society. In the 1996 elections to the Palestinian Authority, on the other hand, Arafat and the supporters of the Oslo process, who conceded 78% of historic Palestine to Israel, won more than 90% of the vote. We must also be careful not to confuse resistance to Occupation and a struggle for liberation ??” even an armed struggle employing controversial tactics ??” with a rejection of peace itself. While Israel succeeds in framing Palestinian resistance as mere terrorism and uses it to argue that the ??? Arabs??? are not ??? partners in peace, ??? Palestinians cannot allow themselves to be imprisoned forever in an apartheid-style Bantustan with no hope of any future for the coming generations.

This is why the adjectives just and viable are integral parts of any sustainable peace, as evident in the acceptance by Hamas and Islamic Jihad of the Prisoners Document, forged among all the Palestinian factions in 2006, in which peace with Israel is agreed to in exchange for all the Occupied Territories. That Israel has a long standing peace treaty with Egypt and Jordan and functional ties with many other Arab and Muslim nations must also be factored in. 28 An emblematic conflict with glob