

# [Injustice](https://assignbuster.com/injustice/)

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Injustice Introduction Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus all argue to prove that justice is a bondage that people choose to avoid suffering the punishment of injustice. The views are all answers to Socrates question of justice.   
Discussion   
Thrasymachus points out that justice is the advantage of the stronger. Meaning that injustice is the disadvantage of the rules established. He claims that rulers and makers of law do not commit errors in their decrees and that they make laws that are best for themselves. Thrasymachus argues that subjects have no chance but to do as the decrees of their ruler without question. This argument makes injustice act solely for the interest of the rulers. According to Thrasymachus, injustice is stronger if it is on a larger scale, and it is more masterly than justice is. Injustice always gets more (Plato. 343b-344c).   
Glaucon view on justice is that it is a necessary evil that people allow themselves to suffer to avoid a much greater evil of impunity (Plato. 438b-e). Injustice is thus a much better preference than justice is as justice is just a burden that we engage in out of fear. People participate in justice, as they are afraid of the punishment of injustice. Injustice rewards all that practise it, with honour and wealth, as it allows one to indulge in all his urges (Plato. 357a-367e). Adeimantus claims that justice does not act solely but for something more: for the rewards, that one reaps in the current life and aftermath. One seeks injustice for one’s sake while justice is only for something more, the rewards it brings along (Plato. 357a-367e).   
Conclusion   
In light of the arguments proposed above, it is apparent that the three favour injustice rather than justice. Injustice is as a practise of free will that satisfies the body, unlike justice that is a bondage of something more.   
Work Cited   
Plato. The Republic. London: Heinemann [u. a.], 1963. Print. (343b-344c, 438b-e, 357a-367e)