

# Intelligence requirements - graded



**ASSIGN  
BUSTER**

Part Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) are the ones that require answers leading to specific information requirements (SIRs). These are important to a collection plan because they serve as target goals or objectives that need to be fulfilled. In the middle, especially the complex PIRs require the formulation of intermediate indicators that are further broken down into SIRs. 1 It is important to break down indicators into SIRs because at some point they will try to eliminate the probable complexity of the given PIR. 2 No matter how complex the PIR might be, this will even lead further to more meaningful strategies that are linked to it. However, the more indicators that link to PIR, the more branches will therefore exist between the PIRs and SIRs. This even will lead to PIR as something that is difficult to answer. 3 However, even if there is a certain degree of difficulty in it, the presence of the indicators is an essential point that will lead to a justifiable outcome of providing answers for PIRs. Indicators should be predictive. 4 If they are predictive, indicators are guaranteed to be of a high quality. Staffs should therefore evaluate if the chosen indicators are predictive enough which will qualify them to provide the opportunity to provide the remarkable answers for certain PIRs. Thus, prior to using their radars and other intelligence tools, the intelligence soldiers will have to engage into the identification of the appropriate indicators that will lead them to potential answers and as prior to the appropriate moves that they will have to take. 5

## Part 2

1. Will it be practical for intelligence soldiers to value SIRs if their linked indicators are not well-studied?

Answer:

<https://assignbuster.com/intelligence-requirements-graded/>

The answer is evident from the fact that indicators must necessarily be predictive. 6 The quality of a good indicator is that it is something measurable, and there is no relevant drawback to it. 7 It must be something that is substantial or enough to provide evidences that will lead to the appropriate answer prior to doing the most crucial strategy as the next course of action. In other words, this argument simply illustrates the point that it will be impractical to rely on a substandard indicators, because in the end it will also result to substandard SIRs too. As a result, the PIRs will result a substandard answers. The accuracy and efficiency of the action plan will be compromised, leading to the failure operation and possible earning of substantial cost or damage along the way. 8 It is therefore important to maintain a high level of practicality for any chosen indicators, because these are essential evidences to always lead to possible courses of actions.

2. Are radars and other essential or relevant tools for intelligence always helpful in every action linked to the work of intelligence?

Answer:

Radars and other relevant tools are not the primary highlights in every work linked to intelligence. In the first place, their usage should rely on the actual identified indicators, and or other relevant information in order to justify the right course of actions. Furthermore, their usage is also proven beneficial especially in the actual strategies or action plans that the team will have to engage. In other words, radars and other relevant tools are just supporting tools in every intelligence work. 9 The actual heart of intelligence work is the actual opportunity of every intelligence soldiers to use their mind, creativity and skills in the art of finding the appropriate strategies for employment.

However, they have to employ tools along the process. This means that tools

for intelligence are helpful in the work of intelligence, but it is not as always because their employment will still rely on the effectiveness or skills and creativity of the intelligence soldier. 10 If these tools are used not in the right way, then they are not contributing any help at all. It boils down to the users.

### Bibliography

Beebe, Sarah Miller and Randolph H. Pherson. *Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action*. London: CQ Press, 2011.

Davies, John L., and Ted Robert Gurr. *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998.

Demetriou, Andreas and Anastasia Efklides. *Intelligence, Mind, and Reasoning: Structure and Development*. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994.

Ehrhart, Robert C. et al. *Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War II*. Washington, DC: DIANE Publishing, 1996.

Hall, Wayne Michael and Gary Citrenbaum. *Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2009.

Herman, Michael. *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Heuer, Richards J., and Randolph H. Pherson. *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*. Washington, DC: SAGE, 2010.

Leonard, Barry. *Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogations: Army Field Manual*. Washington, DC: DIANE Publishing, 2010.

US Army Intelligence Center. *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*. Virginia: US Army Intelligence Center, 1996.

Xu, Mark. *Managing Strategic Intelligence: Techniques and Technologies*.

London: IGI, 2007.