

Revised
communities: a. the
eu's commitments •
providing



Revised Turkey-EU Migration Deal Turkey hosts the largest refugee population in the world.

Turkey is a strategic partner for EU. The new EU-Turkey deal is a revised but conditional agreement. Without an alternative plan to cooperation with Turkey, EU could face serious problem. The agreement provides political gains for both entities. It is constructed on the basis of a win-win strategy.

It can be interpreted that EU secures its borders while Turkey maximizes its benefit with a process. Turkey wants to use the refugee crisis to pressure EU to achieve its political goals and financial benefits. In particular the revised agreement suggested the following: 1) Supporting Syrians under international protection and the Turkish host communities: a. The EU's commitments • Providing financial aid to improve Turkey's domestic situation via humanitarian association (EU will not direct finance to the government) • Continued provision of assistance, it has already mobilised by the EU for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and displaced within Syria itself b.

Turkey's commitments • Implementing legislation related to international protection • Registering migrants and facilitating their identification • Facilitating refugee access to public services (education, healthcare, economic participation) • Taking care of vulnerable people 2) Strengthening cooperation to prevent illegal immigration a. The EU's commitments • Communicating on illegal immigration and its dangers • Informing migrants of the legal entry procedures into Europe • Strengthening Turkish capabilities in the fight to human trafficking • Cooperation between

members and Turkey regarding to return and reintegration procedures •
Deployment of a Frontex liaison office in Turkey • Participating in development of an asylum, migration, visa system, effective integrated borders. b.

Turkey's commitments • Strengthening Turkish detention capabilities •
Cooperating with Greece and Bulgaria to prevent illegal immigration • Accelerating readmission procedures of illegal migrants who aren't in need of int. l protection • Ensuring the grant of refugee status to those involved • Doing more to counter criminal networks •

Increasing information exchange and cooperation with the EU and its members • Modifying visa procedures with countries at origin of the highest levels of illegal immigration • Stepping up cooperation with Frontex •

Deployment of a Europol liaison office Now, facing a number of commitments between Turkey and EU, the two actors have a major opportunity to move our relationship to a higher level by working together to deal with short and long term issues that are of main importance for both. In some ways, both actors are making a fresh start. R. T. Erdoğan became first Turkish president directly elected by people. EU Commission headed by Jean-Claude Juncker. One of commission's vicepresidents, Federica Mogherini became recent EU high representative for foreign policy.

Donald Tusk re-elected for presidency of European Council of EU heads of state & government. These dynamics in the Turkish and EU political leaderships coincided with the revised migration deal. This decision to re-create dynamics with the European External Action Service help the facilitate Commission's policy.

The review of the deal will have an impact on the EU-Turkey framework. This effect is to be felt on the interplay between policies and actions that play a role in bilateral EU-Turkey relations and in Turkey's neighborhood. EU policies on Syria, Iraq, the Islamic State influence EU relations with Turkey. It is included in areas where joint action will occur a political need when it comes to humanitarian aid for displaced and resettled Syrians and counterterrorism cooperation. At a more global level, there is another risk in the EU's relationship with the new Turkey that was introduced when Erdogan became President. Turkey is pursuing religious conservative policies. Anti-Western narrative captured our country's leadership.

Among these trends, there is a danger that Turkey will be persuaded itself that it is distant from its allies. Such an ideological gap develops contradictory to Turkey's fundamental approach to the West in terms of military and economy. Turkey could run contrary to the NATO and toward the EU.

The risks of such a conflict for Turkey in terms of its economic welfare, social coherence, national security would be endless. The risks for the EU would have at least the same importance. From an EU point of view, the institutional triangle created by Donald Tusk, Jean-Claude Juncker, and Federica Mogherini will keep the opportunity to run EU foreign policy in a more coherent and integrated manner during the 5 years of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.

EU members will have to decide how best to give an effect on the future of Turkey's democracy. That is going to be the first issue of EU methodology. From a Turkish point of view, there is a need to reconfirm that whether Turkish

leadership keep a desire to adopt common EU values or not. Given the review of our politics and recent instability in our region, the EU should re-engage Turkey both on domestic reforms, via the EU membership process, and on foreign policy issues, via counterterrorism. That would be a safer hypothesis than current institutional deadlocks and previous approaches. The step forward could be comprehensive strategy. Turkey no more consider EU accession as main objective, this aim into a wider framework to reflect nature of EU-Turkey relations. Turkey is giving up the following trends.

EU need to address key components of Turkey's democracy. The EU should present alternative models instead of full membership such as a privileged partnership. The EU will have more bargaining power against Turkey's full membership.

From this perspective, the EU will eventually offer a model where Turkish products and people will move freely, this agreement will fail to grant full membership to Turkey. That is why Turkey should be careful against propositions which suggest partial membership alternatives.