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## INTRODUCTION

China’s geo strategic location at the center of Asia lends it importance and relevance. The last two decades have been characterised by the emergence of China as a major economic power with improved capabilities of its armed forces. China is steadily extending its reach into the Indian subcontinent with its growing economic and strategic influence. China has always assumed importance, primarily because of its large territory, vast resources, and large population. Although a relatively weak power throughout the modern era, China’s significance for international politics has been dramatically increasing since 1978, when market reforms were initiated by Deng Xiaoping. These market reforms placed China on a course of action that could lead to a rapid transformation of its latent potential into actual power, both within Asia and in the global arena. China’s military expansion complements her strategic reach. Modernisation of China’s military is indicated by her increased defence spending, trading quality for quantity, perusing innovation and modern defence industrial base. In addition, her nuclear weapon capabilities, permanent status in the UN Security Council, large armed forces and PLA's role in political system and national security policy has given China a commanding position in the region. Analysts predict that China will seek to vindicate its territorial claims and could even strive to attain regional hegemony. China's regional relations and politico-military ties with Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives clearly reflect her larger strategic vision. In addition, her relations with African countries, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and the CAR nations are in alignment with her national interests. Thus, it is fair to say that China has emerged as the country of greatest concern for India. With a changed security environment in South Asia, India will have to re-define its approach and draw its long term strategy options in order to protect its security interests.

## CHAPTER II : METHODOLOGY

## Statement of the Problem

As China grows economically, it could afford to expend 1. 28 percent of its GDP on military modernisation and enhancing its power projection capability on land as well as sea. China is likely to be the most potent military power of Asia by the year 2020. This coupled with strategic nexus between China and Pakistan, unresolved territorial disputes and the perceived competition for regional and global power status between China and India has the potential to pose serious security threat to India. China’s aggressive military modernization, military infrastructure and logistic build up is cause of concern. It has in the past used military power as an instrument of coercion and may be tempted to do so again under any pretext. It has also flouted international conventions by supplying missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan. Therefore, it is imperative for India to take suitable measure to counter the growing threat to its national security.

## Hypothesis

China’s aggressive military modernization coupled with lingering territorial disputes, strategic nexus between China and Pakistan and the perceived competition for regional and global power status is likely to pose a serious threat to India’s National Security.

## Justification of the Study

7. The most significant development after the cold war is probably the sudden growth in China’s economic potential and consequent national power. A rapid rise of a major country in the past has usually led to tension in the region, conflict with neighbours and eventually a war. The immediate and most potent threat to India’s economic and military development is from its immediate northern neighbour, China. The overall objective of this research is to study the rise of China, the likely impacts on India and the measures to counter the threats from China.

## Scope

8. The subject will be researched for military aims of China in TAR, South Asia and IOR. The implications of rise of China to India and the recommended Indian response to meet the challenge will also be covered. The main chapters under which the research will be carried out are as under:-Chapter I. Introduction. Chapter II. Methodology. Chapter III. China – a Current Perspective. Chapter IV. China’s Military Rise. Chapter V. Threat Perception and Military Implications of Rise of China for India. Chapter VI. Recommended Indian Response to Meet Emerging Challenges. Chapter VII. Conclusion.

## CHAPTER III : CHINA - A CURRENT PERSPECTIVE

"(As for the US) for a relatively long time it will be absolutely necessary that we quietly nurse our sense of vengeance… We must conceal our abilities and bide our time".[1]- Lieutenant General Mi Zhenyu

## Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing

## General

9." China sleeps, when she wakes the world will tremble". The prophetic words are attributed to the great military genius Napoleon. In fact China’s emergence as a great power, ranks as one of the major landmarks of the twentieth century for it marks a qualitative shift in world history from a Euro-centric orientation to definite turn towards the Asia Pacific Rim. China is fast actualizing her immense potential and is all set to become a super power. With her existing nuclear triad, she has already graduated well beyond the regional power stage. Despite her recent force reduction, she has the largest standing army in the whole world and the third largest air force after USA and Russia. Her navy is fast emerging from its coastal brown water cocoon to a full-fledged blue water capability with the recent commissioning of new aircraft carrier. 10. China is currently engaged in her four modernisations that were unleashed by Deng Xiaoping. China has awesome geostrategic potential. As a continental power, she has gigantic size and resources and as the most populous country of the world with a population of 1. 2 billion, she has tremendous human resources potential.

## Geography and Demography

11. China is located in East Asia and is the third largest country in the world with a total area of about 9, 571, 300 sq km. The country is bounded on the North by Mongolia and Russia, on the North East by Russia and North Korea, on the East by Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, on the South by South China Sea, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, India, Bhutan, Nepal and on the South by Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, and on the North West by Kyrgystan and Kazakistan. Its capital is Beijing. Shanghai, Tainjin, Shenyang, Wuhan and Guangzhouare are the largest cities with large industrial bases in the country. 12. China encompasses a great diversity of landscapes which includes numerous mountain ranges enclosing a series of plateaus and basins. Mountains occupy 43 percent of the land mass, plains account for almost 26 percent, while hilly basins and plateaus make up 9 and 12 percent respectively. These include the Tien Shan, Kunlun, Qin Ling and the Himalayas, which are the highest in the world.

## Historical Background

13. China is communist country, which has stabilized after the pro-democracy uprising in 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. The communist regime with single party i. e., CCP is strong, with aggressive ideology. It is shedding its conservative ideas and slowly but steadily opening up to the outside world. It is trying to find a fine balance between the liberalization, globalization, open market and the present world order. 14. The most recent and arguably the most fascinating image of China has been its re-emergence in world affairs after three decades of isolation and autarky. Ever since China initiated a programme of economic reforms in 1978 aimed at gradual introduction of a market economy, it set sights on the ‘ Four Modernisations’ - modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology and defence[2]. 15. China is following the path of economic reforms without major political reforms. The political leaders behaviour can be termed as discipline of " democratic centralism"[3]The leadership always wants to operate from position of strength and lack flexibility when dealing with outside world. Its leadership is driven by ancient national-cultural chauvinism, demanding restoration of China’s greatness and regaining its place at the center of the world. . However, the new generation political leadership has taken over the rein of the country recently on 08 Nov 12 which will decide the future courses of action. The implication of this change will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

## Geostrategic Significance of China

16. China is the third largest country in the world. It has the geographical shield by natural barriers from the North, West and South. It has a vast manpower of 1. 3 billion which is a source of cheap labour to her industry. The entire country is served by a well-developed communication network in terms of inland water transport, roads and railway network. China draws her economic strength from the vast deposit of Natural Resources which are as under:-A large Landmass. A vast manpower, source of cheap labour. A high literacy rate of 85 percent. A well developed communication system in terms of inland water transport, roads and railway network. A vast deposit of Natural Resources to include :-(i)Proven reserves of 20 trillion barrels of Petroleum with additional 100 billion barrels in South China Sea. 3. 2 trillion barrels of Coal reserves ranking second only to Russia. 47, 200 million tonnes of iron ore reserves placing it third in the world. Fourth largest gold reserves in the world. 1, 85, 000 tonnes of copper per year placing it ninth in the world. One of the highest reserves of tin, lead, zinc, aluminium, antimony, nickel, cobalt, tungsten and mercury, in the world.(f)Its geographic location gives it the access to major continents by land and has approx 5, 800 km long coastline through which it carries out 85% of trade and earns 60% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It dominates the trade route to east, on the South China Sea.

## Geo- Political Imperatives

17. China is geographically located in the centre of Asia, thus having a direct access to a number of countries of Asia, South East Asia, Korea, Japan, Australia and Russia. Being surrounded by so many large and small countries, from a political and military standpoint, China has achieved its strategic goals. The buffer regions are intact and China faces no threat in Eurasia. It sees a Western attempt to force China out of Tibet as an attempt to undermine Chinese national security. For China, however, Tibet is a minor irritant; China has no possible intention of leaving Tibet. Similarly, the Uighur Muslims represent an irritant in Xinjiang and not a direct threat. The Russians have no interest in or capability of invading China and the Korean peninsula does not represent a direct threat to the Chinese. The greatest military threat to China comes from the United States Navy because of their dependency on seaborne trade and the United States Navy is in a position to blockade China's ports. Taiwan because of its geo-political position poses a threat to China in such a way that it can readily serve as an air and naval base that could isolate maritime movement between the South China Sea and the East China Sea effectively leaving the northern Chinese coast and Shanghai isolated.

## Chinese Crescent of Influence

18. In keeping with world hegemonies, China is well poised today more so because of its geostrategic location to exercise direct influence in the South China Sea, Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Seas. Also, it has the potential to seek access to the Central Asian Republics and from there on influence events in the Mediterranean Sea as well as Europe. 19. The Indian Ocean has emerged as a major hub of maritime activity, with more than half of the world’s container traffic and 70 percent of the world’s total oil traffic passing from its entry points. However, ripples of assertiveness shown by China have threatened the majority of South Asian Region. The contours of regional security matrix are as under:-(a) Central Asian Region (CAR). The CAR has witnessed increased engagement by the US, China and Russia owing to the availability of hydro-carbon reserves. CAR countries are fledging economically and have nascent governing structures, thus making them potential sources of conflict. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which has China, Russia and four of the Central Asian Republics as its members, is reflective of emerging power equations.(b)South East Asian Region. The economic importance of the ASEAN region, especially the Straits of Malacca for movement of global trade and energy has resulted in India actively pursuing its 'Look East Policy'. India also shares some common concerns of the region on a wide range of security challenges like terrorism, religious radicalism, arms trade, drugs, piracy and illegal immigration.(c)Afghanistan. The outcome of substantial re-construction efforts in Afghanistan to bring this country into International mainstream, in the long run, is likely to have a profound effect on the global security matrix of the region. The situation remains critical as Taliban continues to concentrate its ranks to step up attempts to disrupt the re-construction process.(d)Pakistan. The situation in Pakistan has always remain fluid. Various contradictions in the social fabric, power struggles between the polity and the army and the fragility of constitutional institutions are likely to occupy central stage for some time. The biggest challenge faced by the Pakistani government is to moderate the largely radicalised sections and to improve relationship between various constitutional organs.(e)Other Nations. Young democracy in Nepal is witnessing turbulence. Future prospects of peace and stability depends upon the approach of new dispensation to governance. The radicalisation of the domestic environment in Bangladesh, continuous inflow of illegal immigrants to our North Eastern borders poses grave security implications for India. Keeping Myanmar engaged due to security and economic reasons is vital to us. Bhutan is transitioning peacefully from hereditary monarchy to democratic governance.(f)Troubled Waters : South China Sea. The area of South China Sea which remains the most contentious issue has been in news for all wrong reasons. China accuses Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei of overreaching in their claims of parts of South China Sea. Although all the countries remain signatory to United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) but still China claims that the Paracel and Spratly islands belong to it since ancient times. The US plans of moving almost sixty percent of its Pacific fleet and its relations with Philippines would add fuel to fire in the already boiling waters of South China Sea. China has always opposed the South China Sea dispute being discussed in international fora and prefers a bilateral approach to the issue. However, several ASEAN countries which are party to the dispute prefer a multilateral approach.

## CHAPTER IV : CHINA’S MILITARY RISE

" We should not underestimate China’s ability to disrupt our interests around the world if our relationship becomes belligerent rather than cooperative."[4]- Richard M Nixon

## President USA

## General

20. In February 1991, China’s High Command was stunned to realize just how far behind modern militaries the People’s Liberation army has fallen[5]. Gulf War, with its awesome display of firepower, electronics, stealth, computers and the satellites revealed that the warfare had made a quantum leap into the new era. Gulf war had significant impact on the Chinese leadership and new defence strategy emerged, based on fighting modern warfare using advanced technology. In the wake of the gulf War, PLA strategy was revised to focus on " limited wars under high – technology conditions[6]. It learned many lessons which are enumerated below:-Electronic warfare and advanced weapons are decisive. Importance of strong air and naval power. Rapid response and fast deployment are a true measure of overall capability. Logistical support is as important as actual combat capability.

## Mil Rise of China

21. China’s leaders view the first two decades of the 21st century as a " period of strategic opportunity" for China’s growth and development. They assess that this period will include a generally favorable external environment, characterized by interdependence, cooperation, and a low threat of a war. They believe this provides China a unique opportunity to focus on internal development while avoiding direct confrontation with the United States and other regional powers. 22. To advance its broader strategic objectives and self-proclaimed " core interests," China is pursuing a robust and systematic military modernization program.

## China’s Mil Strategy

23. The PLA’s modernization efforts focus primarily on building a force capable of fighting and winning " local wars under conditions of informatization" — conditions in which modern military forces use advanced computer systems, information technology and communication networks to gain operational advantage over an opponent. 24. China’s " Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period," completed in 1993 and revised as recently as 2004, contains the overarching strategic and operational guidance that directs the training, development, and employment of China’s armed forces. The key operational component of these guidelines is known as " active defense," which serves as the highest-level operational guidance to all PLA services on how to fight and win wars. The war fighting principles embedded in active defense emphasize using precise and well-timed offensive operations, gaining and retaining the initiative, attacking only under favorable conditions, and exploiting an opponent’s most vulnerable weaknesses. 25. The changes in the doctrines have evolved over a period of time are as follows:-Peoples War. It was characterised by mass, protracted length of time, trade space for time, attrition, inferior weapons and combination of regular troops and militia. Peoples War Under Modern Conditions. Importance and role of modern weapons in war fighting was grasped, yet the doctrine mainly catered to inland warfare. It was characterised by reduced manpower, defence dominated and ushered in combined arms ops. Limited War. Doctrine was based upon more offensive content, i. e., shifting to ‘ active defence’ and in the ‘ periphery of China’. It was characterised by controlled space and time, elite forces, RRF and combined arms ops. Limited War Under Hi-tech Conditions. It graduated further to hi-tech conditions due to enabling functions of science and tech after 1991 Gulf War. It was characterised by its War Zone Campaign (WZC), Offence dominant, quick resolution, mobile, forward deployment, mechanisation, elite forces and RRF with Joint Services ops. Ltd power projection was inherent in this doctrine. Limited War Under Modern Info Conditions. This doctrine was triggered by Coalition - Iraq war 2003 and Kosovo air war. It is characterised by WZC, higher content of information warfare and info-intensified systems, space and integrated ops and logistics. Power projection inherent. 26. Military Expenditure Trends. On March 4, 2012, Beijing announced an 11. 2 percent increase in its annual military budget to roughly US $106 billion. This increase continues more than two decades of sustained annual increases in China’s announced military budget. Analysis of 2000-2011 data indicates China’s officially disclosed military budget grew at an average of 11. 8 % per year in inflation-adjusted terms over the period. Moreover, China’s published military budget does not include several major categories of expenditure, such as expenditure on equipment of foreign origin. Analysing the 2011 prices and exchange rates, it is estimated that China’s total military-related spending for 2011 ranges between $120 billion and $180 billion. 27. Modernisation Plan. Phase I – Until 2010. The aim during this phase was to reduce the mil differential with major powers & lay a solid foundation for itself. The emphasis is to have a lean force. Phase II – 2010 to 2020. The aim during this phase is to achieve regional predominance in mil power. The emphasis, however, will be on hi-technology weapon enabled Army, Navy & Air Force. Phase III – Untill 2050. China’s aim in the third phase will be to achieve the status of a world class military power. PLA’ s emphasis will shift from conventional forces and she will accord a high degree of priority to space warfare, nuclear deterrence & force projection.

## RMA

28. Drawing lessons from the Gulf War 1991, China realized the importance of both technology & Information Warfare & started the concept of RMA. 29. China intends to pursue a mil revolution with Chinese Characteristics which include the following:-(a)For China, RMA is an evolutionary process based on its current efforts at modernization. Experts call it a modernization-plus approach. The thrust remains to gradually bring profound changes to every aspect of Chinese army building systematically.(b)Party’s direction of military modernization serves as a key impediment to Chinas pursuit of RMA. This may also result in political conservatism for the future leaders to bring drastic changes to the military.

## PLAAF

30. Once oriented solely on territorial defensive, the PLA Air Force is transforming into a force capable of off-shore offensive and defensive ops. Mission areas include strike, air/missile defensive, strategic mobility, and early warning/recce. 31. China’s present holdings of aircrafts comprise of:-

## Ac Type

## Role

## Str – 2012

Q5Ground Attk400J-7AD834J-11MR232SU-30MR80+23J-10MR155J-8Strike240JH-7Strike240H5 & H6Bomber216 + 10632. Modernisations.

## J-15.

Based on the SU -33, this aircraft is reportedly upgraded with advanced avionics, upgraded engine & radar absorbent material. On 25 Nov 12, two J-15 ac carried out successful landings on the aircraft carrier Liaoning.

## J-20.

January 2011 flight test of China’s next-generation fighter prototype, J-20, highlights China’s ambition to produce a fighter aircraft that incorporates stealth attributes, advanced avionics and super cruise-capable engines. A Chinese military publication forecasted that China would complete preparatory work for fitting out the J-20 by 2015. Modern Weapons. China is currently developing a genre of new weapon system to gain an asymmetric edge over her adversaries. These weapon system include the following :-LT-2 LGB. LS-6 GPS Bomb. Volumetric Expl Device. Anti Txn Line Bomb.

## PLA Army

33. Along with other branches of the PLA, China’s large ground force is undergoing significant modernization and has steadily improved capability in most areas. In mid 2011, the PLA began to transform its ground forces into a modular combined arms brigade-focused force structure. 34. Throughout the PLA, growing numbers of modern heavy armour, long-range strike arty, and increased-range air defense weapons have entered service in selected units. Concurrent with this modernization, the ground force has emphasized combined arms operations and long-range mobility. 35. China’s ground forces remain challenged by a lack of combat experience and self-identified limitations in the leadership abilities of its command & staff, particularly at operational levels. These problems have long been aggravated by a lack of practicality in the training imparted. However, the PLA began executing plans in 2011 designed to help overcome these problems by 2020, including increased force-on-force training, starting simulator based training, developing automated command tools to enable command decisions, and increasing education levels in science and technology training of PLA commanders and staff officers. 36. PLA Force Levels.(a)Manpower. The strength of PLA as of now is assessed to be 1. 6 million approximately.(b)Modernisation Strategy. PLA Ground forces have been placed low on priority for modernisation.(ii)Mechanised Divisions & Motorised Infantry Brigades have been increasing in the recent past.(iii)Group Armies have been made more composite.(iv)Aviation corps has been given priority.

## Second Arty Corps

37. The present stock piles of the second arty is as follows:-Missile TypesMissilesRange (Kms)QuantityRemarksSRBMsDF 11, DF 15300-9751000-1100Both msls being upgradedMRBMs/ IRBMsDF 3, DF 21, DF 25, DF161700-310070-110DF 25 under developmentLRBMs/ ICBMsDF 4, DF 5, DF 31, DF 31A7000-1200080-100DF 31 A under developmentSLBMsJL 1, JL 22500-800012+JL 2 under trialsCRUISE MSLsHN 1, DH 106501500-1800150-35038. The PLA Second Arty Corps is modernizing its short range ballistic missile force by fielding advanced variants with longer ranges and effect. It is also acquiring and fielding greater numbers of conventional medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships, including aircraft carriers, operating far from China’s shores beyond the first island chain. Similarly, China continues to create large numbers of advanced ground launched cruise missiles capable of stand off and precision strikes. 39. By 2015, China will also field additional road-mobile DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and enhanced, silo-based DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBMs.

## PLA Navy

40. The PLA Navy’s development has mirrored the PRC’s Maritime Strategy over the years. From 1949 until the mid-1980s, the PLAN’s strategic concept was one of " coastal def." In 1982 the Maritime Strategy evolved to near seas or offshore defense under the stewardship of the then PLA Navy Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing. It was inherent in the notion of " defend actively, operate in the near seas. Thus, the PLAN is regarded as a " strategy service," which means that it would op more independently and have its own geographical bounds of ops, a clear departure from the near-coast defense which regards the PLAN as a supportive service primarily for assisting land ops. For op bounds and space, near-seas active defense is defined as covering the sea areas within the first island chain. 41. In December 2001, China’s third generation leader Jiang Zemin stated that while continuing to implement the near-seas active defense strategy, the PLAN should " in the long run pay attention to enhancing the far-seas defense and op capability. After Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang as China’s fourth generation leader, he also stressed in 2004 the need for the PLAN to " make the gradual transition to far-seas defense and enhancing the far-seas maneuvering operations capabilities. 42. Based on the above the PLA navy’s road map to development and growth can be divided into three phases as follows:-

## Phase I – Until 2010.

(i)Blue water operations up to 1st island chain.(ii)Infrastructure development.(iii)Force development for platforms & capability .

## Phase II – 2011 to 2020.

(i)Acquire capability to operate upto 2nd island chain.(ii)Maritime force projection capability .(iii)Conventional carriers & integrated amphibious forces.(iv)Submarine & surface fleet to be modernised.

## Phase III – 2021 to 2050.

Break out beyond the 2nd island chain. Acquire global power projection capability in stages. Possess nuclear powered carriers. 43. Current Asset Holding. The PLANs current holdings are estimated as follows:-Surface combatants – 78. Conventional Submarines – 50. Nuclear Submarines – 08. Amphibious & Med landing Ships – 51. Missile equipped patrol crafts – 86. 44. Modernisation. The PLA Navy primarily focuses on improving anti-air and anti-surface warfare capabilities, as also developing a credible at-sea nuclear deterrent. The submarines, and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve sea superiority within the first island chain and counter any potential third party intervention in a Taiwan conflict. However, commissioning of the Liaoning happens to be the biggest asset of PLAN in the recent times. 45. Aircraft Carrier Liaoning. The PLA Navy’s first aircraft carrier, the ex Varyag, was commissioned into the PLAN on 25 Sep 12 as the Liaoning. The Liaoning has been fitted with a host of Chinese weapons and Sensors. The main sensors include the Type 382 Sea Eagle 3D Search Radar with a range of 100 km. This radar’s primary function would be Aircraft direction and Air Defence. The longer rg radar is the Type 346(8) Active Phased array radar with a range of 450 Km. The primary function of this radar would be Early Warning and Air Defence. In addition the ship is fitted with 4 launchers of the FL-3000 N Point Defence Missile system and three mounts of the Type 1030 close in weapon system. Chaff and Anti Submarine Rockets complete the ship’s armament package. The ship is likely to have an air wing of 26 J-15 fighters and at least 20-22 helicopters of various types including ASW and AEW. 46. JIN Class SSBN. China is also developing a near contiguous at sea strategy deterrent with the JIN Class SSBN programme. Presently two of these submarines are in commission with the South Sea Fleet, the 411 and the 413. China aims to build up the no of the SSBNs to six in the near future. 47. The type 093 Shang class submarine SSN. Two second generation SSNs are already in service and upto five third generation SSNs will be added in the coming years.

## Anti Access Area Denial strategy

48. China has emerged as a regional power with robust Anti-Access/ Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities and unclear political and military intentions. Chinese anti-access capacity includes a large ballistic missile force designed to attack key point targets, such as air bases and naval facilities. Chinese area denial capabilities consist of advanced counter-maritime and counter-air systems designed to destroy critical mobile assets, such as surface ships and aircraft. In the event of war, Chinese Anti-Access and Area Denial capabilities will consist of the following:-Land-attack ballistic and cruise missiles. Anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles to incl the DF-21 ASBM. The Chinese submarine fleet has also emerged as a credible A2/AD threat. The Chinese surface-to-air missile (SAM) network. 49. In addition to its significant counter-air and counter-maritime forces, Chinese A2/AD now extends well beyond the traditional domains of air, sea and land. While Chinese cyber-attack activities have been well publicised in world-wide news reports over the last several years, anti-satellite weapons now pose a legitimate threat, as demonstrated by China’s 2007 shooting down of one of its own inoperative satellites.

## The Chinese Grand strategy

50. Aim of China’s Grand Strategy. The crucial objective of China’s grand strategy in the past two decades (which may well last till 2050) can be captured in just one sentence: to secure and shape a conducive environment (security, economic, and political) so that China can concentrate on its development. 51. Overriding Objectives of the Chinese Grand Strat. Security. Due to the peculiar position of the Asian Continent, the People’s Republic of China realises that Asia is a region with the world’s highest concentration of major power struggle. As a nation in this region:-The first goal of China’s regional security strategy is to maintain at least a workable relationship with all the major powers in the region (the US, Russia, Japan, India) so that China will never become isolated and encircled by great powers. The second security goal of China’s regional strategy is to maintain, whenever possible, a cordial relationship with regional states in order to prevent a hard containment coalition led by any combination of the external great powers. Economy. China understands that it is already a regional economic power, and its influence will continue to grow if its economy continues its growth. China’s main concern is to make China’s economic growth not a threat but an opportunity for the region, so that regional states will not unite to spoil China’s economic growth. China has decided that the best strategy is to eventually make herself a locomotive for regional growth by serving as a market for regional states and a provider of investment and technology. Political. China’s regional strategy seeks to establish the country as " indispensable" for the regional issues. China understands that political influence can only be affected through power. China reasons that the best way for regional political influence is through cultivating an image of " a responsible great power." 52. Implications of Force Modernisation.(a)China’s military capability will increase and combined with regional disputes, stability of the region will be adversely affected.(b)The chances of conflict will increase manifold.(c)China by 2020 will emerge as a military superpower in the region as well as world.(d)China wants to be aggressive and use military force to solve regional disputes.(e)Provide China with power projection capability in the region especially in the sea.

## China’s Nuclear Capability

53. China entered the nuclear club on 16 October 1964. China is self reliant in its nuclear programmes. It has set up a top secret organisation called " Ninth Bureau" for research and development and related activities. China is rich in Uranium resources. China has built approximately 330 to 350 nuclear warheads. The Chinese developed Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) in 1981, tactical warheads, neutron bomb, one megaton weapons. It has a concept of Atomic demolition munitions. Its nuclear policy seems hegemonistic. The main reason for its nuclear capability was to break the monopoly of two superpower and in turn project herself as an alternative power especially in the region and third world. Today it has the complete wherewithal’s to strike anywhere in the world. It plans to use nuclear weapons as a policy tool for furthering her aims and long term interests.

## Developments in Space and Cyber Capabilities

54. China has been focusing on development of its strategic capabilities. It has made significant progress particularly in the space/ counter space and cyber warfare capabilities. China’s approach is evident from its heavy investment in these spheres of warfare. 55. Information warfare.(a)Information warfare is another capability which has been the focus of Chinese modernisation. In fact Information warfare is an important component of informationisation. The 4th department of the general staff department is responsible for conduct of information warfare in the PLA. China’s Info Warfare objectives are as listed below:-(i) To target and destroy enemy’s command and control system.(ii)Shortening duration of war. Minimise casualty.(iv)Enhancing operational efficiency.(v)Reducing effects on domestic population.(vi)Gaining support from international community.(b)PLA continues to lay great emphasis on information warfare and has focused on offensive as well as defensive aspects. It has laid over a million km of fibre optics line and has developed extensive communication infrastructure. Optical fibre cables now cover 98 percent of the units at the regiment or battalion level and above, as well as key border defense posts and en­try ports. Upto 99% of all communication has been routed through this network since the last ten years thereby affording PLA better battlefield awareness. 56. Cyber Warfare.(a)The PLA has invested in all the three facets of CNO that is Computer network attacks, Computer network exploitation, and Computer network defense.(b)The PLA has established info warfare units to develop viruses for attack en computer systems and networks, and measures to protect own computer systems. IW Battalions and Companies have been raised at GA and Division levels respectively. China has been very efficiently been utilizing the services of developments in the civilian IT sector. Since 2002, PLA has been creating militia units comprising personnel from commercial IT sector and academia.(c)Cyber operations are used as psychological warfare tools. China has its parallels of youtube, facebook and twitter in youku, fanfou. com, taotao. com etc. Reportedly, bloggers are paid for positive posts.(d)Chinese emphasis on information and cyber warfare can be gauged from the number of research and training institutions that exist. Some known ones are as follows:-(i)Academy of Military Science & Military Strategy Research Centre.(ii)PLA Academy of Electronic Technology.(iii)The State Key Lab of Information Security (Shanghai).(iv)Communication Command Academy (Wuhan).(v)Defense, Science & Technology Information Centre.(vi)China National Research Centre for Intelligence & Computing System (Chengdu).(e)Since 2009, numerous computer systems around the world, including those possessed by the Indian government were the objective of intrusions that appear to have originated within the PRC, demonstrating Chinese capabilities in the field. Indian computer systems and networks have also been hit by Chinese attackers. India’s INSAT 4B communications satellite suffered a malfunction in July 2010. It used Siemens software that was the targeted by a Stuxnet worm that apparently entered the satellite through its control system software. It has been speculated that Chinese hackers disabled the Indian satellite for commercial advantage, in an exercise of higher statecraft. 57. Space Capability. The Chinese space capability can be enumerated as follows:-(a)PLA is acquiring technology to improve its space based C4ISR. PLA writings suggest that adversary’s space based systems would be among initial targets of attack. China is developing the ability to attack an adversary’s space assets as well.(b)Inputs indicate that China has planned to set up offensive and defensive systems by 2020 and 2050 besides setting up a space command. Recently China became the third country to carry out docking in space & is now on track to have its space stn by 2020. In July China completed its Satellite Data relay network with the launch of the third data relay satellite, which will now enable china to be in communication with its space crafts without break.(c)China uses the indigenously developed long march family of launch vehicles. Besides the military aspects, China is also using the commercial launch value of its infrastructure to strengthen political relations with various countries.(d)China’s military space programme consist of a wide range of activities, including military intelligence and reconnaissance, navigation, communications and media and military command and control.(e)An imp facet of the space program is China’s kinetic anti satellite (ASAT) system and a variety of non kinetic space weapons which would increase the offensive ability of China’s forces and consequently their ability to dominate the battle space. China’s anti satellite capabilities include co orbital direct attack weapons and directed energy weapons for damaging satellites, both of which currently are under development. China also is researching technology for electronic attack, such as jamming, against an adversary’s space assets as well as its ground support networks.

## PART V : THREAT PERCEPTION AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

## OF RISE OF CHINA FOR INDIA

" Once China becomes strong enough to stand alone, it might discard us. A little later it might even turn against us, if its perception of its interest requires it".[7]- Henry Kissinger

## Conventional Threats

58. The China’s multidimensional advancement possesses unique challenges for India which are as listed in succeeding paragraphs. 59. Collusive Sino-Pak Relations.(a)Early Years of Relations.(i)Sino-Pakistan relations despite minor frictions over the Islamic insurgency in Xinjiang province continue to grow strong, especially in terms of their military and strategic cooperation.(ii)In 1987, China and Pakistan signed the protocol to formalise the demarcation of their boundary. Its termination at Karakoram Pass and Pakistani recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Aksai Chin clearly indicated an understanding between them. In the late 1980s, China started assisting Pakistan on the development of nuclear weapons, long-range missiles and in large-scale sale of conventional weapons and equipment.(b)Present Sino-Pakistan Relations.(i)Pakistan PM Yusuf Raza Gilani’s four-day official visit to China from May 17 to May 20 was a crucial event post the killing of Osama Bin Laden. During the visit, China agreed to expedite the delivery of 50 JF-17 fighter aircrafts to boost Pakistan’s defence capability. Further negotiations are underway for the supply of Chinese J-20 Stealth fighter and Xiaolong /FC-1 multi-purpose light fighter aircraft to Pakistan.(ii)Pakistan seems to have outsourced the area of Gilgit-Baltistan to China for " developmental activities." In May 2011, Indian intelligence agencies confirmed that the hundreds of Chinese working in POK are actually People's Liberation Army (PLA) engineers.(iii)On 11 August 2011, China launched Pakistan’s first communication satellite, PAKSAT-1R on board China’s Satellite Launch Vehicle from the Xichang Satellite Launch Centre in Sichuan province. This marked a stronger technological co-operation between the two close friends. This is yet another important development for the two countries celebrating 2011 as the year of their friendship. 60. External Threat. The Sino-Indian boundary dispute is a legacy of the British Empire. The boundary dispute basically relates to three sects. The Western Sector mainly consisting of the Aksai Chin area. The Central Sector consisting of certain areas in Himachal Pradesh. The Eastern Sector concerns the areas of NEFA. During the 1960 Summit, China proposed that it will accept Indian position in NEFA provided India accepted Chinese position in Aksai Chin which was refused by India. A dispassionate view of the claims and counter claims is being discussed under three heads – The Eastern, Central and the Western Sector.(a)The Eastern Sector. The moot point is " where is McMahon Line?" Is it defined as " the watershed of Great Himalayan Range" or as " the line marked on the map attached to the Shimla agreement?" If this question can be resolved to the mutual satisfaction of India and China, the border problem also becomes solved. The maps of 1914 were far from perfect, McMahon drew the line where he thought the watershed was[8]. And now with better surveys available we find the watershed to lie elsewhere. Do we follow the watershed or the line McMahon marked on the map? This is obviously a bilateral question.(b)The Central Sector. The Central Sector has seen some " incursions" by the Chinese. However, both sides essentially claim the Great Himalayan watershed as the boundary and there is no major dispute. Incidentally, this is the sector where our genuine sacred territory lies. But we are content to agree that the Chinese are the rightful custodians of sacred places like Mansarowar and Kailash.(c)The Western Sector. The Western Sector requires a political solution involving some compromise on both sides. Most people imagine the Western Sector boundary to be a boundary between Ladakh and Tibet. However, neither the Chinese nor the Tibetans consider Aksai-Chin to be part of Tibet. The Treaty of 1842 between Tibet and India is the most recent treaty concerning the Ladakh-Tibet border. It did not lay down specific boundaries but merely re-established the status quo ante and reaffirmed the traditional boundary between Ladakh and Western Tibet. Thus, we have a defined boundary which, however, has not been demarcated. Briefly, the Chinese claim that Aksai-Chin was " no man’s land" and that they were the first to occupy it. In international law, this stand is correct provided it can be proved that Aksai-Chin was a " no man’s land". Our version is that while it was uninhabited, it was not a " no man’s land". Our claim is that explorers and the occasional hunters traversed Aksai-Chin. Both sides agree that no revenue was ever collected in Aksai Chin and both sides agree that it was an uninhabited area. So, when the Chinese say that Aksai Chin was " no man’s land" and we say that it was uninhabited, un-administered and non-revenue yielding but thinly held land, the difference in the basic position is very little indeed!(d)Present Status of the Dispute. 2003 ushered in a marked improvement in Sino-Indian relations following Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's landmark June 2003 visit to China. China officially recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim as the two nations moved towards resolving their border disputes. In year 2004, the two countries proposed opening up the Nathu La in Sikkim which was opened in 2006. However, tensions have again built over the past few years. China has embarked on a large scale modernisation of the PLA and also a largescale improvement of military infrastructure in Tibet. These developments have made India uneasy. China has also issued stapled visas to residents of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir, stating that they are disputed areas. Reports of presence of Chinese military personnel in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) have alarmed India. China and Pakistan have signed an agreement to widen the Karakoram Highway from 10 metres to 30 metres, thereby making it an all weather highway, suitable for move of military vehicles. A rail link would also be established between China and PoK. 61. Internal Threats. India is faced with intense internal security problems in large parts of Jammu and Kashmir, NE States and in Red Corridor. It has been known fact that China is supporting the insurgents in the NE States, militants in the Jammu and Kashmir indirectly via Pakistan and is giving both moral and financial support to Naxalism in the Red Corridor.

## Non-Conventional Threats

62. Some of the possible non-conventional threats for India are listed in succeeding paragraphs. 63. Economic Threat. China has made dramatic economic progress during the last ten years has made it the world’s largest exporter and second largest economy, surpassing Japan. It has been predicted that by 2030 China will surpass USA in terms of GDP. China has already taken lead from India by engaging the emerging world economies of the world ie Africa, Middle East, Brazil etc. Thus, to overcome such a situation, challenges before Indian economy are as under:-(a)Cheap Chinese goods flooded in Indian markets are detrimental to Indian textiles, machinery, toys and electronics industries.(b)Greater trade imbalance in favour of China.(c)Threat to Indian outsourcing industry.(d)Conflicting interests in various international forums like UNO, IMF, Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. 64. Energy Security. China has set eye on the huge reservoirs of oil and natural gas around the world and necessary measures have already been initiated to secure multiple energy resources by engaging Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, CAR, Russia, Africa, middle East and Philippines. Oil exploration and production is one of the key areas of foreign investments made by China in various under developed countries. As a result, China has ensured its energy requirements by diversifying its source and transport means. This is a serious energy security threat to India. 65. Maritime Security. The location of India and China is likely to arouse a sense of competition between two countries as the commercial shipping is bound to traverse in the same oceanic routes. Considering the China’s pursuit of maritime power, it has become imperative for India to secure its Sea Lines of Communication. China has realised that her survival and development depends on the safe and sustained import of energy resources and the uninterrupted flow of trade along the SLOCs. Induction of an aircraft carrier into PLA Navy this year indicates clearly of the Chinese ambition about their expeditionary desires, which is one of the pre-requisite of becoming world power. In addition to this PLA Navy is in way of making its bases in and around India like in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and has started employing its warships in anti piracy role in Indian Ocean. Their landing ship flotilla of the South China Sea Fleet recently conducted a three-dimensional landing drill in the South China Sea. 66. Water Security. The debate on diversion of Brahmaputra waters resurfaced recently with China diverting Brahmaputra water as part of its Great South–North water transfer scheme. This issue needs to be solved before it becomes another serious impediment to relations between the two Asian heavyweights. 67. Cyber Terrorism. China is believed to be training super-sophisticated cyber attack operations at PLA’s cyber warfare training hubs in conjunction with students of China’s Sichuan University whose cyber operations are funded by PLA cyber units. Many countries, public organisations in the world have been victim of Chinese cyber attacks and sensitive information has been stolen from their sites / servers. India also has been a victim of such attacks in past and is likely to face more in future. 68. Space Warfare. China has increased its budget allocation to space which has significant military utility but purposely kept it out of its defense budget. China’s development of missiles, space planes, LASER based weapons and anti-satellite weapon program are a serious threat to Indian war fighting capability. 69. Nuclear Threat. China in past has professed for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Still they are instrumental in transferring nuclear technology to countries like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. All these countries have a poor proliferation record which makes the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of non - state actors very eminent.

## Implications of China’s Strategic Designs for India

70. China's Expansionist Designs. China has indicated time and again its willingness to settle disputes by use of force. There are various claims being made by the present day communist regime on the territories of some of its neighbours and its expansionist policies :-Many islands in the South China Sea area, such as the Spratley islands, held by Vietnam have been contested by China. The Chinese Navy in 1994, captured eight Vietnamese islands (Paracel) by blasting and destroying three Vietnamese ships and also killing 70 sailors. China also claims Taiwan which attained independence in 1949. China launched offensive in India in 1962 across Eastern and Northern Himalayas and still continues to occupy vast areas of territory in North(Aksai Chin area). In 1979, China attempted to invade North Vietnam but was pushed back. China has claimed that it has used force since 1949, and it has done so only within its historic region and that more often than not, judiciously and effectively.(e)China has also been planning a grand strategy in conformation to its comprehensive national power. It percieves that China’s position in the international sphere is moving up and that this is an irreversible phenomenon.

## Implications of China’s Expansionist Designs on Sino- India Relations

71. The major issues in Indo – China relations are :-(a)Border Dispute. China continues to occupy large areas of territory. In Akshai Chin, China has been occupying approximately 30, 000 square km since the 1962 war. In addition Pakistan also illegally ceded more than 5000 square km area in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to its ally China in 1963. China maintains its claim that the issue of reunification of Arunachal Pradesh with China, and it is yet to formally recognise accession of Sikkim to India.(b)Chinese assistance in the nuclear, missiles and military hardware fields poses a present and future military challenge to India.(c)China is increasing its influence in Southeast region in terms of upgradation of port facilities in Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka as well as its efforts to engage with Nepal.(d)China’s perceptions with regard to India’s standing in the region.(e)Ideological differences.(f)Vehement protest over nuclear test by India in May 1998.(g)Indian support to Dalai Lama and escape of Karmappa to India.(h)Economic issues like the standoff regarding the oil exploration off the Vietnamese coast. 72. China may follow Sun Tzu dictum " he who excels at resolving difficulties does so before they arise. He who excels in conquering his enemies triumphs before threat materialises". All these issues have the potential to flare up to a war. Be it on the land borders, maritime front, air or space, conflict can get triggered in a short time. Other dimensions of warfare like cyber and information are already active in some sense. India must eye all moves on these issues with suspicion and at the same time prepare for any possible confrontation. 73. Implication of China's Foreign Policy - Strategic Encirclement of India. China sees India as a potential competitor in its quest for super power status. China therefore has embarked upon a policy of strategic encirclement of India. It has done so by achieving the following : -(a)Strategic Linkage with Pakistan. Pakistan’s missile programme has sustained itself on the assistance provided by China. China is also providing extensive financial and technical assistance in development of the port at Gwadar. China’s presence at Gwadar in Pakistan would give her the ability to guard her shipping lanes in the North Arabian Sea whilst maintaining a vigil on our Western Naval Fleet. Through Aksai Chin, China built the Karakoram highway that now provides a strategic land link between China and Pakistan.(b)Relations With Myanmar. The opening of land route from Kunming in China to Lashio in Myanmar has further helped in easy transit of arms to Myanmar. China has been developing the Naval ports at Hangyi and Coco islands in Southern Myanmar. This would help Chinese Navy getting access to the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal.(c) Supply of arms to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, playing on their fears of India's hegemonistic intentions.(d)Overtures to Bhutan and Nepal to wean them away from the Indian sphere of influence. The Kathmandu - Lhasa highway is being upgraded so that it can be used throughout the year.(e)Domination of Indian Ocean. According to China watchers, Beijing has planned to create a force of at least a dozen nuclear missile armed submarines to provide it a nuclear second-strike capability in the region. The security implications of the military presence in the India should therefore be considered alarming. 74. With these clear indicators of China’s expanding Navy being in position of obtaining access to the Indian Ocean, both from our west and from our east, the Sino-Pak-Myanmar axis shall continue to be an area of great concern. India is likely to find itself encircled, though such projections may not seem very impressive unless seen in a long-term perspective.

## Implications of Chinese Military Capability for India

75. Defence budget of China for the year 2012 is US $ 17. 62 billion, a substantial increase of 17. 7 % over previous year. The likelihood of Chinese exercising the military option to lay their claim on territories along the LAC cannot be ruled out. The Chinese development of an air-land battle concept has converted what had been regarded as a massive, but primitive monolith into a formidable opponent who has integrated war in three dimensions. Chinese tactics now emphasise the use of integrated air, heliborne, airborne and special forces in a simultaneous deep battle. More importantly, these forces are also training in NBC scenarios, both in offence and defence. Hence there is a need for India to rethink her perceptions of her adversaries and develop a method to counter these threats. 76. Military Infrastructure Development in Tibet. China has improved its infrastructure in Tibet in the following manner :-

## Highways.

(i)Western Highway. It is class 18 road extending from Hibichuan Ho to Lhasa with length of 1990 km.(ii)Central Highway. It is class 50 road extending from Gormo to Lhasa with length of 1127 km.(iii)Eastern Highway. It is class 18 road extending from Pangta to Lhasa with length of 2405 km.(iv)Karakoram Highway. It extends from Karakoram to Gilgit (Pakistan occupied Kashmir).(b)Rail. There exists a state of the art railway line to Tibet as of date. The railway line provides a rapid mobilisation advantage to China. In comparison, Indian lines of communication are still under developed and the improvement is taking place at a far too slow pace.(c)Airfields. China has constructed many airfields and airstrips in the TAR which provides it immense advantage to launch strikes against India. Though very few of these have hardened shelters, they have provided a distinct advantage to its air fighting capabilities.(d)Pipeline. Oil pipeline is been established to provide an alternate supply route to China from gulf countries.(e)Implications. China has extensive road communications till their claim areas in Tibet bordering India, their capacity to build up and sustain force levels in Tibet has improved manifolds despite tough terrain conditions separating Chinese mainland from Tibet hence increasing threat to India. Coupled with this is the qualitative improvement in command and control system, means of surveillance, armaments as also a quantitative rise in high quality offensive air support has brought about major change in the PLA's offensive capability.

## Implications of PLAN Buildup

77. Maritime Border. Even though India does not share any maritime boundary with China, Myanmar could become a link in providing China an access to the Bay of Bengal. By geographical location, Thailand could also provide access to China in the Bay of Bengal via a land route through Myanmar. 78. Chinese Intention to Dominate the Indian Ocean. China's rapid upgradation of her naval capability, which include the recently commissioned carrier task force and more on the cards within a decade, her linkage with Burma and positioning of SU-27 and Mig-31 jet fighters in Anhul province and Hainan Island can give China near total control of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean including the Coco channel. Any attempt at domination of Indian Ocean can result in a direct maritime con­flict with Indian Navy. 79. Maritime Implications. The main focus of the Chinese Navy is likely to be the Asia - Pacific region and the South China Sea. However, Chinese forces could well operate into the Indian Ocean with the help of base facilities provided by Myanmar, Laos, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. The specific maritime threats likely to be posed by the Chinese Navy cannot be forecast at this point of time. However, the Chinese Navy is likely to place the following threats : -(a)Threat to our Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) from Asia- Pacific and South East Asia.(b)To limit Indian Naval force projection with a view to con­taining it much to the West of Singapore. To retain a deterrent naval capability in the Bay of Bengal for this purpose.(c) Threat to Andaman and Lakshadweep groups of islands.(d)To establish a long-standing presence in the Bay of Bengal to add legitimacy for Chinese force projection in the future. Chinese SSBNs would pose a threat being stationed in Bay of Bengal.(e)Threat of gunboat diplomacy, as amply demonstrated by China in Taiwan.(f)Increases the possibility of a two front war with China and Pakistan through the medium of land, sea and air.

## Threats Emanating from PLAAF

80. China’s acquisition of modern fighter aircraft coupled with air to air refueling capacity and extension of runway in Tibet has given Chinese Air Force the capability to threaten Eastern part of Indian Hinterland includ­ing Eastern sea coast. 81. China’s sheer size and inherent strength, its conception of itself as a center of global civilization and, its eagerness to redeem centuries of humiliating weakness are propelling it towards Asian hegemony. Its goal is to ensure that no country in the region will act without taking China’s interest into prime consideration.[9]82. The Chinese say the basic logic of all these theories is the same : China is an emerging monster that will threaten world security and stability and must be retained. The West feels heavy-hearted facing an increasingly powerful China.[10]83. Former US State Secretary Henry Kissinger, the man who negotiated the Sino-US rapprochement of the early 1970s has said that no force could hold back the rise of a new power.[11]84. Beijing is seeking to enhance its " soft" international power by refining its national policies and decision making capabilities; improving its foreign, political, diplomatic, economic and military relationship; increasing its role in multilateral activities to include UN, WTO, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and APEC. Since 1985, Beijing has promoted the evolution of the global balance of power from bipolar to multipolar structure. Since 7 May 1999 bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Chinese leaders are discussing ways to offset US power by increasing China’s proliferation activities abroad in addition to other activities. 85. Beijing prefers bilateral diplomacy, it is attempting to expand its role and exert a greater voice in international fora. It desires economic and political presence in Europe, Middle East, Latin America and Africa. China’s technological and political help to the Islamic countries of Central Asia and North Africa and its looming dominance in East Asia is designed to Challenge the present world order.[12]

## CAHPTER VI : RECOMMENDED INDIAN RESPONSE TO MEET EMERGING CHALLENGES

## General

86. Though China professes a policy of peace and friendliness towards India, its deeds clearly indicate that concerted efforts aimed at the strategic encirclement of India are underway. For the last several decades, China has been engaged in efforts to create a ring of anti Indian influences around India through military and economic assistance programmes to neighbouring countries, combined with complimentary diplomacy. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have been assiduously and cleverly cultivated towards this end.

## India’s Future Aspirations

87. For formulating a counter strategy, it is highly relevant to analyse the desired end state for India at the national, regional & global levels. The envisaged ideal end state is as under :-(a)Global, regional & national peace & stability.(b)Preservation of ‘ Strategic Autonomy’.(c)‘ Peaceful Resolution’ of border disputes with China.(d)‘ Growth & prosperity’ in India & its peripheral nations.(e)Achieve desired level of a ‘ Comprehensive National Power’ with ‘ self reliant’ & ‘ capability based’ modernised armed forces with adequate ‘ Strategic Assets’ to deter any external threats.