

# [Boethius and good substance](https://assignbuster.com/boethius-and-good-substance/)

[](https://assignbuster.com/)[Philosophy](https://assignbuster.com/essay-subjects/philosophy/)

Task How Can Substances Be Good in Virtue of the Fact That They Have Being When They Are Not Substantial Goods? The theory brought about by Boethius tries to lay plain the various differences that exist between things that exist in the universe. The explanations given forth explain the different states in which a substance that is considered good can exist. However things can only be good by virtue of their substance or by their participation. Things that are good by virtue of their substance can only be compared to the creator while substances that are good by participation are not always good (McDonald, 65). This is only made true by belief in the mundane human assumption that all substances that exist in the universe always tend towards the good. The theory differentiates the primal existence of substances from the role that existing substance play towards the overall good. Therefore goodness is seen as an embodiment of things and cannot be measured according to participation towards good (McDonald, 18). The basic assumption that individuals have is that all the substances that exist in the world are good. This is grounded on the common understanding between people. This depends on individuals conceptions of the learned and the unlearned which can be that everything goes towards its like which is either be good or evil. Substances that are purported to be good by participation are not good themselves since they always strive towards perfection. Moreover, substances that strive towards goodness are in themselves not good because they do not struggle to posses what they have (evil) but strive to reach for goodness. Substances that are good in virtue do not always tend towards goodness but are in themselves good. The goodness is found in its being and thus cannot be compared to any level of goodness that is strived for through participation. However, this goodness is never derived from the first good because for them to be good, they would possess the same qualities as the first good that go against nature. This makes them posses different qualities of being and being good (McDonald, 65). However substantial goods are those that do not play a part in goodness. This is because what they are good. This is because this goodness is drawn from their being. This means that their being is good and being is synonymous to being good. Substances that are good for the virtue of being good are not always good. This is because these substances already exist and have already been established when they have taken on the form of being. This being is not drawn from the being itself since the being (first good) does not exist in itself (McDonald, 105). The substantial good exists in its purest form and is never mixed with any other in order to be good. Its primal existence independently conveys its goodness and does not need support from other sources. Substances that are good in virtue of their being do not portray this character. The goodness of such substances is always compounded by other factors besides its natural being that help to amplify its goodness. The substances that are good in virtue can only be like the substantial good if they had nothing else except good. Removal of all the qualities that amplify their goodness so they remain with what is good. This would transcend them from being ordinary substances to the source of substances, which makes them achieve the overall good (McDonald, 115). The first good is refers to an embodiment of the true values of goodness. The existence of substances good due to the virtue of its being is dependent. This virtue of goodness flows from a given source that makes its being good. There can never be an existence without its source. The first good is good in virtue for the fact that it is good. The complexity of goodness of substances as a virtue of their being requires a source that wills the existence of such a virtue. The being of all things flows from the will of the first good to establish the existence of the being. Therefore, the existence of a substance good as a virtue of its being cannot exist if it was never willed by the first being, which is independent of any other factors but it’s in whatever way that it is (McDonald, 124). The removal of the first being makes substances be good but not because they have being. They are therefore never like the first being. However, goodness cannot be compared to the creator to imply that all that he has created are good in virtue of their being and therefore all that was created belongs to the creator. It was the will that made them good in virtue of their being (McDonald, 134). Since their creator did not resemble them. Goodness goes with essence while being is correlated to an act but being good is not being just. Its only the things in virtue that we have being that are considered the same thus all that is good is never just. This helps to establish the conscience to approach different concepts since just is more specific while goodness is general. In my opinion, a substance is always good for the virtue of its being. We live in a physical world coupled with various beliefs. Individuals always portray their vices and virtues by simply acting on their being. Therefore the true nature of a substance can truly be determined by the virtue of its substance or participation (McDonald, 155, 164). Work Cited MacDonald, Scott C. Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991. Print.