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## Philosophy

The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge (TAK) maintains that the propositional knowledge is justified, true belief. The TAK defined knowledge in the following structure. If person A believes that S is true, it follows that A believes that S, implying that A knows S. The definition of knowledge presents some problems of epistemology (Lemos 102). Traditionally, people use the term knowledge to refer to various abilities or skills, such as displayed while performing a given task (Lemos 102). For example, if a person knows how to drive a car, that knowledge might be referred to as ability knowledge. Another knowledge involves acknowledging that something in the case. This knowledge is referred to as propositional knowledge (Capaldi 36). Propositional knowledge, as opposed to ability knowledge, is of particular interest to epistemologists. This definition of knowledge requires satisfaction of three conditions for a person A to know S.   
The Gettier’s counter-examples led to the emergences of numerous responses, which either sought to defend the triplicate definition, to introduce new conditions, or to discard it in favor of a new theory of knowledge. Gettier believes that knowledge requires necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure knowledge (Capaldi 36). He maintains that the classical analysis of knowledge is incorrect because they do not state sufficient condition for knowledge (Capaldi 36). Conclusive reasons serve the purpose of eliminating the possibility of an accidental truth. Gettier maintains that his aim was to offer an analysis of knowledge in order to improve the classical account and allows for better understanding what knowledge is by identifying necessary and sufficient condition for knowing.   
Edmund Gettier opposed this argument of justified true belief. In his paper, Gettier presented two counter arguments to show the fundamental flaws in the classical analysis of knowledge (Capaldi 36). In his attempt, Gettier argued that a correct analysis of knowledge would go beyond selecting out actual extensions of knowledge even if, in the real sense, all cases of A knowing S are not true. Consequently, if Gettier is right, it follows that the three conditions do not provide a basis for defining what knowledge is, and he concludes that knowledge is not justified true belief. According to Gettier, if grace believes that an orange is round, and the orange is round, then Grace knows that the apple is round (Lemos 102).

It is evident that the notion of Gettier counterexamples serves as just a play on contrast between two aspects of knowledge. Knowledge is a conception on which certain aspects of reality originate from and a conclusion that is derived from that model. The implication is that even a fundamentally incorrect model can produce exactly the same result as a valid one, although not essentially in every probable condition. These counterexamples to TAK demonstrate that the one can have justified, true belief without qualifying as knowledge. Gettier argues that a true belief does not warrant knowledge, because it needs something different or more. Classical analysis of knowledge maintains that knowledge must be universal and apply to all instances of knowledge, so a counterexample only serves to show that it fails to be general by not covering all the examples of knowledge.   
Gettier based his objections on some issue like this. Consider a situation where all the classical conditions of knowledge were fulfilled, and yet it could imply that it constituted knowledge. For example, Pauline believes that Valery is in the room, Pauline sees Valery in his room, and then Pauline is justified in believing that Valery is present in the room. The reason satisfies the classical conditions for knowledge. Valery is in his room, Pauline believes that is the case and is justified in doing so. However, it could be that what she sees in Valery’s room is not her at Valery, but her cousin from the province, Sharon. In addition, Valery is hiding in the closet. From the classical point of view, it would imply that Pauline is correct, but only by coincidence. If Valery is in the room though hiding inside the closet, Pauline is justified in believing in not consider her presence, except that con a genuine case of knowledge because Pauline is correct through coincidence.   
The outcome would appear to infer that because justification is not made a belief true, it is always possible to have justified beliefs that are true, but not are based on their rationalities. The idea was that the better and more justification provided, the closer you get to the truth. The case of Gettier shows that the justification can serve its purpose better without coming closer to the truth or any further away from arriving through coincidence (Lemos 102). The role of incorporating a justification condition in the analysis of knowledge served to prevent luck guesses from counting as knowledge (Lemos 102). However, the Gettier problem indicates that including a justification does not eliminate instance of epistemic instances of luck. Another weakness of the Gettier counterexamples is that the reasons he presented were not wholly conclusive. If the classical analysis of knowledge is based on conclusive reasons, then the counterexamples of Gettier fail. One possible situation of a conclusive situation is when a belief with a conclusive reasons for belief that could not be true.

## Works cited:

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