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Literature, Russian Literature



The English legal system was unable to provide a sufficient and practical definition for the contractual element of consideration for centuries. The case of *Currie v. Misa* (1875) became a significant case in terms of providing the definitive definition for consideration, consequently the case presented Judge Lush with the opportunity to define consideration as “Either...some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the one party or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the other”. Meaning that a party must provide something in exchange for the promise, in order to be able to impose that promise, that “something” is called “consideration” 1.

In terms of the necessity of consideration in the formation of a contract, it is clear that it is one of the fundamental aspects as contracts will mostly only be binding if they are supported by the concept of consideration and the fact that consideration is demanded by the common law. Despite this, it would be incorrect to assume that the doctrine of consideration is “too firmly fixed” due to the existence of promissory estoppel. Lord Denning established the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the case of *Central London Property Trust v High Trees House* 1947, which meant that in some instances can stop a person going back on a promise, which is not supported by some form of consideration. This essay will examine the true extent in which courts require contracts to be supported by consideration through three/four main arguments. In order for consideration to take place, there are four main rules, which should be taken into account. Firstly, the promisee must provide consideration and it must move from the promisee. Meaning that, the person who wishes to enforce the contract must show that they provided

consideration; it is not enough to show that someone else provided consideration.

The promisee must show that consideration came from him in some form. As it is not adequate for someone else to provide consideration, this rule of consideration has caused some difficulty in contract law, especially in assessing contracts that have more than two parties involved. This can be explored further through the case of *Price v Easton* (1833). A declaration between the parties stated that X owed the plaintiff a sum of money. Due to this, X agreed to complete work for the defendant in exchange for payment, which would clear the debt that he owed to the plaintiff.

The defendant agreed he would pay the plaintiff on X's behalf once the work was finished. However, once the work was completed for the defendant, he did not pay the plaintiff, or X, as had been promised. The plaintiff sued the defendant for the money that X owed him. The court held that X performed his part of the agreement with the defendant but the plaintiff was not involved with the contract between the parties and therefore could not sue for the sum owed by the defendant. This was in consideration of the fact that the money owed would have been paid to the plaintiff to clear the previous debt. The court found that on this basis the plaintiff had not provided any consideration for the promise between the parties.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed by the court. Although, this case clearly highlighted the major extent in which courts required consideration when tackling cases, it was ultimately flawed when a third party was introduced as it created complications for the courts. Despite the significant time gap, this

case and many other cases including third parties consequently lead to the parliament passing down the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act in 1999 and “thereby removed one of the most universally disliked and criticised blots on the legal landscape”². The Act allows third parties to enforce terms of contracts that benefit them in some way. In addition, it allows them access to a range of remedies if the terms are violated. Moreover, the act limits the ways in which a contract can be altered without the permission of an involved third party. Simultaneously, it provides protection for the promisor and promisee in situations where there is a disagreement with the third party, and allows parties to a contract to specifically exclude the protection prohibited by the Act if they want to limit the involvement of third parties³. The “cardinal necessity” of consideration is pinpointed here, as it is one of the most significant factors in the formation of a contract.

The second rule states that consideration must be ‘sufficient’ but does not need to be adequate. It is commonly stated that the court will “not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration⁴”. However, the adequacy of consideration may be relevant in determining the extent in which the other party is obligated. The case of *Bainbridge v Firmstone* (1838) reveals that consideration does not need to be adequate (generous enough to appear a fair bargain in terms of monetary value) but must be sufficient (of enough recognisable value to satisfy the courts). The case consisted of the defendant asking the claimant to let him weigh his two valuable boilers, the claimant agreed, the defendant then left the boiler in pieces and the claimant was unable to reassemble the boiler. The defendant attempted to argue that

there was no consideration and therefore no contract; however, his claim was dismissed by the court.

The claimant received the recovered damages due to the breach of contract⁵. The validity of consideration can be questioned once again as there are some promises that are regarded as a void or nullity. Although, a promise to do an act or to refrain from doing an act is generally deemed as adequate consideration, there are certain acts and promises, which are deemed to be of no value in law. The case of *Gaisberg v Storr* (1950)⁶ assessed both promises made by both parties as void. The wife's promise not to take her husband to court to seek maintenance from her husband was deemed void and the courts would not countenance the exclusion of their statutory jurisdiction to award maintenance, therefore, her husband's promise to pay her money in consideration of her not going to court was made without consideration and was deemed as void too. Revealing that a void promise is not to be regarded as consideration. The second rule reveals that, whilst the existence of consideration in decision making for the courts is significant, factors such as the sufficiency of consideration must be taken into consideration or the potential for the consideration to be deemed as void is present.

The third rule for consideration to take place follows by promises to do what one has the duty to do. It is the preexisting contractual obligations where a party merely does something by which they are already legally bound to do, this can never be sufficient to amount to consideration for an entirely fresh agreement. Essentially, X is only doing what he is already legally bound to do

and Y is getting nothing more than what he is entitled to under the law, therefore consideration is not present⁷. The case of *Glasbrook Bros Ltd v Glamorgan County Council* (1925) ⁸ is a significant case in support of the principle that the performance of a duty imposed by law is not an adequate consideration.

The council sued on a contract they had made with the owners of a colliery, arguing that a fee was agreed with the owners in order to receive the police garrison supplied to the colliery in order to protect the workers of the coal mine. The coal miners refused to go to work, unless the police supervised them. The owners of the colliery argued that they should not have to pay the council, as there was no consideration for the promise, as the police were under the oath of protecting the public and the property.

In this particular case, the court deemed the verdict in favor of the council. However, this was only because the judge held that that what the managers required of the police was more than what is required of their public duty. If the police had done no more than their duty then they would have inevitably be obliged to do so without extra pay. Therefore, through this case it could be concluded that the courts do not require consideration to be present in all cases. Nonetheless, law is a constantly evolving and ever-changing subject, if the events described in *Glasbrook Bros Ltd v Glamorgan County Council* took place today, the verdict could possibly be different. The Police Act (1996) ⁹ states that “ The chief officer of police of a police force may provide, at the request of any person, special police services at any premises or in any locality in the police area for which the force is

maintained, subject to the payment to the police authority of charges on such scales as may be determined by that authority.”¹⁰ Furthermore, Lord Denning contested the rule that the performance of a duty is not sufficient consideration on numerous cases.

As an example in *Ward v Byham* (1956),¹¹ a man promised to pay the mother of his child £1 per week on the basis that the child was “well looked after and happy”. Lord Denning believed that even though the mother is doing nothing more than her statutory duty to look after the child, in essence she was still providing consideration to support the man’s promise since she was providing a benefit to the father of her child. Which can be interpreted as a “practical benefit” and consequently, consideration.¹² The colliery case highlights the fact that previously in contract law, various cases did not require consideration due to certain parties being legally obliged to do certain acts. Yet, a more modern approach by Lord Denning and the existence of law reforms reveals that in most cases some sort of consideration is still present and necessary in the formation of a contract. The fourth rule states that past consideration is not generally consideration.

An offer demands for something in return if a binding contract is to be formed.¹³ This means that a promise is not enforceable if it is only to pay for services already rendered, or for some other benefit already conferred. As an example, the case of *Eastwood v Kenyon* (1840)¹⁴ John Sutcliffe died and left Eastwood as the carer of her child, Sarah. Eastwood borrowed money to pay for Sarah’s education and Sarah promised to pay him back when she came of age and paid one year’s interest to him.

Sarah then married Kenyon who also promised to pay Eastwood back. Kenyon failed to do so and Eastwood sued. Kenyon stated that he would repay the money after he and Sarah have their first child¹⁵. However, this promise is not enforceable. The only possible consideration, which could be found in this case is the sum of money used to pay for the child maintenance of Sarah. However, because these acts took place in the past before any promises had been made, resulting to the consideration not being valid. To further dissect past consideration, it could be argued that that a minor exception is present to the rule.

Under the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 it quotes that “ Valuable consideration for a bill may be constituted by,—(a) Any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract;(b) An antecedent debt or liability. Such a debt or liability is deemed valuable consideration whether the bill is payable on demand or at a future time.” ¹⁶ Although being regarded as a limited exception, if person X is owed a sum of money and that sum is returned to person Y in the form of a variety of bill exchange in payment, it is possible to sue on that payment and the original debt. Promissory estoppel stands as the main obstacle to the concept of consideration, as it allows some promises to be revoked. The case of Central London Property Trust v High Trees House 1947. High Trees, leased a block of flat from Central London Property Trust. The property was struggling to be fully let because of to the crisis of World War II. Therefore, a conscience decision was made to reduce the rent by half.

However, the parties made the mistake of not determining how long the temporary reduced price should stay. HTH continued to pay the rent at this

new rate. The war had ended half a decade later and the flats were at full occupancy. The CLPT then sued HTH for the full rent from 1945 onwards. In order to reach a conclusion, the courts reviewed previous cases such as *Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co* (1877)¹⁷.

Denning J took a controversial approach by stating that previous similar cases showed that a promise, which the promisor knew was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made, was enforceable even though a lack of consideration was present. Here, the plaintiffs had made a binding promise. However, this was only applicable during the period of war.

Therefore, only after the war the defendants were liable for the full sum they claimed. 1 Book 742 Dean (2000) p. 1433 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/31/section/14> *Photo Productions v Securicor* 1980; 1 ALL ER 556 in Chapter 155 Book 806 1 KB 107, CA. 7 Book 83 8 AC 2709 Section 25(1)¹⁰ <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/16/section/2511> *Ward v Byham* 1956 1 WLR 496 12 Book 84 13 Paul S Davies 78 14 *Eastwood v Kenyon* (1840), 11 Ad 438 15 http://casebrief.wikia.com/wiki/Eastwood_v_Kenyon¹⁶ Bills of Exchange Act 1882, Section 27 (1)¹⁷ *Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co* (1877) 2 App Cas 439,