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This is a study of the lucky German agent during the Second World War, which at the same time was the unlucky spy in modern history. By connecting with the Nazi dullness same duplicity, Cicero made something little for his German masters and for himself. In October 1943, using a habit to take home the Ambassador of the Embassy of secret documents began to withdraw from them and sell photocopies of the German attaché Ludwig Moyzisch got a conspiratorial nickname Cicero. Bazna espionage activity continued until the spring of 1944 - in particular, through it received a number of warnings about the Allied bombing in the Balkans. The effectiveness of the use of information coming from Bazna, however, remains in question; In addition, it is possible that the entry of British intelligence and disinformation (in particular, the prospect of invading Allied armies in Greece) (Farago 14-301).
After completion of the Tehran Conference German, intelligence has done everything possible to learn about the most important decisions made by the leaders of the USSR, Britain and the United States. Some of this information, available at the time of great national importance, became known to the German secret service agent of the Gestapo and Abwehr worked in the embassy and military attaché in Turkey through their secret agent Elyesa Bazna. Bazna known as Cicero obtained this information from the German Ambassador in Turkey, von Papen nickname Cicero; who got the valet to the British ambassador in Turkey Netchbellu Hyudzhessenu (Farago 14-301).
The leak of classified information from the British Embassy in Turkey was later recognized by the then Foreign Minister Bevin Labor Government. In response to the question of a member of the British Parliament Shepherd 18 October 1950 of stealing secret documents, including documents about Operation Overlord from the British Embassy in Turkey Bevin said that no documents were actually stolen during the war from its embassies Majesty in Ankara. However, the investigation of the case showed that the valet at the Embassy Ambassador photographed several secret documents and sold the film to the Germans. He could not have done it if Ambassador complies with the regulations relating to the storage of classified documents. However, the question of the deputy Latona, for what purpose very secret details of military operations is provided after in countries such as Turkey, there was no answer (Farago 14-301).
Undoubtedly, the British ambassador in Turkey did not have enough materials to complete the Tehran and Cairo. He was sent only a brief report on the decisions taken. Bazna was able to photograph this summary of the decisions taken in Tehran and Cairo sold the film for 300 thousand. F. Art. (They were fake) L. Moyzisch, secret agent of the Gestapo in Ankara, is a 'commercial attaché German Embassy in Turkey. Showing these films, Moyzisch, as he writes in his book, I saw that in his hands were all protocols Cairo and Teheran Conferences. But it was a blatant lie, as in Tehran and Cairo were not kept records and were only recording sessions made up of individual representatives of the delegations of the USSR, Britain and the United States.
Head of Nazi spies in Ankara Ambassador von Papen later wrote in his memoirs: Information Cicero was very valuable for two reasons. British Ambassador was aimed summary of decisions taken at the Tehran Conference. This revealed the intention of the Allies on the political situation in Germany after its defeat. However, an even greater and immediate value to him was the fact that the order received secret information about the operational plans of the enemy (Farago 14-301).
At the end of 1943, Cicero gave von Papen top-secret protocols of the Teheran Conference with the decision to open the Allies in May-June 1944, the second front in Europe. Schulenburg found out about it sooner than read text protocols in Moscow, Washington, and London. Learned, but none of it is not reported. Therefore, the landing of the Americans and the British in Normandy was for the military leadership of the Reich complete surprise
Total Cicero was paid more than £ 300 000. It is the largest amount of money ever mentioned in the history of espionage. There was so much money that they scored their entire wardrobe, and Cicero was forced to keep the rest of banknotes under the carpet in one of the halls of the British Embassy. Almost two years British diplomats, unsuspectingly walked on a wad of money received for the disclosure of the most intimate secrets of the UK (Farago 14-301).
After the war, Cicero freely left the embassy staff. Moreover, sentimental sir Netubull Hyugessen ordered long irreproachable service to pay his former valet Award! From the embassy, ​​bending under the weight of trunks with money Cicero went straight to the nearest bank. Spy wanted to put the accumulated pounds at his expense, but failed. Cicero a shock - all derived from von Papen hundreds of thousands of pounds were fake!
The greatest in the history of the spy, so long the nose of the British, was deceived himself. The shock left Cicero not immediately. However, pragmatism Albanians took its toll and Cicero to the Government of the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany's request to reimburse the amount of the put Cicero DM. There was no response. Then Cicero wrote a letter with the same request personally Chancellor of Germany. April 16, 1954 Cicero received from Bonn, not without black humor response: With regard to your claims against the German Reich. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany regrets that he cannot take the case any action. Recommend recourse to the government of Adolf Hitler (Farago 14-301).
During the Second World War is Turkey a neutral state. The intelligence of both the Allies and the Axis powers try to pull the Turkish government on their side. One evening in 1944, the German ambassador entertain Franz von Papen and his English counterpart, Sir Frederic with the French Countess Anna Staviska, the widow of a German Count friendly. The Countess is so that your Papen espionage services offered. However, the German ambassador refuses.
The German military attaché Moyzisch is in the same night photographs of secret British documents. The mysterious man, who offers, calls for 20, 000 pounds. Moyzisch intends to challenge first, but the man seems so confident that Moyzisch promises to talk to the ambassador. The man agrees. He goes to the British Embassy, ​​where he works under the name of Ulysses Diello as a butler for Sir Frederic. Sir Frederic, who knows that Diello was in the service of Count Staviska ago, talks to him about their poverty (Farago 14-301).
Papen recognizes that the British Ambassador in Ankara was sent only a summary of the decisions in Tehran and Cairo: Telegrams Cicero spoke about the debate Big Three in Tehran on a formula unconditional surrender. At the same time, it is unclear why in Berlin reacted with indifference to this, it would seem, the most valuable information and failed to take appropriate action! Why is the semi-tained information about the operational plans of the enemy were never used fascist politicians, generals? Papen expresses the idea that in the highest circles of the Third Reich, concealed from Hitler's bad news. Of course, decisions about new attacks on Nazi Germany, its unconditional surrender could hardly like Hitler. On the other hand, hardly Ribbentrop, Kaltenbrunner, through which there was information about Operation Cicero, dare to hide from Hitler's so important information.
Lack of adequate measures to prevent the operation Overlord can be explained by the fact that the Nazi leaders did not believe in the authenticity of the information Cicero, considered it a provocation, a matter of British secret service or clever ruse on the part of the enemy. The same Papen stated: Hitler and Ribbentrop knew about the decisions taken in Tehran and Cairo but a special mindset prevented them to come to the appropriate conclusions (Farago 14-301).
The point, of course, not in the mind, and the error of the concept of Hitler and his entourage, who hoped that the conflict between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States will grow and second front to be opened in 1944. Lack of appropriate action by the fascist politicians and generals explained, apparently, by the fact that the German General Staff was not aware of Operation Overlord very much. In particular, the exact location of the landing of Allied troops was not known to the Germans. In addition, if the fascist generals, and possessed some data on the Overlord, they could not prevent the opening of a second front in northern France, not having sufficient forces to counter the landing operations the United States and England. The German command was in Northern France, Belgium, and Holland, and only 45 divisions incomplete structure, 22 of them were equipped with 17-year-old youths and soldiers older, poorly armed, without a sufficient number of vehicles.
The first in June 1944, more than 180 German divisions were on the Eastern Front. The Red Army on the battlefields brings to life the decisions taken in Tehran - mercilessly crushed the enemy, creating conditions for a successful attack US and British armies, attacking Nazi Germany from the east, west and south. The Tehran conference was of great importance for the course and outcome of the Second World War. For the first time during the existence of the anti-Hitler coalition agreed plans of waging war against a common enemy, created the conditions for the victorious completion. The course to expand political and military cooperation between the USSR, the US, and Britain became increasingly necessary and inevitable. Military and political cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and the United Kingdom during the Second World War is one of the greatest lessons of history, which cannot pass into oblivion. Decisions of the conference met with enthusiastic approval workers of the USSR, USA, England and other countries, who saw in strengthening cooperation of the great powers shortest way to achieve the defeat of the fascist states, to lasting peace (Noon 339–364).
The historic meeting in Tehran - the newspaper Izvestia - imbued with a strong will and determination allies in the very near future joint crushing blows to end the bloody fury of fascism and open to humankind the way to a long period of peaceful co-operation. Decisions taken in Tehran showed increased strength and international influence of the Soviet Union successfully carry out its mission of liberation. At the Tehran Conference leaders of the three Allied Powers demonstrated ability and desire to successfully despite the presence of significant, sometimes fundamental differences, to reach an agreement on major issues to ensure the victory over fascism and the postwar political peace settlement (Farago 14-301).
The enduring importance of the decisions taken in Tehran, noted in the journal Communist as they are seen today, with a distance of four decades in the atmosphere dramatically increased threats to peace and to the very existence of humanity. This lies primarily in the fact that they are allowed in the name of achieve humane, universal goals to overcome the barriers of alienation between the three great powers belonging to different social systems. trilateral coordination of military plans, carried out for the first time during World War II, contributed to a significant approximation of its completion, thereby saving thousands and thousands of lives. In the same time, the conference approved the basic principles of the postwar world order were a significant contribution to the concrete implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence, in the form of intergovernmental agreements. Tehran conference opened semaphore further inter-Allied meetings big three - which took place in 1945 and the Crimean Berlin Conference.
Almost from the first days of the Second World War, the capital of Turkey, Ankara neutral has become one of the largest centers of international espionage. This is a well-known resident of Ankara named Elias Bazna - a middle-aged man and fat build, an Albanian by birth, has long been consumed with dreams of wealth (Noon 339–364).
Once he had the idea that fill up your skinny wallet can be selling spy secrets. First, he bought a German camera Leica and soon learned to retake quality paper lying on the table, even at night lighting. Luck came to him when he took a job at the British Embassy. Sick old servant of Mr. Ambassador, Sir Hugh Netchbulla-Hyugessena, and an important diplomat suddenly took Bazna to his valet. Every evening, Sir Hugh luxuriated in the bath for at least half an hour. All the while, his casket, in which he brought home urgent official paper, was discovered in his home office. Bazna gradually accustomed his master to the fact that while he was taking a bath, it's valet, tidies uniforms ambassador (Noon 339–364). Looking at the melancholy, silent figure of the servant, hardly anyone of the guards could have imagined that in a bucket, a rag is a camera Leica. Upon entering the home office to the ambassador, Bazna listened to make sure that Mr. still splashing in the water.; Then opened the unlocked the box and carefully examined its contents.
Bazna found a buyer at the German Embassy, ​​which asked for the film with English secrets of 20 thousand. Pounds. After much thought and consultation with Berlin German diplomats, spies agreed to the terms visitor, and it has paid off: in their hands was the most important information of political and military nature. Soon, the de facto head of the RSHA Kaltenbrunner withdrew from the newfound agent Ribbentrop Office for security purposes and handed Albanian Foreign Intelligence Service LED by Walter Schulenburg. Chapter SD invented himself for Bazna code name – Cicero (Farago 14-301).
Cicero collaborated with the Nazi secret services about five months - from late October 1943 to early April 1944. However, it is hard to find in the history of exploration of other, equally effective informer. Cicero, in particular, gave information about the Tehran conference with the heads of the three Allied powers - Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, which was held November 28 - December 1, 1943. It was determined the approximate date (May-June 1944) and the opening of a second front landing massive landing in France. Incredibly, copies of top-secret protocols of the Teheran Conference Cicero had to withdraw before the documents printed for official use in Moscow and Washington!
In the same December, he gave a photocopy of the document, which dealt scheduled for January 14, 1944 a massive bombardment of the Anglo-American aviation Sofia and some other Bulgarian cities to encourage Bulgaria to the exit from the war. Berlin does not even warn about it his Bulgarian ally. Only after accurately within the specified time, a wave of air raids on Sofia, which killed more than 4 thousand? Civilians, the Germans seem to be truly appreciated the importance of Cicero. Schulenburg wrote in his memoirs: It was stunning details top secret correspondence between the British Embassy in Ankara and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London. Documents related to the relationship between England and Turkey, England and Russia (Steury 1–10). For five months of work in Berlin, Cicero received from their hosts 300 thousand. Pounds, which at the time was the mud-pois fantastic sum. At some point, he either sensed that the clouds are gathering, or decided that the money earned on the life of him is enough, but only in April 1944 suddenly disappeared from Ankara, taking, of course, all the cash earned by overwork (Farago 14-301).
Even 15 years after the war, experts on the history of intelligence knew nothing about the postwar fate of Cicero. Then in 1961, he himself appeared in Germany, becoming the hero of the noisy scandal. Bazna said that all the money he received from the Germans were false. By that time, it was widely known the so-called enterprise Bernard, where during the war the Nazi Secret Service established the production of counterfeit pounds, which paid off with many of his agents. Fake differed so high quality workmanship that have been reviewed in the prestigious Swiss bank, where they were recognized as authentic! Bazna but argued that he received banknotes were so primitive fake that he had, in the end, throw them away. On this basis, he demanded that the German Foreign Ministry to pay him compensation as a victim of deception of the Nazis.
Answer sustained in a sarcastic tone, did not wait: Regarding your claim to the Third Reich, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany regrets that he cannot take on this issue any action. Recommend recourse to the government of Adolf Hitler. However, Bazna not going to give up. Sitting as a night watchman in Munich, he began to bombard various instances of Germany letters addressed to the administration, even the chancellor. The litigation continued until his death Bazna, followed in December 1970, on the 67th year of his life, after which officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs relieved. Bazna carried away with him to the grave, and other secrets. One of the photos caught in Schellenberg, clearly visible on the fingers photographed document. As experts have concluded, to take pictures at the same time keep the document handed to one person would not do. Therefore, in Bazna at the British Embassy had an assistant, which no one knew but himself.

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