

Sociology essays – beck bauman straw dogs



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Contents

- VII. Bibliography:

Of Straw Dogs and Straw Men – Contrast, comparison and measure the statements Zygmunt Bauman and Ulrich Beck make about ‘ individualisation ‘ and ‘community ‘

I. Introduction

Lao Tse compared worlds to strawdogs (Gray: 2004: 3) , underscoring the insignificance of the human animate being. Such a view would come as a daze to the two writers in inquiry in this essay. Both Beck and Bauman make the error of putting adult male at the Centre of the universe, as the exclusive self-constituting agent for his actions: in making so they replicate the double stars of modernness that they wish to get away. In order to sham this escape from modernism, they construct a structural homology. Just as the industrial society disembedded adult male from his links in the Feudal system, so our second modernness is now disembedding us from household, gender and category based links. In order for this to be convincing, both Beck and Bauman construct a series of straw work forces that they move through in order to get at the post-modern (or liquid modern, or 2nd modern, depending on your pick of theorist) adult male. This essay 's cardinal contention will be that the central arguments of Bauman and Beck sing the new signifiers of individualization and community rely on a series of category errors. The primary error both theorists make is that they confuse discourse for experience in the world's history: a error with a great many reverberations.

Both theoreticians talk a batch about sociology 's intent: which, harmonizing to Bauman, is to give people tools with which to believe (1993: 6) . Both bookmans attempt to make this by turn toing the central concern of sociology: the relationship between society and the individual. This concern cuts to the bosom of what sociology is concerned with: it addresses the tenseness between the one and the many. How does the 1 (the sociologist) speak about the many (the object of survey) ; what is the relationship between the one (moving topic) and the many (corporate organic structure) ; how does one get from the one (the specific, a individual, or a civilization) to the many (the universal, or a larger civilization of group) . In turn toing these questions, both theoreticians trace a way from the pre-modern adult male to the emergence of post-modern adult male. This essay will first analyze the pre-modern adult male upon which their strategies rest, before sing, comparison, and measuring their arguments on the outgrowth of individualization and the current possibility of community.

II. The First Straw Man: Premodern Man.

The writer would be interested to meet premodern adult male as he is constructed in the work of Bauman and Beck. Bauman argues that premodern adult male had no uncertainty in his life: his life was dictated entirely by the broader societal and spiritual class into which he was born. Bauman asserts that the major uncertainty in premodern adult male 's life is the uncertainty over his ain decease. It is non merely that this word picture is simplistic and ahistorical: for such a word picture of premodern adult male contains some major defects of statement that imperil the possibility of the remainder of Bauman's argument.

The first can be put merely: is it not the instance that it is from the uncertainty of death that we derive all other uncertainty. What is the pressing ontological ground for action if it is not an awareness of our finiteness? If one were to take Dewey's (1929: 45) impression of how one manages hazard: it is exactly physical direct hazard, such as death, that provokes such great demand for the myth and big societal constructions Bauman and Beck claim are at the Centre of premodern life. Bauman asserts, like Beck, that today we live in a hazard society. Yet, in this light the prostration of grand narratives of societal construction onto which we can attach our individualities (individuality in Bauman maps instead like a coat one can attach to coat hangers) seems more declarative of the absence of hazard. Here one could be tempted to change by reversal the old Marxist statement. Rather than superstructural religion supplying the opium for infrastructural economic inequality, is it not contentedness and material luxury that today provides a satisfaction for a lack of purpose and way. What we see in premodern society, if we accept the simplifications of Beck and Bauman, is a great trade of hazard.

To develop this statement, it is wise to look at words of Benjamin (1999: 248), who argues: The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of exigency' in which we live is not the exception but the regulation. The province of exigency besides refers to (every bit good as sovereignty), how ephemeral significances are: how clearly one can see through the discursive order of an autonomous power to the founding force (Agamben: 1995: 17) that lies beyond it. In every system of administration where at that place is hierarchical power there will be the uncertainty of the force (that which,

as Agamben notes, does not necessitate jurisprudence to make jurisprudence) that lies concealed as the basis of sovereignty. It is exactly from this sense of uncertainty that one derives hazard: the hazard of being both at the same time inside and outside a juridical order. Here one feels the ' state of exigency ' , and to cite another Benjamin (1999: 86) essay, it is from this infirmity of being that one derives the possibility of myth.

Bauman would no doubt answer to this argument that while premodern adult male had a great trade of uncertainty in his life, it could be dealt with by being placed into societal classes and so it would not have the same power as the hazard that today we see as being built-in to our own being. Yet, this assumes that for the premodern, the death would be attributed to the unknown, or to the Gods. Yet, if we look to Evans-Pritchard's work on the Azande (1977: 42) , we see that most catastrophes or jobs are located in the socially relevant beginnings. All jobs that can be are blamed on witchery: therefore, it would be evident that uncertainty is besides bound up in the manner the Azande understand the universe, much like us secondary moderns. Therefore, already we see the simple dichotomization made by Beck and Bauman, that today risk is internal, while before it was a belonging of the unknown, can merely not stand up to the grounds.

There are further jobs with Bauman ' s analysis. He often confuses two points. It is one thing to say that premodern adult male had more solid societal constructions than our liquid modernness ; it is another to state that he did not cover with hazard and uncertainty because these classes were placed within societal constructions. The root of this problem is that in claiming modern adult male makes himself, Bauman forgets the great lesson of

Heidegger (1962: 148) , that being is a home. Because Bauman argues that liquid modern adult male is vagabond and borderless, he is forced into change by reversing the polarity in premodern adult male. Yet, in doing this apposition he forgets the great similarity of premodern thought to liquid modern thought. Furthermore, he neglects, as the essay will develop subsequently, that being of any kind is necessarily being in clip and infinite, which, as Heidegger, notes, is the precondition for linguistic communication.

All three ' men ' we will look at place uncertainty and uncertainty at the same time within class internal to him and yet constructed by the society as a whole in which he is ever already a member. The Zande who blames his neighbor for capturing the tree stump on which he stubbed his toe, is not so different from the adult male making out for scientific accounts of how trains go derailed, and faulting decennaries of under investing: both concept, from societal established class, accounts relevant to societal action.

Finally, the fastness of category that Beck and Bauman assign to premodern adult male is merely not well-founded. It is one thing to state that a society assigns person stiff places. It is another to say that they do not see identical crises over these places. The placing of cosmologies and societal hierarchies as designs for action in the world ever creates mystifiers and anomalousness, particularly as the lived world changes. Furthermore, to take the foremost translator of Lacan, Laplanche, one can see that this uncertainty about individuality is a belonging of the relationship between a topic and hegemony on a broader degree. As Laplanche (1989: 130) notes:

[It] is a brush between a single whose psycho-somatic constructions are

situated preponderantly at the level of demand, and forms emanating from an

grownup. Those signifiers pertain to the satisfaction of the kid's demands, but they besides

convey the purely interrogative potency of other messages and those other messages are sexual. These enigmatic messages set the kid the hard, or even

impossible, undertaking of mastery and symbolisation and the effort to execute it

necessarily leaves behind unconscious residues. I refer to them as the source objects

of the thrusts.

These statements are non as marginal to understanding how Beck and Bauman construct the modern universe as they might appear. For if it is the instance that premodern adult male, in all his diverse signifiers, is much closer than we think to post-modern adult male, so many of the displacements that are posited by Beck and Bauman either must be illusive or merely displacements of degree. Further, in some of the comparings given here, the writer hopes to demo that the great job with both theoreticians in inquiry is that they forget the importance of topographic point. They accept tacitly two discourses that should be critically examined. They accept that postmodern adult male is vagabond and makes his own history, which, as the

following two subdivisions show, is not the instance, and they accept the discourse of modernness that ascribes fastness to premodern adult male. It should be noted that the latter discourse was the really same discourse used to justify the modernist political undertaking, and in visible radiation of this, it seems even more surprising they have accepted it so uncritically. Given these arguments have small footing, it becomes evident that our current impressions of individualisation and community do not adhere to phenomenon as they appear in the existent universe.

III. The Second Straw Man: Modern adult male

In contrast to our premodern friend, rooted in his absolute constructions of societal hierarchy and faith, our modern adult male is rooted in expansive sets of thoughts and political orientations. These are what Lyotard (1995: 23) calls expansive narrations. These are those larger narratives against which one can ground one ' s being to give it tone and definition. These very same narrations are those that Lyotard contends are no longer possible today. The modernist undertaking was a undertaking of expansive passage. Beck (1998: 10) remarks that merely as modernization dissolved the constructions of feudal society in the 19C and produced the industrial society, modernness today is dissolving industrial society and another modernness is coming into being. We can see the principle leitmotiv in both writers at work here: as feudal society is to industrialisation, industrialization is to 2nd modernness.

The expansive narrative emerged with the rise of the nation-state. For Bauman, individuality emerges wholly dominated by nationalism. The state province erases difference between persons through planned activity. Such a

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societal order makes authorities intercession appear as natural ; modernness, as Bauman (1999: 15) notes, being an ordered totality. Both writers here owe a debt to the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault (1979, 1980) elaborates a alteration in the order of authorization, an epistemological interruption, whereby autonomous power begins to move straight on the organic structure of citizens. Rather than merely make up one's mind over death, autonomous power begins to represent what is life, and as such conceals the impression of the single and of the community. Foucault portions with Beck and Bauman the impression of modernism as ordered totality. The jobs that emerge in Foucault ' s work, nevertheless, are far greater when brought into the work of Beck and Bauman. For while Foucault is practicing discursive analysis, Beck and Bauman claim to be practising sociology.

As such, there are a figure of questions they leave unanswered. It is not plenty to depict an ordered totality in discourse to turn out it exists in world. If, in two hundred years time, sociologists were to read Bauman (1988: 807) , would they be content to believe that: in the present twenty-four hours society, consumer behavior (consumer freedom geared to a consumer market) moves steadily into a place of at the same time, the cognitive and moral focal point of life, integrative bond of society, and the focus of systemic direction. Not merely would such an premise be untrue, it would be an mistake of analysis. To account for the homogeneousness of discourse is never to understand whether processes mirror the coherence of such a discourse. To get down to understand such a inquiry, it would be necessary

to answer the undermentioned inquiries, which Foucault, Beck and Bauman fail to make

- Given the evident outgrowth of an 'ordered entirety', it is apparent that it could besides hold been possible that other epistemes *could* hold emerged. How are we to explicate the privileged development of the episteme we call modernness?
- What so, is the position of all the other series of discourses that constitute a society without being their paradigmatic episteme? It is not plenty to presume societies homogeneousness without looking at the massed ranks of series that are not used: that constitute the first rule for the possibility of their heterogeneousness. As a relevant modern illustration: what topographic point does the Christian bequest have in secular Europe today?
- It may good be the instance that certain of these other, soundless, epistemes, survive mutely in patterns that are not foregrounded by a hegemonic discourse. It is merely chesty, for case, to reason that feudal system merely vanished.
- Both Beck and Bauman besides fail to turn to the point made by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* (1979), that the patterns instigated by the dianoetic processs of modernness really displace the ordered entirety of discourse.

Through these inquiries, the author hopes to bespeak that the impression of modern adult male that Beck and Bauman have setup is a straw adult male, against which they wish to put their new 2nd modern man with greater declaration. Given that modernness had far greater heterogeneity than we

would wish to believe, it become evident that the impressions that Beck and Bauman claim to emerge merely make non be as all of a sudden emergent. Therefore, their undertaking needs to be wholly reconceptualised.

IV. The Third Straw Man: Postmodernist adult male, hypermodern adult male, liquid modern adult male, 2nd modernity man or the simulacrum.

As we have noted above, in the schemes of Bauman and Beck, modern adult male existed in ordered entirety, his identity deducing from the construction of the province and the political orientations attached to the manner of production in industrialization. Obviously, something happened recently. For now, Bauman states, postmodern adult male has a

‘ painful and disgusting experiencing of perpetual uncertainty in everything since the hereafter ’ (1997: 192) . Bauman asserts this is because now nil is certain any longer: all the grand narratives have collapsed, and we have nil in which to believe. Postmodern man so, is non in a feeling of uncertainty because he is placed within a system of capitalist extraction that increases and perpetuates a systematic hierarchical inequality. He is non unsure but he is hungry, or because he feels oppressed at work, or because his kids go to school where merely 30 % of people pass their GCSE ’ s. No. He is unsure of his individuality. His individuality is uncertain because he no longer knows anything apart from consumerism ; there are no longer any alternate poles onto which to establish being. This uncertainty resembles nil if non Sartrean sickness. Though the writer does non hold time to develop the impression here, it could so be suggested that no merely do the authors in inquiry unquestioningly take the bequest of modernism, their anxiety over their postmodern being structurally mirrors Sartrean (1989: 361) nausea over

bourgeois being. Beck mirrors Bauman in his description of the uncertainty of our disembedded individuality. This subdivision will put out to reply an important inquiry: does postmodern adult male be? If he does be, where can I find him?

Bauman notes (1988: 807) in the present twenty-four hours society, consumer behavior (consumer freedom geared to a consumer market) moves steadily into a place of at the same time, the cognitive and moral focal point of life, integrative bond of society, and the focal point of systemic management. Because of this laterality of the consumer society, a strong process of individualizing occurs. Given there is no longer any impression of community upon which to establish one ' s action, people progressively treat their identity like a set of consumer goods: picking and taking what one wishes. It is in consumerism that one finds the moral focal point of life that in modernism was provided by political orientation and in the premodern universe by faith. Indeed, Baumann asserts that in the present twenty-four hours the extremum experience (the experience which binds people together in a community) has ceased to be spiritual service but can now be found in consumerism.

This thesis is non tenable. Religious experience provides an orientation into something that is constructed as outside oneself (I live for God) , whereas consumerism provides a fortification of the ego (now I can be a new individual with my new places: I live for me) . Religion provides one with a community into which one is orientated as a whole number: consumerism, while one might portion a minute of joy with a friend over a new bandeau, asserts that one is self-created and therefore non built-in to something

exterior of oneself. This is not to propose that today we have no peak experiences create a sense of community. Rather, it is to propose that Bauman is looking in the incorrect topographic point to happen them and in making so has fundamentally misunderstood the procedure of individualization today.

Furthermore, for person who has supposedly emerged from out of the essentialist premises of the discourse of modernity, Bauman has surprisingly essentialist positions of consumerism. In formulating such positions, he forms straw work forces out of the material of the present age. To read Bauman on consumerism is to believe that we sit in forefront of adverts and say 'now I must purchase that' and that we go to the promenade and revel in our newfound consumerism and the easiness with which we can happen new individualities. Contrary to the notion that the dominant leitmotiv in society is consumerism, a figure of points can be raised.

- A system of marks ne'er totalises the significances that can be made from it. It is not the instance that people accept the significances of consumerism uncritically. They form their own significances out of them. Goods such as trainers, nutrient and hair cartridge holders are formed into personal narratives and broader narrations that far exceed their significance as consumables. This emphasises Appadurai's (1986: 15) points that commodification is not an essentialist belongings of an object but instead a phase in its life flight: likewise, people are consumers for merely a period of their life, and utilize consumer goods in all kinds of ways outside of the manner the system constrained them.

- Bauman states that market dependence has replaced articulated legitimacy. The province, it seems, no longer exists as an effectual force because, in Foucauldian manner, people are self-governed into accepting market dependence and their individuality as unsure, hazardous consumers. Yet, it is the articulated legitimacy of the province that makes market dependence possible. As Hardt and Negri (1999: 112) note, the market has ever been reliant on the province for support.
- Not merely is the market dependant on province force for its continued operation, and as such is still necessary, but people do non self-govern themselves into perfect consumers. As De Certeau (1999: 23) notes, in society there are all kinds of illustration of the manner people distort and manipulate the system: soundless ways of defying market outlook. He gives the illustration of *La perroque* : the manner in which people will steal points from their work topographic point or usage work clip as their ain clip. In fact, the position of the dateless infinite less single that is seemingly postmodern seems to emerge from the same impression as Sartre: a bourgeois person who does non meet the direct force of articulated legitimacy nor indulges in the tactics of opposition the oppressed (who we should observe, are ever told they have a topographic point) are forced to utilize.

Yet, harmonizing to Bauman, in this new society (2001: 98) all bounds are off bounds. We resemble the perfect decontextualised, unembedded consumer, unencumbered by history or restriction and free to indulge in maximal consumerism. While the writer might agree with Bauman that this is

suggested by the discourse of postmodernity, the author would argue that it is exactly at the meeting point between this discourse and lived world that the meaning emphasis of postmodern adult male occurs. He soon realises that there are bounds (it is merely they are off – concealed – bounds) . Limits to the sum of good being practical world can give him. Limits to consumerism ; posed, in the terminal by deace. It is in this signifying stress between our function as free consumers and the bounds we place, and the hidden bounds we find, that mean the possibility of interrupting out of this discourse is conceivable, and so, frequent.

Bauman asserts with Beck that we have moved from societal persons determined by modernism to individualised individuals. This move explains why (2001: 12) the narratives told today do not reach beyond the narrow and fastidiously fenced off enclosure of the private and subjective ego. One could add: it is astonishing we can still speak to each other. This individualization is not a pick (ibid) , but a biographical solution to systemic contradictions. Bauman asserts that this individual self-definition is the lone possible solution to the systemic force per unit areas of liquid modernness. In the province of atomization, Bauman claims, faith can simply not supply a satisfactory account that encompasses the liquid modern status. This will come as intelligence to many Americans, who use a religious framework (frequently, if one listens to George W. Bush ' s dictums, in a very totalising manner) as a usher to modern life. The jobs of Bauman's hypothesis are greater nevertheless, than merely the empirical world of the world. Bauman leaves us no room in which to organize communities: and yet, amazingly, communities exist. Not practical communities, not communities on the

cyberspace: but communities centred in topographic point. In these communities, narratives reach beyond the private ego. They do so because they are drawn, as Benjamin (1999: 84) notes of the narrative, from experience. Were Bauman to look at the universe we live in, instead than talk about, he would gain that, as De Certeau (1999: 118) notes, amid the mutters of the system, people produce their own significances.

So while Bauman is right to note that individualization as a discourse has led to a diaphanous contraction of public life, a tapering the art of public life down to a public show of private personal business and public confessions of private sentiment, it is merely an error of analysis to understand this contraction of the populace sphere as it was understood in the 19C as the contraction of the populace sphere as a whole. In classical political theory, the political emerges in the metropolis. Public institutions are designed to chair the demands of private persons (this is non a job in agricultural society where private involvements are bound up together) . Therefore, the outgrowth of the populace sphere is bound up to the possibility of exceeding private involvement. Rather than being a qualitative space, this relationship became quantified: this abjuration of the public space is really what we find in the broad discourse of the postmodern individual. However, in the uniqueness of the metropolis we find public infinities emerging. In the calls of the *sans papier* ; which is non a claim for inclusion within the postmodern discourse but a universalist claim, that, as Rancière (2003: 40) notes: is non a group that ' becomes cognizant ' of itself, finds its voice, imposes its weight on society. It is an operator that connects and disconnects different countries, parts, individualities, maps and capacities. In much less prosaic

ways this public infinite occurs: it occurs because the totalising discourse of mobility that is the leitmotiv of modernness since Machiavelli (and is not at all postmodern as Bauman supposes) is merely that: discourse.

Meanwhile people live in topographic point and infinite, and in such infinities, private involvements are always transcended.

Bauman ' s most of import mistake then, is an ontological 1. He claims (1991: 255)

persons are self-constituting within their home ground (complex system) : there is no end putting by institutions. What is of import to observe here is that persons are not self-constituting: they are thrown (*gewortheit*) , as Heidegger (1962: 45) would hold it, into their societal universe and given functions before they are even self-conscious. The establishment of the societal universe one is in dictates one before one is witting. Indeed, one can state that Bauman ' s analysis stems from the possibility of seeing the universe as self-created. But of class it must appear so within the footings of any discourse, because the background practices that concept the ego are needfully left in the background.

Bauman (2001: 48) eventually claims with gusto: we must learn to populate with ambivalence. Here the writer must admit some confusion: did we not populate with ambivalence before? Was it misplaced in earlier times, or buried, or is it a recent innovation? As stated in the previous two subdivisions, the inability of Bauman, and, as we shall shortly see, Beck, to pull historical continuities into modern experience leaves their analysis as shoal and overstated.

Sadly, Beck repeats all of Bauman's errors. While for Bauman we must learn to populate with ambivalence, Beck claims we must learn to populate with hazard. Now, Beck asserts, that we have been disembedded from the certainties of household, gender and sex ; we must contrive our own certainties and go individualized persons. This (1997: 94) he terms subpolitics. This individualising procedure is structurally parallel to Bauman's individualisation. In both, the antecedently rich establishments of modernism are mysteriously emptied of content and we inhabit a dual universe between these institutions which no longer command any facet of individuality, and our new reflexively modern (for Beck, 2nd modernness is tantamount to Bauman ' s Liquid Modernity) selves. For Beck, this is the contrary of the industrial revolutions, where strong establishments dictated to people (besides cryptically emptied of content) .

Like Bauman ' s forced individualisation, now for Beck, every determination is a personal one. Notions of community for Beck emerge from the underside up, from freely chosen links between people, instead than the top down entire ordination that he finds in modernness. We have already noted for Bauman that modernness was non totalizing, and that the idea of community being born of free persons ignores the fact one is always already within a community. For Beck, these new communities challenge the idea of a community linked to a individual vicinity. He so gives many illustrations, like the Hmong community outside of Vietnam. What is noticeable for the writer about the Hmong community is the extent to which *despite* the planetary separation of its members it needfully connects to a topographic

point. As Heidegger (1962: 120) notes, all being, so all linguistic communication, is connected to put and how one inhabits it.

Among members, like the remainder of the second modern universe, determine themselves in footings of hazard. Rather than the notion of hazard being an unknown, as seemingly it was for the moderns, risk becomes a belongings of ourselves: we become hazardous. For case, Beck gives the example of atomic waste as an illustration of a recent phenomenon that is a property of our action itself. He notes (1998: 53) : in category place being determines consciousness, while in hazard places, conversely, consciousness (cognition) determines being. Which is to state: we determine our being through cognition. What this ignores, as Bauman besides ignores, is that we are never fully the Masters of our own Acts of the Apostles. Man is found in a universe that exceeds him. The possibility of the meaning emphasis laid out above is because adult male is acted on by forces of his own creative activity, and these forces are never contiguous with the domain of lived experience. Beck claims that today (ibid: 183) :

The beginnings of danger are no longer ignorance, but cognition ; not a deficient but perfect command over nature ; not what eludes the human appreciation but the systems of norms and objective constraints established with the industrial era. Given what is argued above: it should be evident that the norms and nonsubjective restraints of the industrial era are exactly what elude the human appreciation.

Volts: Many StrawMen organize little Straw Dogs: the coming community.

Both Bauman and Beck are positive political minds. While they chronicle the evident death of previous notions of community, and chart the rise of individualization, they are also hopeful for new signifiers of community to emerge ; what Beck calls a re-embedding. Yet, for the minds of postmodernity, the replies to what organize community will take are surprisingly old. Bauman, who we shall analyze foremost, gives what we will name the premodern reply, while Beck, the modernist answer.

Bauman, obviously worried about all this unrestrained individuality, calls up a new arm: morality. For Bauman (1993: 13) : moral duty is a enigma reverse to ground. Bauman uses a train of idea that has its beginnings in Aristotle, but is so used by both Arendt, and more recently, Levinas. With Levinas, Bauman argues (ibid) rousing to being for the other is the rousing the ego, which is the rebirth of the ego. This is unusually similar to Arendt (1964: 256) when she notes:

It seems that a adult male who is nothing but a adult male has lost the really qualities which make it possible for others to treat him as a fellow adult male.

The statement would run here that the really possibility of humanity is given by the acknowledgment of the other within you: that your concurrent being is the footing for being. Yet, Levinas (1999) and Arendt are utilizing a bequest here wholly incompatible with Bauman and his impression that we are either tourists or vagabonds (condemned to move around, some with pleasure some with hurting) . He claims this topographic point (or accepting the other) can be called communitarianism and is (1997: 189) a point from which all

things can be seen in true proportions. In this scheme, community precedes choice: a community is formed and so we come to a determination. I will not repeat arguments made elsewhere in the essay, but simply note that the ontological base for the statement of Levinas can be found in Jewish thought which requires precisely the silence of a committedness to something outside of yourself: exactly not that given by postmodern discourse.

While Bauman takes Levinas and uses him in an incoherent manner, possibly reflecting the inability of postmodern discourse to happen good models for coming communities, Beck utilises modernism in an surprisingly unchanged manner. In a recent essay (2004) , Beck attacks universalism as doing all civilizations tantamount and onslaughts relativism as ignoring the interconnectedness of civilizations and taking to common ignorance as neither side admits the possibility of cognizing the others truth. After attacking these straw work forces, he proposes his solution: realistic cosmopolite pragmatism. What would such long words mean? It would needfully (ibid: 430) embrace universalist criterions ' in order to protect one ' s basic rules ' , and realistically accept that ' it may in some fortunes be necessary to violate them. Beck ' s sociology here runs aground on several counts. He assumes that there are basic rules without turning it, and uses the illustration of the debate de la Casas had on whether the Amerindians had souls. What is interesting here, is that at the same clip, as Levi-Strauss (1955: 84) notes, the Indians were holding a conference on whether the Spanish had organic structures, and subjecting them to rigorous proving by submerging.

The point to deduce from this story is that such criteria of basic rule assume the universe La Casas had assumed: a individual universe with a individual impression of the organic structure and of the universe. In this sense, the modernist minds had made the Earth a diatonic integrity. Now the Earth seems like a pressure unconceptualised world, and within this reality calls for pragmatism assorted with basic criteria fail to reply any of the pressure jobs of the universe today. Beck notes (ibid: 438) : cosmopolitanism, once more, means a acknowledgment of distinctness, both external and internal to any society: in a widely distributed ordination of society difference are neither ranged in a hierarchy nor dissolved into catholicity but are accepted. The pressing inquiries of how they are accepted, or why, or which differences, are all left unreciprocated.

VI. Decision

This essay has analysed the manner in which the two writers in inquiry have made usage of a common mythico-history of the universe. This mythico-history is a bequest of a modernist undertaking that wanted to place the premodern adult male in the kingdom of myth and phantasy, and topographic point the modern adult male at the tallness of reason. In some senses, Beck and Bauman continue the review of modernness that began in Adorno (1972) . They criticise reason and the enlightenment undertaking: but they do so from within ground. The real undertaking that is necessary in order to measure what it means today to be an individual, and what it means to be within a community, is to understand the ways in which modernism was not an ordered entirety but a heterogeneous array of processes and patterns. Once this undertaking is achieved so we can get down to think about the

liquid modern person. Sadly, neither of the writers in question hold begun that undertaking.

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