INTRODUCTION
” War is fought with the will of the government, competence of the armed forces and the support of the nation” Carl Von Clausewitz1. The nature of modern warfare involves the entire nation. The armed forces, no doubt have a key role to play, but in a democracy, without the popular mandate of the people, war cannot be brought to a successful conclusion. While combat success wins battles, it is the political impact of combat that wins wars, and this political impact depends on how it is communicated to the people by the media to mobilise their support towards the cause. 2. The impact of media on the conduct and outcome of modern day wars and insurgencies has always been acknowledged by military leaders. Revolutionary development in mass communication technology and the resultant capability of the media for instant and graphic coverage of operations, coupled with increasing democratic demand for more information for all spheres of government activity includingmilitary, have transformed media into an important war winning factor like never before in history. 3. The military – and the media are interdependent, both need each other for their respective roles, however, their relationship is a complex one. In that the armed forces attempt to manage the media to report and project their point of view, while the media attempts to get to the bottom of the issue to ferret out the truth. The term `media management’ is, however, anathema to media men, they detest any control or restrictions imposed on them; they are of the opinion that media cannot, and should not be managed in today’s `info- tech’ and `info-savvy’ world. 4. The Indian Army’s experiences in fighting low intensity conflicts in the North-East, Punjab, Sri Lanka and Kashmir have repeatedly driven home the importance of the role of media in influencing the outcome of conflict. Both the insurgent and the security forces use the media for winning the ” battle of minds”. The Indian insurgent has however, shown a remarkable consciousness in managing the media, as can be seen by the systematic and well publicised `exclusive stories’ put out by the media in support of their cause. The militants’ ploy is to create situations whereby the security forces are perceived as having committed `excesses’. The cleverly engineered media trap gets the armed forces bad publicity, forcing them to be merely reactive after the damage has been done. Thus, sections of the media have inadvertently or otherwise helped the militants in Kashmir and the North-East to achieve their aim of internationalising thehuman rights issues. These issues have to be adequately tackled by the armed forces to bring out the military viewpoint, and to counter secessionist propaganda. The armed forces need to realise that creation of a favourable public opinion in counter insurgency situations is the real `strategic objective’, and the media an effective means to do so. 5. In spite of the recognition of the role of the media in winning wars, the handling of the media by the Armed Forces, especially in our country leaves much to be desired. Till recently armed forces were actively (and officially) discouraged from interacting with the media. This has now changed, but the old reluctance still remains; this has inhibited the desired level of mutual interaction necessary for objective reporting. Excessive secrecy and the tendency to be overly cautious by the military appear to irk journalists. In an environment in which state-of-the-art technology makes available most of the information concerning nations, it would be realistic to review the Official Secret Act and the security classification system. More importantly, there is a need for the military to establish a harmonious relationship with the media, based on greater interaction and transparency. This is all the more pertinent in conflict situations where the fight against militants is largely dependent upon local, national and international public opinion, which is molded rightly or wrongly by a large cross section of the media. Thus, the information battle has to be planned and orchestrated with the full confidence of the media, aimed towards a common goal of peace, tranquility and development. Today public support is required towards strengthening the armed forces, maintaining morale of the troops, to convert combat success into political victory.
METHODOLOGY
Statement of Problem
6. The handling of media by the Indian armed forces today leaves much to be desired cannot be denied. This is apparent by the indifferent coverage of news and features about the military by the media, lack of understanding of the armed forces by the common man and unduly one sided publicity attracted by a few aberrations in the army’s otherwise fine actions, especially while fighting low intensity conflicts. Current military-media relations are characterised by mutual distrust, lack of empathy and antagonism. Therefore, it is imperative that military commanders must understand the tremendous power of media in influencing public opinion in today’s world so that they can successfully harness this power to their advantage. 7. The purpose of this study is to critically analyse the existing military-media relations, the issue of media handling by the armed forces, and recommend suitable changes that need to be implemented for ensuring more effective handling of the media which will assist in correct projection of the image of Indian Armed Forces.
Justification of the Study
8. A nation’s military security comes from the strength of its armed forces and the media is considered to be the watch dog of the nation itself. Thus, both contributetowards a common cause. By virtue of the demands and nature of its peculiar employment, the army is required to function in border areas; a little away from the people most of the time. The media becomes the main and probably the only link between the people and the armed forces. Therefore, amalgamation and union of aims of the armed forces and the media becomes very important. The successes and failures of the defence forces are directly affected by the nature of their relationship with the civil society and the place they have in society. Even more important is the enhanced awareness of civil society about their defence forces, and the mass media plays a vital role in building it up. 9. Relations between armed forces and media are generally friendly, informal and supportive during the war because both are imbued with the fervour of patriotism in the wake of alien aggression. But during peacetime this cordiality and cooperation is generally found ‘ missing’ in the media-military interface. Performing their respective roles is partially dependent on the assistance of one another. Presently, there appears a serious problem in their mutual relationship. This contentious issue demands comprehensive study and remedial measures. Professional media handling by the armed forces will lead to healthy military-media relationship during peace. This will turn media into an effective force multiplier during conventional war and LIC situation.
Scope
10. The scope of the dissertation will be to focus on the current state of military – media relations, and the significant role played by the media in the projection of a positive and constructive image of the armed forces. The study will further suggest a methodology that needs to be implemented towards harmonising this often contentious relationship; and recommend organisational and policy changes that need to be introduced for optimising military – media efforts for projecting a more positive image of the armed forces during war and peace.
Preview
11. The dissertation will be covered in the following parts:-(a) Historical Perspective of War Reporting.(b)Defence Journalism in India.(c) Role of Media in OP VIJAY.(d)Military Media Relationship – The Way Ahead.
Brief Summary of the Research
12. The research establishes that relations between armed forces and media are generally friendly, informal and supportive during the war, but during peacetime this cordiality and cooperation is generally found missing. This conflict has been prevalentfrom the time the two have come to coexist. At the core of this conflict is the requirement of secrecy on part of the military and the requirement of information by the media. While the military has been applying various means at its disposal viz censorship, threat of punitive actions etc, to control the media, the media has shown its power as a formulator of public opinion and thus become a force to reckon with. The military needs to understand this force and work towards using this force to its advantage rather than be at cross roads with it. To this end, the military has to come out of its shell and be more indulging towards the media. It has to be transparent in its dealings and develop a relationship based on trust with the media. The media on the other hand must be alive to the power that it wields in opinion formulation and the responsibilities that come along with it. It has to exercise discretion in its reporting so as not to compromise national security.
Sources of Data
13. The basic source of data for the dissertation has been the books available in the college library. In addition, the internet and the data available on various sites have also been used for the research. A detailed bibliography of the study material is placed at the end of the research paper.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF WAR REPORTING
” O Lord, may it ever be so, that words are mightier than swords and the pen is mightier than the sten”[1]Anil Bhat14. Whenever man has gone to war, there has always been someone to write about his exploits. Homer’s ” Iliad” was perhaps the first written account of a battle. The Athenian historian Thucydides wrote a brilliant narrative of the war which Athens waged against Sparta; a serving soldier himself, he used his experience of battle together with eye-witness accounts to form descriptions of war which have retained their originality many centuries later. The character of war has changed continuously. With the increase in range of weapons, the distances between the fighting soldiers continued to increase, as a result, the war fighting continued to become more impersonal and less heroic.[2]15. In more modern times, the first professional war correspondent recorded is Henry Crabb Robinson who covered the Napoleon’s campaign on the River Elbe, for London Times in 1807. The father of modern war correspondent is, however, considered to beWilliam Howard Russell. His reporting of the Crimean War for the Times, London can well be seen as the first organized effort to report a war to the civilian population usingcivilian reporters. Russell was extremely critical of the war in Crimea. He exposed the lack of basic facilities to the field forces such as medical etc. His extreme criticism led to immense amount of political pressure being put on him and his being branded a Russian spy. His reporting led to the fall of the Government in 1855.[3]When the new Secretary for War, the Duke of Newcastle came to the Crimea later in the year, he told Russell, ” It was you who turned out the Government”.[4]
1860-1910: The Golden Age of Defence Reporting
16. The period from 1860 to 1910 is described by Peter Knightley as the ” Golden age of Defence reporting”.[5]This period saw the American Civil War, the Franco Prussian War, the war in Sudan, the Boer War and the Russo Japanese War as the major conflicts. This period also saw an increasing level of conflict between the military and the media, the advent of censorship, a dilemma on part of the various establishments in dealing with this new force i. e. media. This was an era which saw the gradual influence of technology creeping into media reporting.[6]
During First World War
17. Tension between the military and the media continued to prevail during the First World War. In the wake of estranged relations between reporters and the military authorities during First World War in the US, media persons had to swear to ” convey the truth to the people of the United States”, but refrain from disclosing news that might help the enemy. At the end of the First World War, it was said that Reuters was ‘ mightier and more dangerous’ than the fleet or army.
During Second World War
18. Immediately after the American entry into the Second World War, Washington lost no time in setting up an Office of Censorship and an Office of War Information to handle the flow of news, which became the nation’s official office of propaganda. 19. The use of mass media as an additional weapon of war, which had assumed significance in the First World War, reached a level of higher sophistication during the Second World War. The Second World War witnessed increased use of radio in particular and news agencies for management of information and disinformation. And it was during this period that the word propaganda acquired its current negative connotation. General Dwight D Eisenhower fared better during the Second World War. He recognized the importance of press coverage in maintaining public support. He embraced reporters, considering them to be quasi-staff officers whose mission commanders must understand and assist.
Korean War Phase: 1950
20. The Korean War is described by Royle as ” the worst reported war of modern times”.[7]Journalists in this war have been described as cheerleaders essentially for their blind support to the war effort and towing the state’s line towards the initial phase of war and bestowing unqualified praise on the establishment’s achievements. There was limited censorship towards the beginning of the war, which changed as the war progressed.[8]The media’s dynamics about reporting from the field were completely changed during the war coverage in Korea and Vietnam. Information was confined to a daily briefing by the United Nations command. Journalists were required to submit their materials to a field censor who then submitted the materials to senior level officers in Tokyo for another review. Some journalists and media outlets felt provoked to intentionally deride censors. For instance, Newsweek published a map that depicted the battle order for the US 8th Army. Censorship was extended beyond security to include areas of legitimate commentary and debate.[9]
Vietnam War
21. From 1964 to 1972 the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world committed a major military effort in order to defeat a nationalist revolution in a peasant country – and failed – this was the Vietnam War. The war in Vietnam was not a war likeany previously experienced by the American people.[10]In the 1960s, TV had emerged as the main source of information and it changed war reporting forever. Morley Safer’s expose of American soldiers burning a village had a huge impact on viewers at home, and added to the military’s mistrust of reporters. 22. Reporters in Vietnam had more freedom of press in conflict areas; there was no official censorship in place and correspondents could move around with more freedom. But this was not the problem; the problem lay at home, broadcasters filtered the information and network TV polices that were aimed against airing footage that might offend soldiers families sanitized the coverage of the war. Information that got to the public was a watered down version of what was coming straight from the field as media companies declared that some of the information was, as Miss Gellhorn said when she tried to publish some of her detailed articles about the war, ” Everywhere I was told that they were too tough for American reader”. It is widely thought that Vietnam had been the ” living room war”, an ” uncensored war” showing its ” true horror”. It wasn’t the mainstream media that turned the public against the war; it was the public, especially the growing antiwar movement fortified by Vietnam veterans who opposed the war – that encouraged mainstream media towards more critical coverage of the war.[11]
1991 Gulf War I
23. In obliging the nation’s ” need to know”, the television media choreographed the event similar to a Hollywood producer making a mini-series for television. They had moments of high-drama, suspense, violence, sadness, contemplation, and elation. As the New York Times Malcolm Brown noted ” This war seemed to smell more of greasepaint than of death”. To enhance the palatability, the media accompanied the information with the recorded sound of drumbeats or flutes, and a grandiose headline in bold letters that read ” War in the Gulf” or ” America at War”. 24. For the democracy to function effectively, the media must ultimately be responsible for providing information that is accurate and truthful to the participants: this is the definition of news. Anything that is not truthful or accurate cannot be classified as news, but rather perhaps it should be referred to as disinformation or propagandas. More importantly, in a democratic system the media have to ensure that their right to provide accurate information is secured. If the media fail to attempt (not fail in the attempt) to ensure their rights to access information, then they are as culpable as the institution or government that intentionally prohibited them from presenting accurate information. It is on this scale of duties and obligations that the media and the Pentagon’s action in the Persian Gulf War should be weighed. 25. In addition to an agreement to withhold sensitive military secrets, as was the case in Vietnam, the media were further bound by six pages of rules issued by the Pentagon governing their behavior in Saudi Arabia and the Kuwait Theater of operations. Partial lists of the guidelines are as follows:-Journalists must accompany military units in special combat ” pools”. All pool stories must be submitted for ” security review” and cleared by defense spokesmen. Television coverage of ” personnel in agony or shock” or ” imagery of patients suffering from severe disfigurement” was prohibited. Military commanders had the right to ” medically evacuate” journalists they deemed physically unfit. Coverage of religious services in Saudi Arabia was prohibited. Disclosure of geographic locations, security precautions, information on downed aircraft and ships, enemy attacks and the number of aircraft, tanks, trucks and radar were prohibited. 26. The Pentagon gave three basic reasons for insisting the coverage be provided by small pools of reporters. First and foremost, the pool system would ensure the physical safety of the reporters. The later disappearance of CBS newsman Bob Simon and his crew after leaving a journalistic pool seemed to confirm the Pentagon’s reasoning. Second, the military by reviewing the reports would prevent the release of information that could endanger US or allied personnel. As Pete Williams, assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, explained, in an era of instantaneous satellite transmissions, ” How do you assure commanders that nothing will be reported that jeopardizes their operations and the lives of their men”. Finally, the Pentagon reasoned that the logistics of having 800 reporters stationed in Saudi Arabia to roam the desert was not practical.[12]
Gulf War II: Op Iraqi Freedom
27. Op Iraqi Freedom saw a new concept coming up, the concept of ‘ embedded journalism’. Under this concept, journalists were ‘ embedded’ with combat units to report on the war. They had the freedom to travel along with the units and report on various engagements. There were briefings carried out for the media to give them the overall perspective of the operations. The US used the media to continuously build up the case for its intervention into Iraq. A continuous portrayal of Saddam Hussein as a tyrant and threat to world security and the supposed ‘ omnipresent threat of weapons of mass destruction’ were the two main foundations on which the American argument of war was based. It used these arguments to convince the home audience and the international community of the need to go in for war. The international community was however hard to convince.[13]
Afghanistan War
28. The US military restricted media access to troops and was sometime hostile to reporters in Afghanistan. The media were denied access to American troops in the field of Afghanistan to a greater degree than in any previous war involving US military forces. Spokespersons of the US Defence Department usually spoon-fed correspondents a regulated daily-ration of news about the military operations that left he journalists frustrated and mutinous. Neil Hickey arrived at those conclusions on the basis of his interviews conducted from early October through mid-December, 2002, with more than a score of foreign editors, Pentagon correspondents, Washington bureau chiefs, top news executives, media critics, and others.[14]
Conclusion
29. The bitterness that came to pervade military media relationship since the days of the First World War has not got diluted over all these years but in certain cases it has further sharpened, particularly in the context of the US. To some extent, with technological innovation in the form of mobile and satellite phones, cable and satellite television networks, and the Internet, the media have witnessed a sort of revolution in transmission of information in peace times as well as in war situations, the military still continues to be in a commanding position in terms of superior technology and other ‘ controls’ that it can exercise on the flow of information.
CHAPTER III
DEFENCE JOURNALISM IN INDIA
” Every day, a newspaper publishes enough words to fill a novel. But unlike the novel, the newspaper is not written by one writer laboring alone. The newspaper is like a great ship which does not sail without a crew, each member assigned to independent tasks yet all coordinated by its Captain.”[15]Sangeeta Saxena30. Military and media are key components of free nation’s strengths in a world that witnesses increasing power in the non-state actors’ repertoire. Fundamentalism’s intolerance of free societies is bound to fuel assaults, with the weaponry being fielded by the fundamentalists graduating to more and more lethal levels, tomorrow. Off the shelf technology, ability to recruit technically qualified manpower globally, along with the assets of sanctuaries especially in countries in Asia and Africa, allow terror movements to refine their inventory. Media’s spread allows them greater reach, while obviating the disadvantages of their geographically widely dispersed small modules that remain incognito, though embedded in modern societies. 31. Militaries will need to seek the media more and more in their efforts to reach out with their message to influence the populace. The greater goals of military campaigns in the future will be people centric and in pursuit of creating lasting influence favourable to their national interests. The often repeated statement: winning hearts and minds, is gradually transforming to be an axiomatic truth. Such military-political objectives require mass media walking in step with military interventions.[16]32. The status of defence journalism in post independence India has been a sad commentary of neglect, indifference and lack of trust between the Government and the media. The country was subjected to an aggression in 1947-48, followed in quick succession by three wars, military actions for integration of states and assistance in upholding democracy in neighbouring countries. This sad state has come to pass due ignorance on the part of our planners in the importance of the media in defence matters. Post independence, the defence forces were seen only as an extension of the Government’s right to rule and hence a situation was created wherein all matters connected with defence and national security became the proverbial ‘ Holy Cow’ which was not to be touched and must remain shrouded in secrecy. The biggest aberration is been the lack of an information policy.[17]33. The country can hardly boast of a handful of journalists who have acquired some degree of specialisation in the field of defence. Maharaj K Chopra, Manoj Joshi, Ravi Rkhye, Kanwar Sandhu and Dr Mankekar are just the few names which can be thought of. By far the field of defence journalism has been confined to a few retired army Generals who have recounted their experiences in service or written accounts of various battles. These accounts obviously have a one-sided pitch and do not present a rational analysis. While the situation in the present media has been poor, that in the electronic media is dismal. All India Radio does not have a single Defence Correspondent. The only exception in this field has been the unbiased reporting of Mark Tully for the BBC. In the last few years we have seen Maroof Raza reporting and analysing for foreign channels like STAR TV. He perhaps because of his army service is able to understand the nuances of the services and is thus in a position to carry out some bit of analysis.[18]34.” For the most part of the major trend in defence journalism in our times is the reporting of raising days, visits of delegations and change of guard in defence establishments. Most of the time the localised leanings of the newspaper are visible in such reports. If the city boasts of having defence training establishments, then the passing out parades and graduation ceremonies get a full fledged covering. Days like Army Day, Navy Day and the Air Force Day are days which the press normally remembers and gives reports on the local celebrations of the concerned fraternity on these days”.[19]35. We are the only democracy in the world where no debate is carried out by the journalists or any other form of media on the Defence Budget or on the functioning of organisations like Defence Research and Development Organisation. Numerous examples on the type of articles which appear on defence matters in books like ‘ Defence Journalism in India’ Sangeeta Saxena and ‘ Defence Reporting in India’ by Natarajan and Chakraborty. Even the editors and publishers of various newspapers and books have been found wanting in this field. Till recent years the only published material available on Defence matters were official publications by defence institutions like Sainik Samachar, Defence Science Journal, Trishul, Combat and the like. These publications had limited circulation within the services and no contributions from outside. The only exception was the USI journal a legacy of the colonial era. This trend has witnessed a gradual shift in recent years. Lancer Publishers was started by an ex army officer, Capt Bharat Varma (Retd) which opened the field for people involved with defence matters and those involved with National Security to put across their views. The period also saw the birth of the ‘ Indian Defence Review’ which ran into problems with defence authorities in its initial years and was banned for a short while. The publication has now matured over the years and found wide readership both within and outside the services. Gradually, additional publications have emerged like ‘ Defence Seminar’ and ‘ Defence Today’ and the field is slowly opening up.
Freedom of the Press
36. In the Indian Constitution there is no separate provision exclusively dealing with the freedom of the press as is the case in other countries like the USA. The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution deliberately avoided to incorporate any provision in the Constitution guaranteeing the freedom of the press. The term ‘ freedom of expression’ is a broader one and includes all possible forms of expressing opinions, thoughts, feelings, ideas and convictions. And this expression may take place through writing, printing, and picture or by any other manner and includes expression through the press. Recognising the importance of the right to freedom of speech and expression the Supreme Court of India observed:
” Freedom of speech and of the press laid at the foundation of all democratic organisations, for, without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular government, is possible”.
37. Dr BR Ambedkar, one of the founding fathers of our constitution had this to say regarding the freedom of the Press:-
” The press has no special rights which are not to be given or which are not to be exercised by a citizen in his individual capacity. The editor of a press and the manager are all citizens and, therefore, when they choose to write in newspapers, they are merely exercising their right of expression and therefore, no special mention is necessary of the freedom of the press”.
Official Secrets Act 1923
38. One of the chief obstacles to the free flow of information and one which largely influences the functioning of defence journalists in our country is the existence of certain provisions of the Official Secrets Act, 1923. The biggest irritant in the Act is Section 5, which prohibits from communication:
” Any secret official code or password or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information which relates to or is used in a prohibited place or relates to anything in such a place, or which is likely to assist directly or indirectly an enemy or which relates to a matter the disclosure of which is likely to affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State or friendly relations with foreign States or which has been made or obtained in contravention of this Act”.
Committee on Defence Coverage
39. The Press Council of India Committee was constituted in September 1992, and submitted its final report in October 1994. The Committee in addition to other aspects recommended enactment of a bill on Right to Information. In its deliberations with various defence officials, the committee was informed that no change in the Ministry’s information guidelines was contemplated but that discussions had been held between the Defence and Foreign Secretaries and the Press Information Officer as a result of which more openness would, hopefully, ensue. The committee in its final report highlighted the need for greater transparency with regard to defence related matters.
Ethics for Defence Journalists
” Individual newspapers, agencies and audiovisual organisations have their own role to play as have professional associations at all levels. The Press must be concerned about black-seep within the fold whose irresponsible actions tarnish the image of the entire profession. Government, the media and society are not and should not be ranged against one another, separated by suspicion and hostility”.[20]
40. The importance of media ethics assumes great importance particularly for defence journalists. A defence journalist faces two ends of the dilemma, on the one hand he can succumb to special treatment and privileges given by the defence personnel and on the other hand to pressure of the gun from terrorists. There are numerous instances of disgruntled elements within the services, using the journalists to act as their mouthpiece while remaining anonymous themselves. Though self-identification is a must in all reporting, it is very essential for defence reporting.
Military Media Relations in India
41. The relationship between the military and the media in India has remained tenuous since colonial days when the military was usually confined to cantonments and had hardly any contact with the outside world. The first J&K campaign, which was independent India’s debut in war, somewhat reduced the communication gap between the military and the media, but the drift reappeared soon thereafter. Three wars later and regardless of countless tasks in aid to civil authorities be it floods, drought, terrorism or wherever the services have been seriously involved no serious attempt has been made to resolve the mutual aloofness. However, notwithstanding the aberrations, the media respects the military and acknowledges the compulsions and the hardships, unique in their own senses, it faces in India. Media emphasizes the national pride in its composition, role and outlook and considers the defence force above the day-to-day controversy that surrounds so much else of national life. Notwithstanding the positive inclination of media towards the military, there are certain areas in which media in India, in particular, finds the interactions with military difficult. Some major areas of difference are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. 42. Organisational Difference.[21]The military, institutionally, is mission oriented, and so is the media. Although, one may feel that their mission appear to be antithetical, it must be borne in mind that military as an organization is an instrument of the government and is subject to all the external constraints that come with it. On the other hand media organization is structurally slimmer, quicker and flatter with a preference for facts and views. Thus, at times, the situation arises where the conflicting requirements have to be accommodated in the overall interest of the nation to whom both are committed. 43. Cultural Ethos. Army has inherited barriers to external communication as it remains in remote and far- flung places. Living conditions are harsh and different than any other organization. Obviously such an environment generates different expectations, feelings and behavior. Military is an organic being, not a robot of mechanical obedience. Unless the media have the basic knowledge about them and their psyche and ethos, media cannot be objective, accurate and credible in reporting about the military. 44. Image Consciousness. Like anyone else, the Army too is image conscious. It matters to an individual as well as the organization as to how their actions are perceived by others, as their strength lies in the support that they receive from the others in each and every action of theirs. It must be remembered that whatever actions a soldier takes in his professional capacity are for a just cause; for the security and integrity of his country. 45. Motivation and Morale. Motivation is another factor that has far reaching implications for a soldier at all times and it is the most important factor in a war. Morale of the soldier soars when he knows that he has the backing of entire nation for a particular cause; he is even ready to lay down his life for the same. Media plays an important role in garnering this support, in forming a bridge between him and the people. 46. Rules and Regulations. Being an instrument of the Government the hierarchy in the military is subject to all rules and regulations associated with it. Army too has certain regulations governing the professional conduct of its members, laid down in the Regulations for the Army. Communication to the press is not forbidden but it does have certain preconditions that must be fulfilled; basically to prevent the breach of overall security. 47. Public Relations. Public relation is one area where the military in India had taken a lead. Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) in South Block is one of the oldest public relations organisation in the country. DPR, under the Ministry of Defence (MoD), is working ever since the British days. DPR is an umbrella organisation for maintaining interaction with the media and public. The DPR is headed by the Director, an officer of the Indian Information Service and comes under the Joint Secretary (General) of the MoD on the policy matters. The DPR is in a unique situation in that he is accountable to the Principal Information Officer (PIO). He is the Government of India’s (GOI) chief spokesperson, rather than to the MoD.[22]The Director is assisted by the three Services Public Relations Officers (PROs). PRO (Army) is in turn with the PROs at various levels and locations. A recent addition to the Army Headquarters is the Army Liaison Cell (ALC), which came in its present form during the Kargil battle. Notwithstanding the above, there is an existing need to have ” media savvy” PROs down to unit/subunit levels.[23]It must be remembered that the future battlefield will be fashioned by low intensity conflicts and limited wars, where higher Formation Headquarter will often be too far away to respond immediately to the demands of the media.[24]
CHAPTER IV
ROLE OF MEDIA IN OP VIJAY
” The media is allergic to the uniform and resistant to management” Maj Gen Arjun Ray,[25]VSM, Indian Army48. Operation Vijay was a war which India waged with severe self-imposed restraint in the possibility of a nuclear flare-up. The conflict was truly a war of three ‘ M’s- Military, Media and the Motherland.[26]Working full-time with heightened diplomacy was the media which brought the war right into most homes, imparting a different complexion to the conduct of war by the politico-military combine. 49. By announcing the massive intrusions in the Dras-Kargil Batalik belt, the media acted as the sounding board and got a head start over the military which took roughly three weeks to grasp the situation and commence Operation Vijay on 26 May 1999 to flush out the intruders. 50. Aware of the media gaze, the military plans were made with caution and reviewed as the operations progressed.[27]51. Kargil War was the first experience in India after the TV had reached every single village in the country. The people saw on their TV screens how the officers and soldiers fought in the most treacherous terrain and under most challenging circumstances. The people also saw the living conditions of the soldiers, their clothing or the lack of it in certain areas and the physical effort and mental endurance displayed by the Indian Army. This perhaps was their first introduction to the Army. They saw the artillery guns deployed and firing. They saw the IAF carrying out bombing sorties. They saw the casualties bring evacuated by helicopters and treated. They saw the convoys of military vehicles, the drivers negotiating their vehicles on the NHIA under the enemy fire. 52. The credit for generating national patriotism has to go to the print and the audiovisual media. In the beginning, the entry of media personnel into the battle zone was not permitted.[28]Gradually the Army overcame its inbuilt inhibitions of secrecy. The media people were with the advancing troops, in their battle locations, at the gun positions at various headquarters. In so doing they were able to highlight the realities of the battle field to the people. The media was able to focus the viewers to the spirit of sacrifice of the young officers and soldiers.[29]53. The peace of 28 years between the 1971 war and the Kargil war lulled our defence force into complacency. The 1971 India Pakistan War was a photo-finish 14 day war which began on the night of December 3, 1971 and resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. The TV was still in its infancy. During the war, correspondents fanned outin the western as well as eastern sectors and reported the event s extensively sharing agonies of soldiers and also their joy. The role of Mukti Bahini as a savior was well brought out by the media. However, what was lost in the fight on the western from J & K in particular, was compensated with the success on the eastern front. 54. For the first time in the history of India, which had recently undergone a revolution in the field of telecommunications, we saw an extensive, though selected use of satellite phone which could be hooked from any destination to convey the latest news on the warfront. Earlier, the dispatches of war correspondents were scrutinized by the media officers before they could be sent. But there were no such constraints this time. There was self restraint and dependence on the government machinery.[30]
Pakistan’s Information War
55. India decided to an independent travel by journalists for ” national security reasons”, the wily Pakistan Information and Media Development Minister Mushahid Hussain alleged that India was losing the information war and had been isolated internationally. This explained his quick invitation to Indian journalists to visit Pakistan and see the damage caused to the ” life and property of the civilian population of Azad Kashmir due to the unprovoked Indian firing along the LOC”. 56. Chief Executive the Dawn group, Hameed Haroon, appealed to former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, saying the action ” does great discredit to India’s democratic credentials”. As Haroon pointed out ” Dawn has an influential, albeit small readership who read it to gain an insight into the perceptions of the more moderate and influential elements of Pakistani public opinion. Failure to understand these perceptions can only lead to further misunderstanding between both nations.[31]57. India also has to put an end to its jingoism, as reflected in its radio and TV news bulletins and in the fulmination and sneering tone of its military leaders. It almost appears as if it is in India now that the military is leading the political government by the nose. TV was practically running amok with war songs and discussions among motley gatherings of known hawks. Now it is having a hard time trying to trap doves for its interviews[32]
India Media Scene
58. Every effort was made by the electronic and print media, as well as the country’s rulers and newsmakers, to create war hysteria and fuel patriotism. Probably every Indian soldier killed has now been lionized and made a hero. The newspapers and magazines are still full of their stories of ‘ bravery’ and the brave words of their parents, family members expressing satisfaction over their sacrifice and showing willingness to die in the cause of India. 59. Media Management. India, however, remained critical of India’s media management. It is no secret that while the media responded heroically, the Armed Forces system for managing them in wartime broke down.[33]In the daily Kargill briefing terse, cryptic replies in monosyllables did not enthuse the scribes, just as long discourses on tactical theory put off the press gallery which sought good meat for copy.[34]60. The unfortunate episode in which former Gen Rodrigues came under criticism for not choosing his words with care during a newsperson’s interview in March 1992 resulted in a distrust of the Press. Subsequently, the Army started warming up to the media for its force multiplier potential. 61. It is to the credit of the Army that in Kargil after an initial bout of grumbling, it allowed reporters into most of the battle zone. The result, to their surprise, was an unleashing of competitive patriotism that made those masters of the game; the Pakistani Inter-Services Public Relations look terribly outdated.[35]62. The foreign press trapped in the Valley turned to events around them and the world received a blitz of anti-India sentiments from the local Kashmiris. Such stories inthe independent, the Washington Post, BBC etc were given play by PTV in their propaganda war against India.[36]
Influence of Media in Kargil
63. The CNN coverage of the Gulf War 1991 changed it all, turning real battle into a video game which was being enjoyed along with snack or dinner. Imagine the people enjoying world cup Cricket and Kargil war alternatively with the touch of a button on remote controls. 64. In regard to issues of defence preparedness, can neither be quantified nor underestimated. For the first time, the media coverage of a war, that too an undeclared war which was fought with localized confines of a battle theatre, people realized that fighting and dying for one’s country has different connotations and consequences than fighting and dying for one’s country facing British bullets in a freedom Satygraha. 65. The media coverage of the Kargil war brought out a few home truths to the media, and probably newspaper editors and owners are more aware today than they were even six months ago woefully ” literate” the media today is on defence coverage. Not so strangely, only a new newspaper, some of them language papers, could mobilise ” in house” interpretation of the progress or otherwise of the war. Judging at least by the bylines in the various newspapers during the eight or ten weeks of the war, even the most favourable assessment can only be that some newspapers do not have on theirstaff writers well-informed or capable of writing on war matters that only a handful of papers carry on their rolls writers aware of strategic issues like nuclear policy and defence preparedness, and that by and large even the national news agencies are deficient in this respect. 66. The unfortunate aspect of the distance between the media and the defence establishment is that in five decades we have failed to develop a defence and security culture. The media has been, rained, not with its consent but out of necessity to survive on, handouts from the Ministry. It is interesting and not without significance that the high visibility of our former Defence Minister George Fernandes cannot be sources to his portfolio but to his political role. 67. The military cannot hold the media at fault, since they had done precious little to educate journalists during peace time on the requirements of war reportage. In reality, the media may well not exist for the defence establishment in peace time and vice versa. 68. If Kargil teaches anything to the armed forces, it must be that the media in future wars must be allowed greater access to the area of operations and there must be a greater degree of mutual trust and confidence between the commanders and the media. This is easier said than done but it is not such a formidable objective to reach. A beginning has to be made in educating the media on the tricks of the trade of war reporting, and beginning has to be made in educating the commanders on the tricks ofsharing information and confidence with the media. This will eventually help in relieving to some extent, though not fully, the media’s dependence on official spokesmen and encourage in due course a degree of perspective coverage of the war keeping in mind both the national interest and the need to preserve the morale of the fighting forces.[37]
CHAPTER V
THE WAY AHEAD- OPPORTUNITIES & CHALLENGES
” One difficulty is that the media have little or no memory. War correspondents have short working lives and there is no tradition or means for passing on their knowledge and experience. The military, on the other hand, is an institution and goes on forever. The military learned a lot from Vietnam and these days plans its media strategy with as much attention as its military strategy.”– Phillip Knightley, Fighting dirty, The Guardian, March 20, 2000
Principles of Combat Coverage
69. Suggested Principles. A set of recommended principles for open and independent reporting of Indian military operations by the media are:-Media Pool. Limited number of news media who represent a larger number of news media organisations for news gathering and sharing of material during a specified activity may be considered after a careful study of the system that worked well during the first Gulf War.(b)Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be applicable for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.(c) Journalists in a combat zone shall be credentialed by the military and shall be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect Indian Armed Forces and their operations.(d) Journalists shall be provided access to all major military units. However, special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.(e) PROs should act as liaisons, but should not interfere with the reporting process.(f) Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft when possible.(g)Consistent with its capabilities, the military shall supply PROs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and shall make those facilities available, when possible, for filing independent coverage. If government facilities are unavailable, journalists, as always, shall file by any other means available. The military shall not ban communication systems operated by news organisations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.(h)Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification.(j)A free flow of general and military information should be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.(k)Information should not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment.(l)Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.(n)The Public Relations Office (PRO) should perform the following functions[38]:-(i)Advise if the proposed interview/interaction is authorised or appropriate.(ii)Research potential interview issues, including questions likely to be asked.(iii) Assist in helping commanders prepare for the interview/interaction, including review of possible questions and answers and conducting one- on- one rehearsal.(iv)Make all arrangements for the interview, including ground rules, time and location.(v)Monitor the interview / interaction, if necessary, to provide an in-house record of the interview, as well as follow up on items to be provided later.(vi)Act as a liaison with the news organisations and provide follow-up video copies, news clippings, etc, of the resulting story.(vii)Provide after-action review and feedback.(viii)Escort the reporter and monitor the interaction.
Media Policy
70. Suggested Policy Changes. Certain recommendations on policy changes required for open and independent reporting of Indian military operations by the media are as under:-(a)Statement of Policy. The media policy must address the core issue of defining the degree and kind of restraints to be placed on the media during peace, low intensity conflict and war in order to ensure positive media coverage without loss of credibility, while not endangering operational security and troop safety. It must lay down the media objectives, priorities, methods, means and constraints for the three situations.(b)Evolution of Policy. It is important that the media itself be taken into confidence while evolving such a policy. Considerable and as far as possible open debate with eminent media persons, PR experts from the industry, institutions such as the Press Council of India and academic bodies involved in teaching mass communications must precede declaration of the media policy.(c)Feedback System. The Army must institute a regular feedback system to gauge the effect of media coverage of defence related issues on different categories of audience ie. Citizens from different regions and strata, troops and families of troops. Military Intelligence Directorate must institute measures to get direct feedback from troops and their families. This information must form the basis for formulation of media objectives and selection of propaganda themes and media.(d)Transparency. Transparency must form a corner stone of the media policy as it will lead to greater public understanding and awareness which in turn will lead to greater appreciation and public confidence on the armed forces. This openness must be reflected in positive encouragement to the media to cover operations and exercises without endangering operational security and troop safety. The military must educate the media about what readiness requires forces to do and why. Until the media understands why the military requires certain standards and behaviour, they will continue to write stories that misinterpret, misconstrue, or miss the point entirely.(e)Accrediting of Defence Correspondents. Requisite qualifications for defense correspondents, such as a degree in defence studies and the War Correspondents course must be made mandatory for a journalist to be accredited as a defense correspondent. The accrediting must be reviewed periodically at which time other criteria such as attendance of a refresher/ specialisation course must be insisted upon. Efforts must be made to grant accreditation to adequate number of representatives of regional media, especially in areas affected by or having the potential for low intensity conflicts.(f)Guidelines to Media. Self restraint by media is any day preferable to pre-censorship and will only enhance media credibility. A list of sensitive issues on which the media must exercise restraint and different sets of security guidelines for covering defense matters during peace, exercises, low intensity conflict and war must be evolved in consultation with the media and notified to the media and their organisations such as the Press Council of India.(g)Joint Security Review. A system of joint security review must be worked out in consultation with the Press Council of India and eminent media persons to replace the system of pre-censorship during peace and conflict. This will go a long way towards enhancing the credibility of the armed forces.(h)Budget and Resources. The PR budget of a defence establishment of this size must cater for not only for enough resources and equipment but also for training adequate number of war and embedded journalists.(j)Rapport with Media. A conscious effort needs to be made to build up a rapport with media at all levels and more so at the level of senior commanders and staff officers. Interaction by way of organising seminars and guest lectures, mutual visits, inviting articles of eminent media persons in professional armed forces journals and writing papers for professional media journals must be encouraged at all levels as a matter of policy.(k)Official Secrets Act. Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act 1923 must be revised to incorporate the damage potential of a piece of information as the overriding factor in determining whether or not its disclosure and receiver are guilty. Such a recommendation has already been made by the Press Council of India in 1982 and 1990. Such a step will be a big stride towards recognition of the ‘ right to know’ in a democracy.(l)Embedded Media. This concept proved its mettle during the ‘ Op Iraqi Freedom’ where approx 500 journalists, photographers and news crew were embedded within the US and British military units. It does require professional handling by the representatives of armed forces in selecting, training and operating along with the media representatives in the war front[39].
Public Relations Organisation
71. Suggested Changes in Organisation[40]. Organisational changes could be implemented with immediate effect till the following changes in the organisation to enhance the effectiveness of the media projection of the armed forces are put into place.-(a)PR Corps. Recognising that today media is a battle winning factor, media handling should be treated as a combat support activity which is a function of command and staff at all levels. Therefore, there is a need to reorganise the DPR into a uniformed Joint Services Organisation called the Corps of PR and placed under the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC). PR units should be raised at the scale of one per command of each service. The subunits could be allotted to the corps and area headquarters on as required basis. The PR units should be fully equipped and empowered to produce multimedia publicity material and communicate these to various media organisations in addition to assisting the media representatives in covering operations and the PR staff officers should be placed at all headquarters down to divisions.(b)Command, Control and Coordination. The Corps of PR should be headed by a Director General under the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The PR staff at each headquarter should form a part of the General Staff branch and function in close coordination with intelligence and operations staff. The argument that DPR serves all departments of the MoD in addition to the services and therefore cannot form part of the services does not hold well because there are other such organisations under the services headquarters. This step is bound to produce a quantum jump in the media coverage of the services.(c)Rank and Status of PROs. The rank and status of PROs will automatically get upgraded with the reorganisation of DPR into Corps of PR. The senior most PRO at each headquarter will get direct access to the commander and senior staff officers in his capacity as their media adviser and will also participate in policy formulation and operational planning just like other advisers from the supporting arms, who form part of the commander’s ‘ Order Group’. Besides, enhancing the status of PROs, this measure will also enhance their effectiveness in briefing the media as they will be fully in picture.(d)Quality of PROs. Suitable qualitative requirements for the selection and protecting their career interests of the PRO should be laid down. Officers with a certain amount of service should be made to go through a practical and oral test to check if the officer has a flair for PR, creative writing and other such skills.(e)Staff Duties. A paragraph on media must be made part of the ‘ Operational Instruction’ and ‘ Operational Orders’ for all operations. This paragraph must include essential aspects such as number of media persons that can be accommodated, restrictions on their movement, emphasis in coverage, responsibility for the conduct of media parties etc.
Training
72. Suggested Training for the Armed Forces Personnel. Training personnel at each level would certainly enhance the overall outcome and help in achieving the desired end state. Some guidelines for training are recommended below:-(a)Training of PROs. Upon selection for the Corps of PR, all officers must be put through an orientation course in media management for duration of three to six months. The syllabus and course material must be evolved in consultation with leading management institutes, Indian Institute of Mass Communications and media organisations including the Press Council of India. The faculty must also be drawn from these organisations. This course should be followed by an attachment with different types of media organisations, such as newspapers, periodicals, wire services, radio and television for a period of up to six months. All officers must be encouraged to obtain degrees in mass communications, public relations and journalism. Selected officers can be sent to leading institutes. These officers must continue to attend all arms courses as applicable for others. PR units must be exercised in all formation level exercises and war games.(b)Training of Other Officers. Media and its handling must form part of the curriculum at all stages of an officers career starting from pre-commission training in the academies to post-commission training in all arms courses right up to senior levels. Commands and Corps must also hold cadres and seminars on this subject for the benefit of other officers. Innovative methods of media training must be incorporated in all exercises and war games for commanders and staff officers.(c)Training of Troops. Dealing with media must form a part of various promotion cadres for Non Commissioned and Junior Commissioned Officers. In addition troops must be briefed regularly and practiced in handling media persons during exercises. The Army must expand these programs by including media awareness training during advanced individual training, basic and advanced non-commissioned officer courses and officer courses.(d)General Staff Pamphlets. All aspects of media handling by the army including the role and effect of media in various operations must be published as a General Staff publication.(e)Training of Media Persons. Efforts must be made in consultation with the Press Council of India, various media organisations, University Grants Commission and leading universities conducting courses in journalism to incorporate defence awareness programmes and specific aspects of defence journalism in their curriculum. Scope of the War Correspondents and Embedded Journalism course must be enhanced and it should be made a compulsory prerequisite for accreditation as a defence correspondent. An advanced/ refresher course should be designed for interested senior defence correspondents. Training should also be impacted by incorporating media in various formation level exercises and war games.
Media
73. Suggested Changes by the Media. Certain changes which can be brought by the parliament’s amendment to the constitution of India are:-(a)Media Advisory Committee. The Union Government must appoint a multidisciplinary committee comprising leading personalities in different media, academicians in the fields of sociology, psychology and political science, senior retired service officers, bureaucrats and police officers to advise it on effective media and information policies. Such a committee will prove to be of immense value in fighting the low intensity conflict on a psychological plane effectively.(b)Press Council of India. This must be enlarged to include eminent persons with experience in the fields of defence and national security, preferably retired senior service officers. Its powers must be enhanced to enable it to evolve and enforce a code of conduct. Training of journalists needs to form part of its responsibility.(c)Broadcasting Council of India. This needs to be set up on similar lines as the Press Council and have television and radio in its scope. Video magazines and internet must also be included in its ambit.
Dealings with Media
74. Suggested Methods of Engaging Media Other than in Battle Conflict. Dealing with media is a professional job and must be handled by trained manpower. Certain principles must to be borne in mind by armed forces while dealing with media are:-(a)Positive attitude and no anti-press bias.(b)Never lie or dodge questions.(c)Mind your own business ie stick to what you know and to subjects appropriate to your rank and appointment.(d)Set firm ground rules and enforce them.(e)Do not speak off the record except to explain a point.(f)Avoid jargon. Remember it is the communicator’s responsibility to make listeners understand.(g)Anticipate reaction of the media.(h)React fast and effectively.(j)Never overlook mistakes of the media and follow them up.(k)Learn to differentiate journalists from different media and their different needs.(l)Some do and don’ts for an interview are:-(i)Treat the media as you would want others to treat you. If you are distant and hostile with the media, you’ll get what you give.(ii)Make short, simple and specific statements. If your quotes don’t stand on their own, then you failed – not the reporter.(iii)Respond to a question then stop. Don’t feel you have to keep talking. Make the interviewer keep the interview going.(iv)Discuss only matters of which you have direct knowledge.(v)Avoid hypothetical situations. Remember, there is no such thing as a personal opinion.(vi)You aren’t obligated to tell everything you know.(vii)If you can’t answer the question, give a reason why. There’s nothing wrong with ” I don’t know” or ” I can’t answer that for security reasons.” Be sure to follow-up with a pre-planned message or promise to get the information immediately following the interview.(viii)Take a second or two to think about your answers. Not only do rapid responses appear rehearsed, but also may not represent your best answer.(ix)Avoid ” No Comments”. To many reporters and the public, it may falsely suggest you are hiding information, lack concern or don’t wish to cooperate.(x)Use personal examples in your responses so those who read, view or listen to the story can relate to you and those your represent as ” real people.” Further, a reporter can’t argue with personal experience.(xi)Talk from the perspective of the Indian public’s interest, not from the viewpoint of the military’s interest. Tell the audience how the nation benefits, not what the military stands to gain.(xii)It is a good idea to encapsulate the question into your response for a taped interview. When the interview is aired or printed, the question may not be identified, and you need to make sure the subject is established.(xiii)When given a multiple-part question, answer the one segment that allows you to make a positive point. Ignore the others. If the interviewer wants to return to unanswered questions, he or she will.(xiv)Avoid repeating or using ” color words” that may have a negative connotation. Words such as ” massacre,” ” scandal,” ” deaths,” ” corruption,” etc., induce overly strong, emotional reactions and may be counter- productive to your objectives.(xv)If the interviewer is hostile, don’t mirror his or her attitude.(xvi)Don’t Lose Temper. Control the interview: the audience will only see your angry answer, not the question that instigated it.(xvii)Don’t answer with just a simple ” yes” or ” no.” Don’t be curt.(xviii)Don’t Pretend to be Perfect. Admitting mistakes from time to time demonstrates candor and the integrity of our organisation.(xix)Don’t begin with gratuitous phrases, such as, ” I’m glad you asked that question,” or ” That’s a good question.” It wastes time, doesn’t convey anything, and implies that all the other questions were stupid.(xx)Inform your interviewer that you are available for additional information or clarification if needed. 75. Suggested Methods of Engaging Media on the Battlefield. While media should be encouraged to report on operations by being present at the scene of action, certain ground rules which must be remembered by the units and escorting officers in such situations are:-(a)No access to classified information for media persons.(b)Always escort media persons in sensitive areas such as air fields, defensive positions, assembly areas etc.(c)Do not release tactical information.(d)Media persons must adhere to unit standards of camouflage and concealment.(e)Media persons should not stray away from their escorts when organised in pools.(f)Study ‘ news copies’ for violation of security guidelines and if differences with the media person persist then report up the chain of command.(g)Operational considerations must dictate granting of permission to media persons to accompany any specific combat mission.(h)Personal safety of media persons is neither a responsibility nor the primary concern of the army. However, as far as possible assistance must be provided to safeguard the life of a war reporter.(j)Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.(k)Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
76. The military and the media have had a long history of conflict and cooperation in wartime and in peace. The conflict in the relationship derives from the fact that the military and the press often have objectives that run counter to one another. The military wants to achieve surprise and maintain security to deny the enemy useful information. The military would also prefer to restrict the transmission of images of the horrors of war on television every night. The media, on the other hand, want to provide information to the people and retain them as viewers, listeners, or reader. The future media will have access to new technologies, highly mobile satellite uplinks and new networks such as the internet that will allow easy broadcast from the battlefield and will allow unprecedented communication from virtually any spot on earth. The ‘ global newsroom’ is indeed becoming a reality.[41]77. The military and the media have improved their relationship since the days of the Kargil War, India’s first television war. Satellite technology and the proliferation of 24/7 news networks have created and increased the so called CNN effect on strategic-level decision making and on how war-fighters direct their commands. The military needs to understand, anticipate, and plan for this new dynamics. As professor Loren Thompson of Georgetown University succinctly put it, ” Even if the dilemmas of war coverage are fully appreciated on both sides and journalists and soldiers develop a sympathetic viewof each other’s need and responsibilities, friction will persist. Tensions between major public institutions are inherited in the functioning of democracy, and it is not surprising that such tension is most pronounced in a setting where lives are lost and national interests are at a stake”.[42]78. The ever increasing reach of the media in various forms, is a modern day reality. Another reality is that media is the window through which the mass population sees the world. Whether one likes it or not, these bestow the powers of opinion formulation onto the media. With these come certain responsibilities for the media such as objectivity in reporting, impartiality etc. As far as the military is concerned, it has to realize the potential of this force and work in conjunction with it rather than be at loggerheads with it. While the roles of the military and media may be diverse at the face value, they do cross each other during the discharge of their duties during conflict situations. It is at these intersections that we need to cement our relationship and work towards a common goal.[43]
